寡头垄断、范围不经济与产业内的产品内贸易

在寡头垄断市场条件下,＂厂商的策略性行为＂与＂厂商范围不经济效应较大＂,而最终产品内的中间产品种类数较多,这两者共同构成产业内的国际产品内贸易的基础。在国际市场竞争中,生产率较高的厂商不仅能扩大各种中间产品的市场需求量并提高最大化的总利润,而且能够出口更多种类的中间产品;而生产率较低的厂商其市场需求会受到排挤,生产率最低层次的厂商将因亏损而被迫退出市场。这些结论表明自由贸易能够在世界范围内提高资源的配置效率,这同当前异质企业贸易模型的结论是完全一致的。     

基于Stackelberg模型的出口补贴政策对经济的影响分析

出口补贴政策一直是各国政府重点研究的战略性贸易政策之一。本文在Stackelberg寡头垄断模型的基础上,分析了当两国企业共同竞争海外市场时,追随者企业所在国的补贴政策对各国经济活动的影响效果。结果显示,补贴政策会增加本国企业的产量,提高本国企业的利润和净福利,甚至会在产品价格下降的情况下提高本国总体福利水平。     

房屋价格持续上涨的原因与应对措施

2003年以来,中国的房价一直处于快速上涨之中,持续、快速上涨的房价不但引致了大量的投机需求并积累大量泡沫,而且必然会减少其它产业的投资,所以房价持续上涨不但会威胁金融领域而且会威胁实体经济健康发展。本文从供给角度入手,运用博弈论工具分析房产企业在土地和房屋两个市场的博弈过程,揭示房价持续上涨的原因,并给出解决房价持续上涨的创新制度安排:把出价最高者获得土地的竞标方式改为归还政府房屋面积比例最大者获得土地,而政府把随机抽取的房屋以市场出清价格用于出租。     

揭露美国次贷危机所引发的全球金融危机真相

美国次贷危机爆发两年来,国内外经济学界以及政界都对此进行了深入研究,观点主要集中在市场主体和监管主体的"有限理性"、内外部经济结构失衡和货币政策环境的影响、全球金融货币体系制度设计的缺陷、以及资本主义制度基本矛盾等几个方面,试图勾画组合出一幅危机的完整图象。但因缺少一条逻辑主线将这些正确的归因与少数为了转移矛头故意歪曲事实真相的借口有机串连,致使图象主题不够立体、清晰。为了更好地认清危机的实质,本文运用中华文明辨证逻辑思维这条主线,深度透视危机的本源,还原危机背后的真相,揭露真正的幕后元凶及其支配主体行为的片面思维逻辑,以便呈现出一幅更为清晰、立体的美国次贷危机全景图。     

Norms as emergent properties of adaptive learning: The case of economic routines

Interaction among autonomous decision-makers is usually modelled in economics in game-theoretic terms or within the framework of General Equilibrium. Game-theoretic and General Equilibrium models deal almost exclusively with the existence of equilibria and do not analyse the processes which might lead to them. Even when existence proofs can be given, two questions are still open. The first concerns the possibility of multiple equilibria, which game theory has shown to be the case even in very simple models and which makes the outcome of interaction unpredictable. The second relates to the computability and complexity of the decision procedures which agents should adopt and questions the possibility of reaching an equilibrium by means of an algorithmically implementable strategy. Some theorems have recently proved that in many economically relevant problems equilibria are not computable. A different approach to the problem of strategic interaction is a “constructivist” one. Such a perspective, instead of being based upon an axiomatic view of human behaviour grounded on the principle of optimisation, focuses on algorithmically implementable “satisfycing” decision procedures. Once the axiomatic approach has been abandoned, decision procedures cannot be deduced from rationality assumptions, but must be the evolving outcome of a process of learning and adaptation to the particular environment in which the decision must be made. This paper considers one of the most recently proposed adaptive learning models: Genetic Programming and applies it to one the mostly studied and still controversial economic interaction environment, that of oligopolistic markets. Genetic Programming evolves decision procedures, represented by elements in the space of functions, balancing the exploitation of knowledge previously obtained with the search of more productive procedures. The results obtained are consistent with the evidence from the observation of the behaviour of real economic agents.     

Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach

Summary. We consider an asymmetric polluting oligopoly. We demonstrate that optimal tax rates per unit of emission are not the same for all firms. We call this property selective penalization. Our Optimal Distortion Theorem states that the efficient tax structure requires that high cost firms pay a higher tax rate. Our Pro-concentration Motive Theorem states that optimal taxes increase the concentration of the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl index. Our Magnification Effect indicates that the variance of marginal costs is magnified by a factor which depends on the marginal cost of public funds.JEL Classification Numbers: Q20, D60, D63.We wish to thank Peter Neary, Kim Long, Raymond Riezman and a referee for very helpful comments. Financial support from SSHRC and FCAR are gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Hassan Benchekroun, Kim Long, and Koji Shimomura for discussions and comments.     

Voluntary Quality Disclosure under Price‐Signaling Competition

We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price‐signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating equilibrium in our model depending on the parameters. Our analysis reveals that, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not only the high‐quality firm but also the low‐quality firm chooses to disclose its product quality to soften the price competition. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a (Salop) circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market-clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated. Behaviour in the stochastically stable outcome depends on the level of market differentiation and corresponds exactly with the Nash equilibrium outcome of the underlying stage game. For high level of differentiation, firms end up at the monopoly outcome. For intermediate level of differentiation, they gravitate to a “mutually non-aggressive” outcome where price is higher than the monopoly price. For low level of differentiation, firms price at a mark-up above the marginal cost. Market-clearing always results endogenously.     

Product Differentiation,the Volume of Trade and Profits under Cournot and Bertrand Duopoly

This article analyses how product differentiation affects the volume of trade under duopoly using Shubik-Levitan demand functions rather than the Bowley demand functions used by Bernhofen (2001). The drawback of Bowley demand functions is that an increase in product differentiation increases the size of the market so the increase in the volume of trade may be the result of the increase in the size of the market rather than the increase in product differentiation per se. The Shubik-Levitan demand functions have the advantage that an increase in product differentiation does not increase the size of the market, but consumers still have a ‘love of variety’. It is shown that the volume of trade in terms of quantities falls with increasing product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively low, but rises with increasing product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively high. Among the results, it is shown that the trade liberalisation is more likely to be profitable under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly for differentiated products with a positive trade cost.     

Numerical solution of dynamic oligopoly games with capital investment

Summary. This paper discusses how numerical techniques may be used to solve the simultaneous functional equations that arise in general dynamic stochastic games. Unlike the conventional linear-quadratic approach, our methods may be used to address general model specifications that may include non-quadratic objective functions, non-linear equations of motion, and constraints on decision variables. As an illustration, we apply our methods to a dynamic duopoly game in which competing firms play short-run quantity game subject to production cost that can be lowered through investment in capital stock in the long run. Received: June 1, 2000; revised version: December 27, 2000