城市公共设施供给中的融资创新——一种基于政府付费或补贴的资产证券化方式

城市政府当期财政难以满足未来城市建设中的公共设施需求,城市发展需要公共融资创新."私人生产、政府付费或补贴、公众消费"模式是城市公共设施融资中一种吸引私人投资的较好模式.在该模式基础上,提出了一种基于政府付费或补贴的资产证券化创新方式,阐述了该方式的运用范围、基本结构和运作流程,并分析了该方式在城市建设中运用的基本条件.     

"啤酒花"为何这样香

本文重点介绍了我院啤酒酿造专业在全国率先实行“双元制”教学的基本做法,总结了十八年来“双元制”教学的基本特色以及培养啤酒行业技能型人才的成功经验。     

Timing of earnings restatements: CEO equity compensation and market reaction

This study investigates the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation on their choices regarding the timing of earnings restatements. The results indicate a negative relationship between options exercised and lags in disclosing the restated earnings, suggesting that managers who exercise options in a given year tend to release information quickly. This effect is more pronounced if the options are exercised after the dark period. We also find that the market penalises longer lags in the restatement disclosure. It seems that the CEO would try to optimise the timing of information release so as to balance the costs and benefits.     

Steward Effects of Target Founder-CEO in Takeovers

Built upon the agency theory and the stewardship theory, this study examines the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities among Chinese publicly listed firms. Using a founder-CEO indicator, we separate steward effects from agency effects, and find that Chinese firms’ M&A activities are significantly influenced by the steward factors after controlling for the agency factors. Firms, of which CEO is a founder, enjoy relatively higher premium during M&A. Further investigation reveals that the steward effects vary in the power of CEO. The results show that steward effect is reinforced when founder-CEO is more powerful.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does contingent pay encourage positive employee attitudes and intensify work?

This article explores the relationships between three dimensions of contingent pay – performance‐related pay, profit‐related pay and employee share‐ownership – and positive employee attitudes (job satisfaction, employee commitment and trust in management). The article also examines a conflicting argument that contingent pay may intensify work, and this can detract from its positive impact on employee attitudes. Of the three contingent pay dimensions, only performance‐related pay had direct positive relationships with all three employee attitudes. Profit‐related pay and employee share‐ownership had a mix of negative and no significant direct relationships with employee attitudes, but profit‐related pay showed U‐shaped curvilinear relationships with all three employee attitudes. The results also indicated that performance‐related pay is associated with work intensification, and this offsets some of its positive impact on employee attitudes.     

Do unfair perceived own pay and top managers’ pay erode satisfaction with democracy?

Many people are relatively unsatisfied with the democratic system as it currently exists. In this empirical research note, the authors present evidence that German workers, who perceive their own pay or top managers’ pay as unfair, are on average significantly less happy with the democracy in Germany. Thus, fairness perceptions in the labour market and of income inequality seem to have spillover effects on the overall satisfaction with the democratic system.     

Life Expectancy Heterogeneity and the Political Support for Collective Annuities

Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker's past earnings) as opposed to the non‐contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.     

CEO继任模式与战略变革研究评述

CEO作为公司战略决策制定和执行的核心人物,其继任模式对战略变革的影响一直是学术界关注的热点课题。本文回顾CEO继任研究发展及CEO继任模式与战略变革关系的研究。     

Increasing pay transparency: A guide for change

The gender pay gap is an important issue today in the U.S. The lack of transparency surrounding pay in businesses is viewed as one cause of this gap. The first section of this article explores the origins of the gender pay gap and presents a brief history of pay transparency. Then, I propose a framework built from three continua that breaks the concept of pay transparency into types and levels. Using this framework, I offer guidance to organizations that want to increase pay transparency. The article concludes with a discussion of the risks associated with increased pay transparency and suggestions for future research.