The economic costs of biological predation

This paper developes a bioeconomic model to analyse the economic losses from the reduced harvesting of prey species resulting from an increase in the stock of a natural predator. Examples of large mammals creating economic damage are whales and African elephants. The economic losses depend critically on the actual management of the prey stock, although the three measures we develop are equal when the stock is managed so as to maximize the sustained economic rent from the prey species. Predation losses are illustrated by the case of the Northeastern Atlantic Minke whale, where the estimate of the average predation cost per whale in 1991–1992 is between $US 1780 and $US 2370, using Norwegian cost and earnings data. A ten percent stock increase is estimated to cause a loss of almost $US 19 million to the fishers of the prey species. If half of this cost were assigned to Norway it would be equivalent to 2.8 and 6.7 percent of the gross profits of the Norwegian cod and herring fisheries, respectively.     

Predation and accumulation

This article incorporates the economic theory of predation into the theory of economic growth. The analytical framework is a general-equilibrium model of the interaction between two dynasties: a potential predator and its prey. We find that the rate of accumulation of capital and the security of property are positively related only for generations of the prey dynasty that tolerate predation. Generations of the prey dynasty that choose to deter predation, even though their property is perfectly secure, accumulate productive capital more slowly than the preceding generations that tolerated predation.     

产品市场竞争、流动性与公司投资

本文基于产品市场竞争的视角,探讨了公司流动性对投资的影响。使用中国A股上市公司1999~2012年的面板数据,通过联立方程组和三阶段最小二乘法进行实证检验,本文研究发现,当公司相对于行业竞争对手持有更多的流动性时,公司下一期的投资相对于行业竞争对手增加得也更多,同时相比于低掠夺风险行业,流动性对投资的正向作用在高掠夺风险行业中表现得更为明显。本文的研究表明,公司流动性具有战略价值。持有一定流动性的储备有助于公司在产品市场竞争中更好地抓住投资机会,从而获得竞争优势。     

现金持有量决策具有战略效应吗?——基于现金持有量的平均效应与区间效应的研究

文章根据掠夺理论来考察现金持有量是否具有增加产品市场业绩的战略效应。研究结果表明,就平均效应而言,现金持有量能够增加企业的产品市场业绩;就区间效应而言,现金持有量的战略效应呈现出随着现金持有水平的提高而逐渐增加的趋势。进一步地检验结果表明大量持有现金引起的投资是造成现金持有量的区间效应呈增加趋势的主要原因,且最终也增加了企业价值。文章还发现行业的竞争强度以及整体财务状态也会影响现金持有量的战略效应。     

Heteroscedasticity of deviations in market bubble moments – how the goods and bads lead to the ugly

We conjecture that market bubbles may be the results of the interplay of Goods and Bads (toxic products) which develop through three interlocking moments – herding, swarming and stampeding, with deviations marked by heteroscedasticity. We use our stylized model of financial predation, the Consolidated Model of Financial Predation, and data we have accumulated through in-the-field eight-year research and the study of 30 years of U.S. market history in order to explore the foundations of market crises. We find that blind trust (or the positivity bias) and of the fear to miss out on an opportunity to enter/exit a market impacts the investors’ decisions to invest or retract. We show how markets are driven towards a make-or-break predatory dynamic that creates winners and losers due in part to weak regulations and identify a constant k that permeates market behaviours.     

The effect of predation risk on cash holdings: Empirical evidence from the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry

Corporate cash holdings play a significant role in the U.S. property‐liability insurance industry yet the topic of insurer cash holdings policy has largely been overlooked by prior empirical research. While a number of studies have investigated firm‐specific factors related to cash holdings in the insurance industry, prior research has not examined how market concentration and potential predation risk impact cash holdings. We propose a new measure of market concentration and provide evidence in support of the predation risk theory. Specifically, we show that insurers exposed to more concentrated markets tend to hold more cash. Furthermore, the relation between market concentration and cash holdings is influenced by access to internal capital. While unaffiliated insurers without access to internal capital hold greater levels of cash in more concentrated markets, group insurers with access to internal capital do not hold greater levels of cash to mitigate predation risk.     

Psychological Points of Equilibrium in Asset Valuation During Market Bubbles

This paper presents the concept of psychological point of equilibrium (PPE), which is a mental state achieved by average investors when trying to make decisions during market bubble's inflationary stages. The PPE results from an interplay between agents acting in a volatile market that is characterized by predatory behaviors. Prior to the 2008 subprime crisis, average investors are assumed to have displaced their logical PPEs in large part as a consequence of their attraction towards predatory mortgages and teaser rates. A better understanding of average investor's vulnerabilities may help governments to implement more efficient measures aimed at curving predatory behaviors.     

Incumbent strategic behavior in financial markets and the exit of entrepreneurial start‐ups

This paper empirically investigates the forces that shape the post‐entry exit probability of entrepreneurial start‐ups, with an emphasis on the impact of incumbents' strategic behavior in financial markets. We find that entrepreneurial start‐ups in highly competitive industries are more likely to exit and that leverage compounds this exit risk. However, the latter result only holds when potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets are large at start‐up. Under these circumstances, competitors can negatively influence creditors' perceptions on entrepreneurial quality or behavior through aggressive strategic actions to impede future financing and induce the start‐up's exit. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predation in off-patent drug markets

In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This article fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo-generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers' catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this article is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is then a predatory strategy.