Trade diversion from tomato suspension agreements

Abstract .  Trade barriers can cause output to be diverted to other countries and into other products. We study the effect of a voluntary price restraint (VPR) on Mexican tomatoes entering the United States. The diversion caused by the VPR is statistically and economically significant – representing over four-fifths of the direct effects of the trade barrier. When the VPR was binding, Mexico exported more tomatoes to Canada, the United States cut back on exports while Canada increased their exports to the United States. The VPR also diverted fresh tomatoes in Mexico into paste production, which was then exported to the United States.     

Supplying Slot Machines to the Poor

As gambling becomes increasingly accessible worldwide, governments face an important policy question: how should they exploit the industry's growth to raise tax revenue while protecting individuals from the detrimental effects of gambling? Using data on slot machines from the largest per capita gambling market in the world, Australia, we estimate a structural oligopoly model to (i) quantify firms' incentives to make gambling accessible among socioeconomically disadvantaged groups and (ii) evaluate the effect of government policy (tax levies, supply caps, and venue smoking bans) on the distribution of slot machine supply, tax revenue, and problem gambling prevalence.     

When two tribes go to work: Board political diversity and firm performance

A substantial literature has studied how increased diversity in terms of gender, age, education, and race amongst members of firms' boards affects decisions and performance. This paper studies whether ideological diversity in the boardroom affects firm performance. We find that whilst a board with a broader range of political opinions and beliefs is correlated with better performance ceteris paribus, that the causal impact of such an increase in diversity is negative and substantial. This negative effect is still present when diversity is measured excluding top management, and when diversity is defined in terms of the difference between firms' management and non-executive directors. In conclusion we consider the implication of these findings given the recent growth in both political polarization and ideological segregation.     

Media market concentration and pluralism

We study the relationship between market concentration and market variety, and thereby focus on two dimensions of variety, namely on internal variety and on external variety. In our setup, firms can expand their internal variety continuously around their focus point on a Salop‐circle. External variety then refers to the market supply of variety offered by all firms on the circle. We believe that this setting is particularly applicable to media. It turns out that in more concentrated markets, there is an incentive to provide more internal variety in order to compete for consumers. Then, the relationship between market concentration and external variety turns out to be ambiguous. There also exists no clear free market bias with respect to socially optimal internal and external variety.     

Leverage and strategic preemption: Lessons from entry plans and incumbent investments

This paper empirically investigates the effect of leverage on strategic preemption. Using new data on entry plans and incumbent investments from the American casino industry, I find that high leverage prevents incumbents from responding to entry threats. Facing the same set of entry plans, low-leverage incumbents expand physical capacity (by 30%), whereas high-leverage incumbents do not. This difference in investment matters because capacity installations preempt eventual entry. Stock market reactions to withdrawn plans imply that effective preemption increases incumbent firm value by 5%. My findings suggest that leverage matters for industry composition, not just firm-level investment.     

Corruption as an organizational process: Understanding the logic of the denormalization of corruption

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.     

Air passenger duties as strategic tourism taxation

There has been a recent debate on the rationale and economic impacts of air passenger duties (APDs) linked to puzzling empirical results on this topic. We argue that an approach from strategic tourism taxation can improve our understanding of these results. APD set by origin countries of tourists can be viewed as an instrument for extracting economic rents that would otherwise be retained by tourism destinations. A theoretical model of strategic taxation between an origin and two destinations is developed to illustrate this idea. We find that countries' strategies may end up with winners and losers, or with all parties facing welfare losses. The game outcome depends on countries' market shares of profits and the substitutability between tourism services provided by different destinations. The findings suggest that the economic impacts of APDs recently evaluated in the literature might be biased because of the omission of other countries' potential tax reactions.     

Independent boards and innovation

Much research has suggested that independent boards of directors are more effective in reducing agency costs and improving firm governance. How they influence innovation is less clear. Relying on regulatory changes, we show that firms that transition to independent boards focus on more crowded and familiar areas of technology. They patent and claim more and receive more total future citations to their patents. However, the citation increase comes mainly from incremental patents in the middle of the citation distribution; the numbers of uncited and highly cited patents—arguably associated with riskier innovation strategies—do not change significantly.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.     

Directional imbalance in transport prices and economic geography

This paper examines how and why transport prices become imbalanced with respect to the direction of shipments and how this affects economic geography. It is shown that the equilibrium transport price of the shipment in a particular direction is a nondecreasing function of the relative size of the embarkation region. Furthermore, we show that the directional imbalance in transport prices increases the likelihood of the symmetric pattern being stable and decreases the likelihood of the core-periphery patterns being sustainable. In short, the imbalance acts as a dispersion force.