地区环境治理动机、政治关联与企业环境违规处罚——来自环保督政制度的新证据

基于新《环保法》的准自然实验,运用双重差分法和倾向得分匹配法,考量新法实施前后地方环境治理动机变化对企业环境违规处罚力度的影响。结果显示,新法实施前,政治关联对企业环境违规处罚力度具有“庇护”效应;新法实施后,“庇护”效应被削弱。其中,官员型政治关联和市场化水平较低地区的“庇护”效应削弱程度更大。结果表明,治理动机不足是以往环境治理失灵的重要成因。应着力完善正负激励互补的激励结构,强化地方政府环境治理动机。     

Penalty and related estimation strategies in the spatial error model

Spatial autoregressive models are powerful tools in the analysis of data sets from diverse scientific areas of research such as econometrics, plant species richness, cancer mortality rates, image processing, analysis of the functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) data, and many more. An important class in the host of spatial autoregressive models is the class of spatial error models in which spatially lagged error terms are assumed. In this paper, we propose efficient shrinkage and penalty estimators for the regression coefficients of the spatial error model. We carry out asymptotic as well as simulation analyses to illustrate the gain in efficiency achieved by these new estimators. Furthermore, we apply the new methodology to housing prices data and provide a bootstrap approach to compute prediction errors of the new estimators.     

我国企业信用缺失问题浅探

本文在分析我国企业信用缺失原因的基础上．提出维护和提高我国企业商业信用的对策：1．制定和完善相关法规并从严执法：2．尽快建立和完善失信惩罚机制和守信激励机制；3．转变政府职能，规范政府行为，加强企业商业信用管理基础工作；4．提高企业经营者职业道德素质，培育企业信用文化。     

论完善对商业贿赂犯罪的刑事处罚

我国现行立法对商业贿赂犯罪的刑事处罚是不完善的,主要体现在财产罚力度不够、生命罚设置过剩、资格罚设置欠缺。商业贿赂犯罪的核心是获取不正当的商业利益,根据“罪责刑相适应”原则,我国应对商业贿赂犯罪加大财产罚力度、废除受贿罪死刑、增设资格罚。     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts in Multiple Penalty Systems with No-commitment to Tenure-track Auditing

This paper generalizes Khalil's (1997) static model to a multiperiod one in the tenure-track auditing. Three penalty systems considered are full-transfer-dependent, partial-transfer-dependent, and transfer-independent ones. It is found that the equilibrium under the tenure-track auditing is also an equilibrium under the periodic auditing. The conditions under which the principal prefers the periodic auditing, or is indifferent between the two auditing schemes are derived. Incentive contracts may vary in different penalty systems. For instance, the equilibrium with principal’s sure ex post auditing exists only under the partial-transfer-dependent and transfer-independent penalty systems. And the equilibrium with the first-best contract as the first-period optimum appears merely under the transfer-independent penalty system.     

Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency

This paper investigates the optimal contract design in a principal-agent model where verification of an agent's action is endogenously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the first best outcome to be implemented as an equilibrium. The equilibrium has the following features: (i) The action level that the agent chooses is not verified even if it is possible. (ii) Nevertheless, the first best can be attained by making a contract contingent on the unverified action. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D20, K40.     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.     

偷税罪“二次行政处罚”犯罪成立标准的立法缺陷及其完善

我国刑法对于偷税罪"二次行政处罚"犯罪成立标准的规定存在诸多立法缺陷,而且不符合税收征管实际,在实践中难以操作。应对此进行相应的修改予以完善:明确规定"二次行政处罚"的时限与数额;将扣缴义务人因偷税被税务机关二次行政处罚又偷税的行为犯罪化。     

农民工教育与工作匹配状态及收入效应

文章基于教育与工作是否适配及其收入效应的视角,根据2013年的CGSS 数据,在运用实际匹配法评估农民工教育与工作匹配状态的基础上,进一步采用D-H 模型和V-V模型估算了农民工教育的收入效应,并且据此讨论了教育获益与教育惩罚的问题。研究表明：(1)在教育适配状态下,农民工的教育收益率最高。(2)就农民工群体而言,教育不足发生率比较高,但并非不存在教育过度情形。(3)男性农民工具有教育过度工资溢价和教育不足工资折价并存的特征,女性农民工不具有这样的特征。(4)在短期内,企业主不仅愿意为教育过度农民工支付工资溢价,同时也会对教育不足农民工实施工资折价。     

均值计数模型下汽车保险索赔频数的估计方法

汽车保险的索赔频数预测问题是非寿险精算理论和应用研究的一个重要内容。但是，在含有高维附加信息的情形下，传统的估计方法就不再适用。本文在均值计数模型基础上，利用凸惩罚函数进行变量选择，找到影响车险索赔频数的显著性因子，并通过模拟和实例分析来评价该模型和所提出的方法的可行性。