Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry

The objective of this paper is to test whether firms in the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) industry take the intertemporal strategic effect of their contemporaneous output decision on their rivals’ future output decision into account or whether they precommit themselves to a production plan. Learning-by-doing and spillovers are present in this industry and introduce an intertemporal component to firms’ strategies. A simplified version of Jarmin's [RAND J. Econ. 250 (1994) 441] dynamic oligopolistic model is applied to firm-level data. Demand and pricing relations for five DRAM generations are estimated. The empirical results show that firms behave strategically and price–cost margins are likely overestimated in a precommitment specification.     

Oligopoly and behavioral uncertainty: An application of fuzzy set theory

This paper provides a brief sketch of fuzzy mathematics. It employs this relatively new mathematical tool to define and describe oligopoly markets and to quantitatively establish the impacts of uncertainty on the decision making that is intrinsic to oligopolistic industries. It illustrates how the technique would be used, for example, by applying fuzzy mathematics to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.The authors acknowledge and appreciate the helpful comments provided by the anonymous referees.     

Re-matching, information and sequencing effects in posted offer markets

This paper evaluates the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Variations studied include the presence or absence of market information, the use of re-matched or fixed seller pairs and alterations in the order of sequencing. Experimental results indicate that such variations can have first order effects on outcomes. For this reason, we recommend that results in oligopoly experiments be carefully interpreted in light of the procedures selected.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

揭露美国次贷危机所引发的全球金融危机真相

美国次贷危机爆发两年来,国内外经济学界以及政界都对此进行了深入研究,观点主要集中在市场主体和监管主体的"有限理性"、内外部经济结构失衡和货币政策环境的影响、全球金融货币体系制度设计的缺陷、以及资本主义制度基本矛盾等几个方面,试图勾画组合出一幅危机的完整图象。但因缺少一条逻辑主线将这些正确的归因与少数为了转移矛头故意歪曲事实真相的借口有机串连,致使图象主题不够立体、清晰。为了更好地认清危机的实质,本文运用中华文明辨证逻辑思维这条主线,深度透视危机的本源,还原危机背后的真相,揭露真正的幕后元凶及其支配主体行为的片面思维逻辑,以便呈现出一幅更为清晰、立体的美国次贷危机全景图。     

基于Stackelberg模型的出口补贴政策对经济的影响分析

出口补贴政策一直是各国政府重点研究的战略性贸易政策之一。本文在Stackelberg寡头垄断模型的基础上,分析了当两国企业共同竞争海外市场时,追随者企业所在国的补贴政策对各国经济活动的影响效果。结果显示,补贴政策会增加本国企业的产量,提高本国企业的利润和净福利,甚至会在产品价格下降的情况下提高本国总体福利水平。     

Leverage, performance and capital adequacy ratio in Taiwan's banking industry

We examine the relation between firms’ financial structures and their risky investment strategies in Taiwan's banking industry. Regressions cover two subperiods: before the first financial reform (1996–2000) and after the first financial reform (2001–2006), to address the impacts of the first financial reform on banking firms’ financial structures. Our first result demonstrates that the restrictions on CAR have indeed affected firms’ risky investment strategies, as market share and leverage are positively related. Second, the firm performance is significantly and positively related to firm size, leverage and financial cost. Finally, the regression results show that financial structures for banking firms are positively related to the states of business cycle (i.e., cyclical). The positive signs coincide with Proposition 4 in our analytical model.     

房屋价格持续上涨的原因与应对措施

2003年以来,中国的房价一直处于快速上涨之中,持续、快速上涨的房价不但引致了大量的投机需求并积累大量泡沫,而且必然会减少其它产业的投资,所以房价持续上涨不但会威胁金融领域而且会威胁实体经济健康发展。本文从供给角度入手,运用博弈论工具分析房产企业在土地和房屋两个市场的博弈过程,揭示房价持续上涨的原因,并给出解决房价持续上涨的创新制度安排:把出价最高者获得土地的竞标方式改为归还政府房屋面积比例最大者获得土地,而政府把随机抽取的房屋以市场出清价格用于出租。     

最优关税和部分私有化战略-产品差异的混合寡头模型

本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型,探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场(mixed oligopoly)中,国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响。研究结果表明:无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标,其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高,政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比。与最近的其他研究发现不同,在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时,收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率。同时本文还得出,福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大于关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例。因此,以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业。     

Environmental policy and stable collusion: The case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly

We show that the imposition of a Markovian tax on emissions, that is, a tax rate which depends on the pollution stock, can induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. This does not hold for a uniform tax. Thus, accounting for the feedback effect that exists within a dynamic framework, where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time, changes the result obtained within a static framework. Moreover, the cartel formation can diminish the welfare gain from environmental regulation such that welfare under environmental regulation and collusion of firms lies below that under a laissez-faire policy.     

Existence and optimality of oligopoly equilibria in linear exchange economies

Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy, one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic existence result for the Cournot-Walras. Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged. Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau