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11.
Conventional wisdom is that a binding price ceiling increases output and so increases social welfare if imposed on an imperfectly competitive market. However, this paper shows that a price ceiling can be harmful to social welfare even though it increases industry output and consumer surplus. This model can be applied to the pharmaceutical industry under price control in many countries, e.g., U.K., Canada, Germany and Japan. 相似文献
12.
Borghan Narajabad 《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》2011,35(6):825-842
We study innovation in a dynamic stochastic discrete-time duopoly with endogenous horizontal differentiation. Innovation takes the form of a quality ladder; horizontal differentiation is Hotelling competition. We compute Markov-perfect equilibria and study the effects on long-run innovation of changes in taste heterogeneity (transport costs) and firms' costs of relocating products. Innovation rises as the industry's long-run position moves toward products that are permanently co-located in the space of horizontal tastes. A large enough fall in taste heterogeneity will raise long-run innovation, while more costly product relocation lowers innovation if taste heterogeneity is high, and raises it otherwise. 相似文献
13.
14.
An analytical model is developed that considers the effect of demand information, and the precision with which demand forecasts are made, on channel profitability. Different channel price structures such as Stackelberg and Vertically integrated are considered and comparisons are made of the impact of information precision on channel profits under each structure. Other demand factors such as brand substitutability and share of base level demand are also included in the analysis, and the interaction of information and demand effects is examined. An empirical study is carried out using a sample of firms based in Hong Kong and support is found for the model propositions. 相似文献
15.
Simon Pierre Sigu Salma Karray 《Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l\u0027Administration》2007,24(2):80-93
We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
16.
郭兰平 《江西金融职工大学学报》2015,(4)
通过建立模型,并将负的组内网络外部性和正的组间网络外部性引入到模型中,研究双寡头竞争平台的商业模式选择。研究结果表明,当消费者给商家带来的正组间网络外部性效应与商家带给消费者的正组间网络外部性效应二者之间的差距足够大时,两个平台均会选择双边市场模式;而当二者之间的差距异常小时,两个平台将选择单边市场模式;但是当二者之间的差距介于中间水平时,其结果就主要取决于平台产品或服务的差异化程度以及商家之间负的组内网络外部性强度。 相似文献
17.
This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks' monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare. 相似文献
18.
针对零售商和第三方回收商具有公平关切的情形,研究由制造商主导的三级供应链成员及整个系统的差别定价最优决策。分析了零售商以及第三方回收商公平中性和公平关切两种情形的决策模型。研究发现:零售商以及第三方回收商的公平关切行为最终会造成各自利润的损失,并且对整条供应链利润也是不利的,而这样的公平关切行为对制造商来说却是有利的。同时当公平关切程度较弱时,对整条闭环供应链系统是不利的;而当公平关切程度较强时,对整条闭环供应链系统是有利的。 相似文献
19.
Yasunori Ishii 《Journal of Economics》2001,73(3):227-246
This paper examines the strategic export policies in a reciprocal market model of an international Cournot duopoly where two firms in domestic and foreign countries reciprocally supply their products to other countries through overseas production as well as export. It also considers the fact that the firms must incur export costs in addition to production costs. Thus, this paper shows, among others, that the effects of export policies on firms' output and export choices do not depend on the slopes of firms' reaction curves. It is also shown that firms' total outputs are independent of the export policies, and the optimal domestic and foreign export subsidies are zero (laissez-faire). 相似文献
20.
It is well known that the Nash equilibrium in network routing games can have strictly higher cost than the optimum cost. In Stackelberg routing games, where a fraction of flow is centrally-controlled, a natural problem is to route the centrally-controlled flow such that the overall cost of the resulting equilibrium is minimized.We consider the scenario where the network administrator wants to know the minimum amount of centrally-controlled flow such that the cost of the resulting equilibrium solution is strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. We call this threshold the Stackelberg threshold and prove that for networks of parallel links with linear latency functions, it is equal to the minimum of the Nash flows on links carrying more optimum flow than Nash flow.Our approach also provides a simpler proof of characterization of the minimum fraction that must be centrally controlled to induce the optimum solution. 相似文献