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141.
Gadi Fibich 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(2):309-321
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. 相似文献
142.
Summary A decision maker faces a known prior distribution over payoff relevant states. We compare the expected utility of this individual under two scenarios. In the first, the decision maker makes a choice without further information. In the second, the decision maker has access to an experiment before choosing an action. However, the decision maker does not know the true joint distribution over states and messages. The value of the experiment as measured by the difference in the two utility levels can be negative as well as positive. We give a condition which is necessary and sufficient for the experiment to be valuable in our sense, for any decision problem.An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title Noisy Bayes Updating and the Value of Information. We have gained from the comments of Stephen Coate, John Geanakoplos, Larry Samuelson, Timothy Van Zandt and seminar participants at Harvard Business School, Princeton, Boston University, the international conference on game theory at Stony Brook 1992 and the Winter meeting of the Econometric Society at Anaheim 1993. The first author received support for this project from NSF grant #SES-9308515 and a University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation Grant. 相似文献
143.
Robert D. Rowe Carolyn M. Lang Lauraine G. Chestnut 《Resource and Energy Economics》1996,18(4):363-394
The New York State Environmental Externalities Cost Study and computerized externality model (EXMOD) are used to examine the specification of methods design and application factors in the computation of electricity externalities. We report the sensitivity of externality estimates with alternative specifications for 15 different factors in the analysis, including the selection of facility type, site, and operating characteristics; air emission assumptions and air modeling procedures; dose-response assumptions; economic valuation assumptions; and other modeling procedures and assumptions. Many of the factors that most influence externality computations can be well specified in the analysis, such as the facility type, age, characteristics, emission rates, whether there is SO2 trading, and the inclusion of long range impacts. Most significant among the factors for which there remains significant scientific uncertainty are the selection and application of air dispersion models, selection of air pollution thresholds for health impacts, reduced life span risks associated with ozone exposure and with long-term exposure to PM10, values for CO2 damages, and the value to be applied to increased risks of reduced life span for individuals age 65 or older. 相似文献
144.
Engelbert J. Dockner Gustav Feichtinger Alexander Mehlmann 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1993,3(2):145-152
We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough. 相似文献
145.
Stochastic stability in networks with decay 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Francesco Feri 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):442-457
This paper considers a stylized model of network formation in which relations among agents are subject to frictions, as described in Bala and Goyal [A non cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68 (2000) 1181-1231]. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self-interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, make mistakes. Then, using stochastic stability, we identify the network structures to which the formation process will converge. 相似文献
146.
Public goods in networks 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yann Bramoullé 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):478-494
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. 相似文献
147.
Sanjeev Goyal 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):460-492
We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) creates a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally, while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus. Thus, individuals form links with others to create surplus, to gain intermediation rents, and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary.Our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation. First, we show that, in the absence of capacity constraints on links, it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs. Second, we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links. In this case, distances between players must be long, which induces players who are “far off” to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents. A cycle network then emerges, payoffs being equal across all players. 相似文献
148.
In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might explain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF's desire to preserve its reputation as a good monitor may distort its lending decisions towards some laxity. Moreover, such distortionary incentives may be exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the Fund. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, for the period 1982–2001, we find that a longer relationship does increase IMF disbursements. 相似文献
149.
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition. 相似文献
150.
Toshihiko Mukoyama 《Journal of Economic Growth》2004,9(4):451-479
This article presents a model of innovation and diffusion of machines which embody a new technology. Users of the machines are heterogenous in their skill level. Skilled machine-users adopt new machines first, while unskilled users wait until machines become more user-friendly and reliable. The improvement of machines is the engine of diffusion, and it is carried out by the monopolist machine producer. The speed of diffusion is affected by the skill distribution in the economy. At any point in time, the machine producer can innovate a new generation of machines. The timing of innovation is also influenced by the skill distribution. 相似文献