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951.
Louis Gagnon 《The Financial Review》2018,53(1):5-50
This paper exploits the unique experimental setting created by nearly 1,300 new single stock futures listings on the OneChicago exchange between 2003 and 2009. I investigate the impact of derivatives introductions on the tightness of short sale constraints facing their underlying assets. After controlling explicitly for supply and demand conditions in the stock lending market, this experiment reveals a precipitous decline in active utilization rates and loan fees in the lending market, after the futures introductions. The paper provides strong evidence that supports the view that derivatives represent a viable alternate synthetic short selling venue relaxing short sale constraints facing their underlying assets. 相似文献
952.
Competition,Loan Rates,and Information Dispersion in Nonprofit and For‐Profit Microcredit Markets
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GUILLERMO BAQUERO MALIKA HAMADI ANDRÉAS HEINEN 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2018,50(5):893-937
We describe the competitive environment of microcredit markets globally and we study the effects of competition on loan rates of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We use a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs in 67 countries over 2002–2008. Controlling for interest rate ceilings and other country‐specific factors, we first find that nonprofits are relatively insensitive to industry‐wide concentration changes, while for‐profits charge significantly lower rates in less concentrated markets. Second, we find spillover effects between the for‐profit and nonprofit segments. Third, we show that the effects of concentration are consistent with an information dispersion mechanism. 相似文献
953.
Kartick Gupta Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti Alireza Tourani-Rad 《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2018,14(1):65-82
Existing research suggests that external governance is more relevant than internal governance in affecting a firm’s value. We contribute to the literature by explicitly examining the interactive role played by country-level financial development and legal institutions in influencing the impact of firm-level governance on the cost of equity capital. Using a comprehensive sample of 7380 firm years drawn from 22 developed countries, we show that firm-level corporate governance attributes affect the cost of equity capital primarily in the Common Law countries with high levels of financial development. Our study is the first to highlight the complementary effects of legal origin, financial development and firm-level governance attributes in influencing the cost of equity capital. 相似文献
954.
This paper establishes the relatively weak conditions under which causal inferences from a regression–discontinuity (RD) analysis can be as credible as those from a randomized experiment, and hence under which the validity of the RD design can be tested by examining whether or not there is a discontinuity in any pre-determined (or “baseline”) variables at the RD threshold. Specifically, consider a standard treatment evaluation problem in which treatment is assigned to an individual if and only if V>v0, but where v0 is a known threshold, and V is observable. V can depend on the individual's characteristics and choices, but there is also a random chance element: for each individual, there exists a well-defined probability distribution for V . The density function—allowed to differ arbitrarily across the population—is assumed to be continuous. It is formally established that treatment status here is as good as randomized in a local neighborhood of V=v0. These ideas are illustrated in an analysis of U.S. House elections, where the inherent uncertainty in the final vote count is plausible, which would imply that the party that wins is essentially randomized among elections decided by a narrow margin. The evidence is consistent with this prediction, which is then used to generate “near-experimental” causal estimates of the electoral advantage to incumbency. 相似文献
955.
The structural consumer demand methods used to estimate the parameters of collective household models are typically either very restrictive and easy to implement or very general and difficult to estimate. In this paper, we provide a middle ground. We adapt the very general framework of [Browning, M., Chiappori, P.A., Lewbel, A., 2004. Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power, Boston College Working Papers in Economics 588] by adding a simple restriction that recasts the empirical model from a highly nonlinear demand system with price variation to a slightly nonlinear Engel curve system. Our restriction has an interpretation in terms of the behaviour of household scale economies and is testable. Our method identifies the levels of (not just changes in) household resource shares, and a variant of equivalence scales called indifference scales. We apply our methodology to Canadian expenditure data. 相似文献
956.
Marianne Bertrand Simon Johnson Krislert Samphantharak Antoinette Schoar 《Journal of Financial Economics》2008
How does the structure of the families behind business groups affect the group's organization, governance, and performance? We construct a unique dataset of family trees and business groups for 93 of the largest business families in Thailand. We find a strong positive association between family size and family involvement in the ownership and control of the family businesses. The founders’ sons play a central role in both ownership and board membership, especially when the founder of the group is dead. Greater involvement by sons is also associated with lower firm-level performance, especially when the founder is dead. One hypothesis that emerges from our analysis is that part of the decay of family-run groups over time is due to the dilution of ownership and control across a set of equally powerful descendants of the founder, which creates a “race to the bottom” in tunneling resources out of the group firms. 相似文献
957.
We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs. 相似文献
958.
This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006. 相似文献
959.
This paper examines the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on earnings conservatism. Using directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, we find that the higher the managerial liability coverage, which reduces the expected legal liability of managers, the less conservative the firm's earnings. We also find that managerial legal liability coverage has a stronger influence on earnings conservatism in a legal regime with higher litigation risk. Our results are consistent with the threat of litigation conditioning managers to practice conservative accounting. 相似文献
960.
Pablo Ruiz‐Verdú 《European Financial Management》2008,14(5):921-943
This paper presents a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his own compensation, constrained only by the threat of shareholder intervention. The model addresses two main questions. How does shareholder power affect managers' compensation and their incentives to maximise firm value? And what is the optimal level of shareholder power? Expectedly, the model shows that increasing shareholder power leads to lower managerial pay. Greater shareholder power, however, also weakens the manager's incentives to maximise value and may even lead to lower profits for shareholders. There might, thus, be too much, as well as too little, shareholder power. The model characterises the optimal level of shareholder power and yields predictions about the relation between shareholder power, managerial pay, performance and firm characteristics. 相似文献