论基金管理人的股东化转型

在传统的基金治理结构中,基金管理人大多采用经理型模式,基金管理人的道德风险的发生难以避免。对基民与基金管理人的委托—代理合同进行优化,重激励、轻约束,不能从根本上消除基金管理人的道德风险。要消除基金管理人的道德风险,必须实现基金管理人从经理型向股东型的彻底转变,将基民与基金管理人的关系由传统的基金运行模式中的股东与经理的关系改造为优先股东与普通股东的关系。基金管理人的股东化转型,相对于经理型基金管理人而言,至少有两大功能:对基金管理人的机会主义行为的矫治功能;对基金管理人能力的甄别功能。     

An agent-based nurse rostering system under minimal staffing conditions

Nurse rostering is a complex problem. We propose a new heuristic using a competitive agent-based negotiation that focuses on nurse preferences called competitive nurse rostering (CNR). Unlike the existing literature, CNR models each nurse's preference functions separately and separates the cost minimization and preference maximization problems. CNR produces quality nurse rosters even though it cannot leverage extra staffing. As an agent system, CNR can distribute computational requirements over several computer systems, include other solution methods at various points in of the rostering problem, and act as a real-time scheduling system. These benefits are not naturally inherent in centralized heuristic solutions.     

演化博弈在水资源多Agent系统发展分析中的应用

在水资源系统中,节点成员之间的协调与合作,对水资源系统的有效运行是至关重要的。良好的协调与合作关系,可以使节点成员在输水提前期、供水保证率、供水成本等方面得到改善和提高。笔者运用演化博弈理论的方法,建立水资源多Agent系统的演化博弈的数理模型,分析水资源多Agent系统节点成员之间的竞争合作机制演变的动态过程。结果表明,系统的演化方向与博弈双方的支持矩阵相关,增加博弈双方群体采取完全合作策略的相对支付以及降低从竞争到合作的门槛。会增加系统完全合作策略的方向演化的概率。     

基于Agent的军队后勤物资保障仿真系统研究

论文提出了一种基于多Agent的物资保障仿真系统模型。首先简单介绍了基于Agent的建模方法,然后对军队后勤物资保障系统进行了分析和个体Agent抽象,着重对个体Agent中的物资仓库Agent、后勤指挥Agent进行了详细分析和建模,通过对Agent间结构和协调关系的分析,最终得出了系统的多Agent体系结构模型。最后对模型的实际应用前景作了展望。     

基于AGENT的装备供应链仿真模型设计与实现

通过计算机对装备供应链系统进行仿真,可以获得许多宝贵的数据,减少相应的风险,增强决策的科学性,提高战时装备供应保障的科学化、现代化水平。文章构建了基于Agent的装备供应链仿真模型,利用Swarm仿真平台描述了Agent仿真模型,并运用Java语言,实现了Swarm平台下的Agent的交互。     

基于Agent的社会科学仿真研究综述

社会系统因为其自身的复杂性使得传统的社会科学研究方法具有很大的局限性,而随着基于Agent的计算机仿真技术的渐渐兴起及其在社会科学领域的成功应用使得社会科学研究取得了一些突破性进展。该文对基于Agent的社会科学仿真的研究成果进行了总结梳理,并阐明对未来的研究思路及方向的启示。     

EMERGENT COMPLEXITY IN AGENT‐BASED COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS

Abstract In this paper, we shall review two kinds of emergent complexity in agent‐based computational economics (ACE). The first kind is based on the complex systems initiated in the 1980s or even earlier by mathematicians and physicists, whereas the second kind is based on the idea of complex adaptive systems composed of autonomous agents, for which many representative works have been collected in Rosser. For the latter, we shall go further to examine the two elements which have just recently been incorporated in agent‐based economic modelling, namely, intelligence and modularity. This augmentation leads to the development of neurocognitive software agents, which can guide the generation and direction of future ACE studies with a multistage ‘brain/behaviour‐to‐emergency‐to‐brain/behaviour’ approach.     

论监理单位的“独立性”及“代理人”角色

监理单位对业主的独立性问题在我国目前监理理论、实践中有很多的争议。监理单位的独立性有两种含义：责任意义上的独立性和组织意义上的独立性。应该否定其责任意义上的独立性而强调其组织意义上的独立性。监理单位的“代理人”问题则是与“独立性”问题紧密相关的，应该重视其经济学意义上的代理角色。     

Network structure,games, and agent dynamics

Consider a group of agents embedded in a network, repeatedly playing a game with their neighbors. Each agent acts locally but through the links of the network local decisions percolate to the entire population. Past research shows that such a system converges either to an absorbing state (a fixed distribution of actions that once attained does not change) or to an absorbing set (a set of action distributions that may cycle in finite populations or behave chaotically in unbounded populations). In many network games, however, it is uncertain which situation emerges. In this paper I identify two fundamental network characteristics, boundary consistency and neighborhood overlap, that determine the outcome of all symmetric, binary-choice, network games. In quasi-consistent networks these games converge to an absorbing state regardless of the initial distribution of actions, and the degree to which neighborhoods overlap impacts the number and composition of those absorbing states.     

Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies

We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II.