Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

改革地方公共管理的权利路径:巴西的经验

巴西的“公共管理与公民权”项目于1996年建立,其目的是发现和宣传由巴西次国家级政府在服务供给上的创新行为。这些创新时巴西的公民权建设产生了直接的影响。本文根据巴西的经验初步分析了从“权利”的路向改革公共管理,扩大其他机构和公民社会参与的可能性。     

Externalities,Cross-Sectoral Spillovers and Productivity Growth

We provide an interpretation of the productivity dynamics in the manufacturing sector based on the idea of the thick market externality à la Diamond. An econometric model has been estimated which allows to disentangle the long run effects of these trading externalities from those of internal economies of scale and of aggregate industry-level economies. The results obtained—based on a cointegrated system of non-linear-error-correction equations—confirm the hypothesis that the trading externality matters. Moreover, our findings point out that the emphasis generally posited both on internal and external economies of scale is not justified.     

论我国地方财政风险的个性特征

我国地方财政风险，不同于一般的财政风险。从整体考察，它具有分散性、非均衡性和传导性；从结构考察，具有隐蔽性、发展性和内生性，同时它又受外部因素的影响很大。     

Litigation, School Finance Reform, and Aggregate Educational Spending

In the past two decades, litigation in many U.S. stateshas triggered educational reform movements designed to reducethe inequalities in educational expenditures across school districts.This paper uses a panel data set across all the states from 1970–1990to examine the role of litigation and educational finance reformin determining the level of education funding in a flexible,dynamic setting. An important finding of our work is that litigationand reform have differential effects across the states, in somecases leading to increases while in other cases decreases inpredicted spending.     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.     

中国地方政府债务权责划分:实践探索与改革建议

地方政府债务权责划分是一国分级财政体制的重要内容。实现中国地方政府债务的合法化已经成为解决当前地方政府债务问题的前提条件。地方政府债务的合法化不仅是债务融资权的界定问题,更是管理责任的归属问题。近年来中国某些地方已经开始自发地探索地方层面上的政府债务权责划分的方法。国家应尽快制定统一的法规,赋予地方政府合法举债权,但应严格控制债务规模、界定使用范围。应在财政部和省市县财政部门设立债务管理机构,明确地方政府的债务偿还及风险管理责任,加大债务监督力度。     

Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market

In search markets, greater spatial concentration of sellers increases price competition. At the same time, though, a greater concentration of sellers can create a shopping externality by attracting more buyers to the site. Using housing sales data, we test for spatial competition and shopping externality effects on prices and marketing time. We find that they reflect both competitive and shopping externality effects from surrounding houses, although the relative strength varies with how fresh the house is in the market, the freshness of surrounding houses, and the phase of the market cycle. New listings have the strongest shopping externality effect on neighboring houses that have been on the market for some time. Vacant houses have their strongest competition effects in the declining market and externality effects in the rising market. Fresh houses on the market reap little benefit from shopping externalities in all phases of the market cycle.