产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究述评

合作R＆D是企业整合研发资源的有效组织形式。本文对产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究进行了较为细致的综述。首先列举了对合作R＆D理论具有一定影响的经验研究；然后梳理了产业组织角度的合作R＆D主流理论；之后介绍了较有代表性的非主流理论研究；最后是全文结论和留待进一步研究的论题。     

Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract. I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This paper shows that under demand uncertainty the regulation has ambiguous welfare effects. Effectively, it raises production, which, under imperfect competition, tends to be beneficial. However, the regulation overshoots and decreases welfare if it requires availability for a state of high demand that is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated regulation is required.     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.     

A note on cheap talk and burned money

Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(1) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-1451]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty

When firms make a decision about irreversible investment, they may not have complete confidence about their perceived probability measure describing future uncertainty. They may think other probability measures perturbed from the original one are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterized by not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called “Knightian uncertainty.” The effect of Knightian uncertainty on the value of irreversible investment opportunity is shown to be drastically different from that of traditional uncertainty in the form of risk. Specifically, an increase in Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of investment opportunity while an increase in risk increases it.     

Terrorism and its impact on economic growth and technological innovation

Recent terrorist acts, in particular the 9-11 attacks in 2001, have created disruptions in the global economy. The short-term impact had been felt in the global tourism, airline industries, as well as the financial markets. While the global economy has recovered and is adjusting to the new global realities, the longer-term impact of heightened security risk across the world can be felt in the form of higher risk premiums in asset markets, as well as a shift of resources towards dealing with terrorism. Just as World War II had accelerated the development of nuclear energy as well as a major contributing factor in the genesis of Silicon Valley, the current war against terrorism will affect both the pace and trajectory of technology trends, as efforts are focused on developing technologies to combat terrorism. In this paper, we review the effects of the current war on terrorism in terms of its impact on the economy, the allocation of resources to R&D, and the trajectory of future R&D.     

A step beside the maximin path: Can we sustain the economy by following Hartwick's investment rule?

If sustainability is interpreted as the requirement to sustain consumption or utility at an optimal level, a maximin objective appears to be relevant. The sustained economy is characterized by an optimal investment following Hartwick's investment rule. This paper examines how the sustainability of a production-consumption economy with a non-renewable resource is modified in the neighborhood of the maximin path, i.e. when the consumption and the resource price are not optimal. A Sustainable Consumption Indicator is introduced in order to characterize the sustainability of constant consumption paths, defined as deviations from the maximin path. We describe how an over-consumption jeopardizes future sustainability.     

Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction. Surprisingly, such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long-run asset's stock. We also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset's stock and the long-run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction. Moreover, a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production.