Communication and reputation in procurement auctions — Some empirical evidence

This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder’s probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.     

Quality growth: New evidence from Japanese household-level data

This article estimates quality Engel curves for 52 durable goods used to measure quality upgrading in the Japanese CPI between 1990 and 2004. The estimation shows that the unmeasured quality growth is averaging less than 0.1% annually.     

Citizens’ trust in government and their willingness-to-pay

We employ the Hicksian compensating variation and a citizen’s subjective perspective on trustworthiness of government, and draw a positive association between citizens’ trust in government and their willingness-to-pay. Our finding suggests that public projects can be hindered by prevailing distrust toward government.     

Inequality of Opportunity in Europe

Using the EU‐SILC database, we estimate and compare the Inequality of Opportunity (IO) of 23 European countries in 2005. IO is estimated as the between‐type (ex‐ante) inequality component following the parametric procedure of Ferreira and Gignoux (2011 ), which allows for the inclusion of the large set of circumstances in the database. We also measure the degree of correlation between IO estimates and a set of past and contemporaneous economic factors related to the degree of development, labor market performance, investment in human capital, and social protection spending.     

A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and commonly-known budgets, and generalizes to richer settings.     

Undesirable competition

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy.     

Observability and incentive in organizations

The paper shows that producer-owned firms are more efficient in quality provision than investor-owned firms if input quality is observable, while they are less efficient when the input quality is unobservable and the size of the organization is large.     

Child abuse: Does public enforcement crowd out private vigilance?

We investigate whether increased public reporting of child abuse crowds out private reporting. We find, despite theoretical models suggesting significant crowding out, that public and private reports have risen nearly equiproportionately and that crowding out is small and not significant.     

Optimal financial investments for non-concave utility functions

We prove a formula for the computation of optimal financial investments in an expected utility framework with arbitrary (not necessarily concave) utility functions. This extends classical results on optimal financial investments for strictly concave utility functions and is of importance particularly for applications of prospect theory where the utility function has a convex-concave shape.     

Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power

We match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6% points more than random voting and that a senator’s probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4% points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.