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811.
OPTIMAL GROWTH, GENUINE SAVINGS AND LONG-RUN DYNAMICS 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Simone Valente 《Scottish journal of political economy》2008,55(2):210-226
Green accounting theories have shown that negative genuine savings at some point in time imply unsustainability. Consequently, recent studies advocate the use of the genuine savings measure for empirical testing: a negative index implies that sustainability be rejected. However, this criterion cannot ascertain sustainability, because positive current genuine savings do not rule out genuine dissaving in the future. This paper derives a one‐to‐one relationship between the sign of long‐run genuine savings and the limiting condition for sustained utility in the capital‐resource growth model, assuming technical progress and resource renewability. This result suggests to extend the genuine saving method to include a test of the limiting condition: if this condition is empirically rejected, positive current genuine savings are delivering a false message. 相似文献
812.
The Easterlin Paradox refers to the fact that happiness data are typically stationary in spite of considerable increases in income. This amounts to a rejection of the hypothesis that current income is the only argument in the utility function. We find that the happiness responses of around 350,000 people living in the OECD between 1975 and 1997 are positively correlated with the level of income, the welfare state and (weakly) with life expectancy; they are negatively correlated with the average number of hours worked, environmental degradation (measured by SOx emissions), crime, openness to trade, inflation and unemployment; all controlling for country and year dummies. These effects separate across groups in a pattern that appears broadly plausible (e.g., the rich suffer environmental degradation more than the poor). Based on actual changes from 1975 to 1997, small contributions to happiness can be attributed to the increase in income in our sample. Interestingly, the actual changes in several of the ‘omitted variables’ such as life expectancy, hours worked, inflation and unemployment also contribute to happiness over this time period since life expectancy has risen and the others have, on average, fallen. Consequently the unexplained trend in happiness is even bigger than would be predicted if income was the only argument in the utility function. In other words, introducing omitted variables worsens the income-without-happiness paradox. 相似文献
813.
If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, individual lending is inefficient. The literature typically offers solutions based on the assumption of full peer information to solve adverse selection problems and peer monitoring to solve moral hazard problems. In contrast, I show that it is possible to construct a simple budget-balanced mechanism that implements the efficient outcome even if each borrower knows only own type and effort, and has neither privileged knowledge about others nor monitoring ability. The mechanism satisfies participation incentives for all types, and is immune to the Rothschild–Stiglitz cream skimming problem despite using transfers from better types to worse types. The presence of some local information implies that the mechanism cannot be successfully used by formal lenders. Thus a local credit institution can emerge as an optimal response to the informational environment even without peer information or monitoring. Finally, I investigate the role of monitoring in this setting and show how costly monitoring can increase the scope of the mechanism. 相似文献
814.
While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their interaction has not. We develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects, but act as substitutes in doing so. The substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent; conversely, financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it. We test this substitutability by predicting growth, of countries and industries, using measures of financial development, lack of corruption, and a key interaction term. Both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor, as well as to a substitutability between them. The growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0.63–1.68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th. The results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers, omitted variables, or other theories of growth and convergence. 相似文献
815.
In a new dataset of 1.3 million firms from over 100 countries, I establish a number of regularities in cross-country differences in economic concentration. Concentration of sales and employment is substantially higher in smaller countries and in less-developed countries; these two factors alone explain roughly half the cross-country variation in concentration. Nevertheless, a number of institutional factors offer additional explanatory power for concentration. Concentration is higher in countries with higher entry costs for new firms, in countries with weaker antitrust policy, in countries with less financial development, in countries with weaker rule of law, and in countries with more burdensome regulation. Weak institutions are associated with higher concentration especially in industries that do not have naturally high levels of concentration. In addition, the relationships between institutions and concentration are more pronounced in nontradable and investment-intensive industries, suggesting that natural barriers to competition facilitate the monopolization of sectors especially when institutions are weak. 相似文献
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819.
Tao Li 《The Developing economies》2012,50(4):334-350
This paper evaluates the impact of a remedial education program performed in two Chinese migrant children schools. The program used a conditional cash transfer contract to encourage peer tutors to help their underperforming classmates. Incentivized peer‐tutoring significantly improved the academic performance of the underperforming tutees over a semester. The impact persisted in the second semester when the intervention was removed. Our results suggest that nongovernment organizations and government agencies can increase their capacity of remedying education by incorporating incentivized peer‐tutoring into their existing merit‐based scholarship and conditional cash transfer programs. 相似文献
820.
MASAHIRO SHOJI 《The Developing economies》2012,50(2):116-140
Frequent and strictly scheduled repayments and savings in microfinance often deteriorate the liquidity of members in the face of negative shocks. Previous articles suggest the introduction of a contingent repayment system that allows such members to be rescheduled, but the unavailability of a suitable dataset makes it difficult to examine how it would actually work. This study is one of the first to evaluate the impact of this repayment system on household livelihood. In employing a unique dataset from Bangladesh, I show that rescheduling reduces the possibility of binding credit constraints and borrowing from moneylenders, and may also reduce transitory poverty. However, short‐term rescheduling has insignificant effects. Indebted members with less liquid assets are more likely to be rescheduled. 相似文献