我国高技术服务业研发机构科技创新效率评价

构建了高技术服务业研发机构科技创新效率评价指标体系。利用2010—2011年我国高技术服务业7个细分行业研发机构的科技创新活动数据,运用数据包络分析法,测度了2010—2011年我国高技术服务业7个细分行业研发机构的科技创新效率,比较了各细分行业研发机构的科技创新效率差异,并分析其原因。进而利用理想点模型,对2010—2011年我国高技术服务业研发机构的科技创新效率进行了排名。研究结果显示:我国高技术服务业研发机构的科技创新效率总体良好,但行业差异较大。最后,提出促进我国高技术服务业发展的对策建议。     

Dynamic Moral Hazard and Executive Stock Options

This paper shows that the optimal executive compensation scheme in a dynamic moral hazard environment is convex in the firm value. This implies that the optimal contract should include stock options. This is because the private benefit of shirking is increasing in firm value and the manager's utility is concave. Therefore, in contrast to the previous literature that takes stock options in the incentive contract exogenously, we rationalize the optimality of their use endogenously. Moreover, we show that the optimal amount of stock options (restricted stocks) increases with agency cost and the executive's reservation utility, decreases with the degree of risk aversion of the manager, and increases (decreases) with the firm size.     

UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING*

This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend to finitely repeated games. A (correlated) equilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose a correlated action profile from the actions played in the equilibrium. The uniqueness result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are equilibrium minimaxing and have the same payoffs. The uniqueness result does not hold under weaker conditions.     

SHORT‐RUN POLICY COMMITMENT WHEN INVESTMENT TIMING IS ENDOGENOUS: ‘MORE HARM THAN GOOD?’

In our model, firms choose when to set cost‐reducing investment and the government, which only has short‐run commitment power, sets an output subsidy. We show that firms that delay investment without government intervention have an incentive to invest early under policy activism, strategically underinvesting or overinvesting to obtain larger subsidies. The policy scheme thus creates a new, potentially more harmful, distortion. Under oligopoly, a firm has a weaker incentive to manipulate policy than under monopoly, which makes policy intervention less harmful. We investigate when the government may do better by adhering to laissez‐faire than by engaging in active policy intervention.     

The cost of firms’ debt financing and the global financial crisis

We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premium paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5500 issues over the period 2005–2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005–2007 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010–2012 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms received a discount of 40 basis points.     

论著作权法对“创作者特权”的确认与限制——以“鬼吹灯”案中的作者续写权利主张为切入点

“创作自由”与“创作者的自由”是一对容易混淆的概念,《著作权法》对于这两类自由采取了不同的确认方式,不宜仅基于“创作自由”的话语扩张“创作者特权”,乃至将其主张为著作权法上的专有权利。“鬼吹灯”同人作品案中被控侵权人主张的“系列故事续写权”实为一种积极权利,不同于一审判决和既有研究中确认的消极权利,因而违背了《著作权法》第1条和第10条中对于“创作者特权”及其专有权利化主张的限制。该类主张的背景是两大法系中作品观融合导致了对于作者权益的挤压,作者权理念在法律实践中出现了反弹。从现代社会中创新的复合属性、版权利益分配格局的自发形成、我国社会中通行的权利观念等角度出发,应当坚守《著作权法》对于创作者自由的既有确认与限制机制。民法典对于一般人格权的保护则能够提供外部的制度协同。     

Delays and equilibria with large and small information in social learning

The general model of social learning with irreversible investment and endogenous timing is analyzed for any distribution of private informations. Strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria appear which are generated solely by information externalities. Different equilibria generate strikingly different amounts of information. The impacts of various assumptions (bounded beliefs, large number of agents, discrete time and short periods) are examined carefully. The properties are robust to the introduction of observation noise with a continuum of agents.     

The welfare costs of unreliable water service

Throughout the developing world, many water distribution systems are unreliable. As a result, it becomes necessary for each household to store its own water as a hedge against this uncertainty. Since arrivals of water are not synchronized across households, serious distributional inefficiencies arise. We develop a model describing the optimal intertemporal depletion of each household's private water storage if it is uncertain when water will next arrive to replenish supplies. The model is calibrated using survey data from Mexico City, a city where many households store water in sealed rooftop tanks known as tinacos. The calibrated model is used to evaluate the potential welfare gains that would occur if alternative modes of water provision were implemented. We estimate that most of the potential distributional inefficiencies can be eliminated simply by making the frequency of deliveries the same across households which now face haphazard deliveries. This would require neither costly investments in infrastructure nor price increases.     

Implementation of college admission rules

Summary We consider both Nash and strong Nash implementation of various matching rules for college admissions problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these rules the lower bound stable rule is implementable in both senses. The upper bound Pareto and individually rational rule is strong Nash implementable yet it is not Nash implementable. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational, and the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his efforts in supervision as well as his useful suggestions. We are grateful to the participants in his reading class, workshops at Bilkent University, University of Rochester, and in particular Jeffrey Banks, Stephen Ching, Bhaskar Dutta, Rangarajan Sundaram and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.     

Stochastic growth: a duality approach

We re-examine the representative agent's optimal consumption and savings under uncertainty in the presence of investment constraints using martingale representation and convex analysis techniques. This framework allows us to explicitly quantify precautionary savings which induces a higher average growth rate than in a certainty setup. We provide a closed form solution for a Cobb-Douglas economy. The effect of uncertainty on portfolio selection is analyzed. Consumption growth rate and risk free interest rate exhibit a U-shaped relationship. Uncertainty negatively affects expected consumption growth rate; such a result seems to be supported by empirical evidence.