信用评级机构在次级债危机形成中的角色解析

由于现代金融体系的全球化,这场涉及美国众多金融机构的次级债危机很快在全球蔓延开来,逐步演变成了一场全球信用危机,而一贯被人们寄予厚望的信用评级机构在这场愈演愈烈的危机中却备受指责.论文重新审视了芙国信用评级机构运营机制的固有缺陷,通过揭示信用评级机构对次级债危机形成的责任,提出我国要以次级债危机为鉴,通过规范信用评级行业的发展,使信用评级机构真正承担金融风险监督者的责任.     

主动监控模式及其在公路桥梁施工中的应用研究

现有施工监理模式强调事后监督和检查,是一种被动监控模式。在全面分析PDCA循环及现代质量管理理论的基础上,提出了主动监控模式,并对该模式进行了机理分析。该模式是一种基于事先监控的预防性监控模式,更加重视施工组织设计及施工计划对质量的影响。将监控环节提前开始进行,并强调督导结合、以导为主,能弥补被动监控模式的不足。在对现有监理制度中代建型监理模式、FIDIC监理模式特征进行分析评价的基础上,提出了基于主动监控模式的监理制度设计,并通过案例分析介绍了该模式在复杂公路桥梁施工中的应用。     

2006～2009年首都机场口岸蜚蠊密度监测报告

[目的]掌握首都机场口岸蜚蠊密度、季节消长和种群构成情况,为首都机场口岸的蜚蠊防治提供科学依据。[方法]统一采用粘捕法。[结果]2006、2007、2008、2009年首都机场口岸蜚蠊的年平均密度分别为0.30、0.49、0.16、0.16只/张.夜;从2008年起蜚蠊密度明显下降,下降率为62.79%;首都机场口岸目前只监测到两种蜚蠊,其中德国小蠊为优势种,占98.50%,美洲大蠊占1.50%。[结论]首都机场口岸全年均有蜚蠊孳生,没有明显的季节消长规律;种类有德国小蠊和美洲大蠊两种,其中德国小蠊为绝对优势种,应成为今后防治的重点。     

Monitoring in service triads consisting of buyers, subcontractors and end customers

Organisations increasingly outsource service delivery to specialist subcontractors. These buyers, their subcontractors and their end customers operate in a triadic service relationship. In these triads, the buyer lacks direct control over service delivery and completely depends on the subcontractor for its performance towards its end customers. Subcontractors are confronted with two principals (buyer and end customer) who may have conflicting objectives.Although traditionally focusing on dyadic buyer–seller relationships rather than triads, Agency Theory provides valuable suggestions on the type of contract to be used and the type of monitoring to be employed. We adopt Agency Theory as a theoretical lens to look at the buyer–subcontractor–end customer triad and develop propositions on the design of contractual arrangements and monitoring activities. We use the results of two cases of service triads to provide some initial validation for these propositions.     

关于动力环境监控系统在通信电源中的应用

通信电源系统的正常运行对通信网络的稳定和安全有极大的影响。而通信动力环境监控系统又是保证通信电源系统正常工作的前提条件,也是不断更新技术的必然结果。本文论述了通信网络中采用先进的管理手段,构成的通信电源及动力环境监控系统为解决通信电源系统的可靠安全性以及为维护人员在管理上更为合理和高效率起到的重要作用。     

开发综合教学项目 加强学生就业能力的培养——对《矿山通信与监控》课程综合教学的探索

本文作者注重开发综合教学项目,将传统的电气控制技术与先进的plc技术结合起来,使学生更加贴近现场实际;利用机电一体化设备和直流稳压电源,实现电牵引采煤机自动调速的具体化,提高教学效果。     

An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of CFO Power on Disclosure Quality

We examine the association between chief financial officer (CFO) power and disclosure quality, measured using financial statement disaggregation disclosure and analyst forecast disclosure. Empirically, we validate that CFO power, measured by multiple dimensions, is positively associated with firms’ disclosure quality. We also find that this positive association between CFO power and disclosure quality is stronger when firms exhibit higher governance monitoring and accounting quality. Further analysis shows that our main results hold across multiple disclosure quality tests. Our findings are robust to addressing endogeneity issues using two-stage least squares, Heckman selection bias, and propensity score matching analyses. The results highlight the importance of CFO power for the accounting reporting process and decision-making.     

Financial reporting quality effects of imposing (gender) quotas on boards of directors

We analyze whether the passage of a Norwegian law requiring a minimum of a 40 percent of women on the boards of public firms affected financial reporting quality. Our results are consistent with a decrease in financial reporting quality for the firms that were most affected by the passage of the law, and with the effects being relatively short-lived. We also find evidence that board members characteristics, beyond gender, changed due to this law. These changes can partially explain our findings. Overall, our results show that mandating large changes to board composition over a relatively small period of time negatively affects financial reporting.     

Value from technology licensing – The role of monitoring and licensing experience

Technology licensing is an important form of exchange in business-to-business markets. Licensees consider licensing technologies as a key mechanism to expand their technological asset base and to innovate. Even though exchange is the central focus of marketing academia, technology licensing contracts as a form of exchange have been largely overlooked. We take some steps to fill this void by studying the role of governance in licensing contracts. We rely on governance and specifically agency theory to study two-sided moral hazard problems in technology licensing. The two-sided nature of the problem is reflected in the presence of both upstream monitoring (i.e., the licensee monitoring the licensor) and downstream monitoring (i.e., the licensee being monitored by the licensor). We demonstrate that the effects of monitoring on licensee value creation are conditional on the licensee’s experience in licensing. Specifically, we observe that, conditional on the licensee having accumulated a high level of licensing experience, upstream process monitoring and downstream output monitoring increase licensee market value while downstream process monitoring reduces licensee market value. Interestingly, we find no support for similar moderating effects of partner-specific experience. We rely on a unique database of original licensing contracts, historical data on past licensing contracts, and stock price data to analyze the value created by individual licensing contracts. The combined results may help licensees draft more valuable contracts.     

Agency controls and subsidiary strategic initiatives: The mediating role of subsidiary autonomy

Prior studies examining the impact of organizational controls on subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives have to a large extent failed to find a significant direct association between the two. We argue that this lack of direct association may be due to the fact that the control mechanisms used exert their influence on subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives indirectly by suppressing subsidiaries’ decision-making autonomy. Drawing upon agency theory we consider the effects of two types of controls, monitoring and incentive alignment, as mediated by subsidiaries’ decision-making autonomy. We test this effect on data from 115 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece. The results of our analyses empirically validate this assertion for both mechanisms. Our findings further show that, when both mechanisms are present, one may accentuate the effect of the other, highlighting the value of employing a contingency approach to fully capture the effects of organizational controls on the pursuit of subsidiaries’ strategic initiatives.