广义Stackelberg市场上企业横向兼并获利性研究

基于广义Stackelberg寡头垄断市场,研究企业横向兼并的获利性和社会福利问题。结果表明,一个领头企业与一个跟随企业之间总是存在兼并动机,而领头企业之间很少存在兼并动机;当边际生产成本的差异程度较大时,两个跟随企业之间总是存在兼并动机;兼并导致的企业利润增加是以社会福利下降为代价的。     

THE OPTIMAL RISK CHOICE OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE R&D IN DUOPOLY WITH SPILLOVERS

This study examines the R&D risk choice in a duopoly market with technology spill overs. The firms conduct R&D programmes with different degrees of risk but an identical expected outcome and they compete or cooperate in R&D. Findings indicate that, in equilibrium, the R&D risk level decreases in the spill over rate under noncooperative R&D, while it may increase under cooperative R&D. Firms are more likely to engage in higher R&D risks under cooperative R&D than they are under non‐cooperative R&D. Moreover, the equilibrium R&D risk level both under competition and cooperation R&D is always too low from the perspective of social welfare, and the extent of this inefficiency increases with the spill over rate if the size of the spill over is large, but the opposite may occur if the size of the spill over is small.     

组合政策下双寡头企业绿色创新博弈分析

为研究政府组合政策对于绿色创新能力不同的寡头企业生产策略的影响,构建演化博弈模型,在环境税税率和创新补贴额度不同的情境下,通过数值仿真模拟企业生产决策的动态选择过程。研究表明:高强度环境税制和高额的创新补贴极大地激励了两寡头企业绿色创新。环境税一定时,补贴值到一定额度,创新能力强的企业率先选择生产绿色产品,进一步提高时,创新能力弱的企业也将选择绿色生产。当环境税税率和补贴都比较低时,两类企业均选择生产普通产品,政府的宽松管控,低额补贴无法激起企业的绿色创新积极性。生产绿色产品的单位成本增额越高,或者消费者对于绿色产品的消费意愿不足时,需要政府的补贴力度越大。     

Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer Under Uncertainty in a Liberalizing Host Economy

This paper tackles the issue of investment and optimal ‘choice’ of market structure for a foreign multinational enterprise (MNE) in a newly liberalized economy under uncertainty and in the presence of sunk costs. A minimalist duopolistic model is developed whereby a foreign investor's subjective belief about the probability distribution of policy uncertainty is endogenized as a function of the aggregate output in the tradable goods sector. The main propositions derived from the model are consistent with some unconventional empirical findings in the literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), technology transfer to and crowding out of domestic firms in LDEs.     

Entry Invitations in a Market with Network Effects

Abstract

This paper reinvestigates the well-known claim by Economides (1996) that the network effects can lead a monopolist to give away its technology for free. This so-called ‘open’ strategy is likely to be adopted when marginal network effects are strong but not too strong relative to marginal price effects. Highly elastic demand and highly convex costs also increase the likelihood of such a strategy. I first study the case in which the post-entry market structure is of the Cournot type and later compare the results with the Stackelberg case.     

Stackelberg横向兼并博弈的分析

文章通过增加"蛇吞象"式兼并分析,扩展了Steffen-Kai-Wieland模型,研究结果表明:无论"大鱼吃小鱼","蛇吞象","强强联合",还是"弱者联合"的兼并,四种兼并对参与企业都是有利可图的.但这些兼并都会提高市场集中度,导致消费者福利下降.     

A cake for Cournot

A cake division mechanism is presented that is equivalent in terms of the size of the pieces of the cake n players’ receive in equilibrium to the quantities that n firms in a Cournot oligopoly supply in equilibrium. This mechanism extends to equivalence between cake division and Nash’s ‘divide the dollar’ game.     

Optimal Investment Decisions for Two Positioned Firms Competing in a Duopoly Market with Hidden Competitors

This paper extends the literature dealing with the option to invest in a duopoly market for a leader‐follower setting. A restrictive assumption embodied in the models in the current literature is that investment opportunities are semi‐proprietary in that the two identified or positioned firms are guaranteed to hold at least the follower's position. More competition is realistically captured in our model by introducing the concept of hidden rivals so that the places in the market can be taken not only by positioned firm but also by these hidden competitors. The value functions and the optimal triggers for the positioned firms differ materially in settings with(out) the presence of hidden rivals. Unlike existing models, our model allows for (a)symmetric market shares and investment costs for the leader and the follower. Cooperative entrance by the two positioned firms is also modelled.     

基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链信息共享策略研究

基于Stackelberg博弈,以单一零售商与供应商为研究对象,构造了一个信息共享模型,分析了零售商与供应商是否共享信息的三种情况,结果显示零售商收集市场需求信息需花费的成本与供应商给予的价格折扣同时满足一定条件时,双方获益最大。此时,信息共享有利于增加整条供应链的价值。     

The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

We study Stackelberg games in which the follower faces a cost for observing the leader's action. We show that, irrespective of the size of the cost, the leader's value of commitment is lost completely in all pure-strategy equilibria. However, there also exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium that fully preserves the first-mover advantage. In this type of equilibrium, the probability that the follower looks at the leader's action is independent of the cost of looking.