基于Stackelberg模型的区域集装箱港口网络建设规划优化研究

本文利用Stackelberg模型考虑港口规划者与货主之间的相互关联、相互制约的关系,目的是想从根本上提高港口网络系统的运作水平,以实现对它优化的目的。     

Sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times: Impact on operating profits

When managing a project, a firm must evaluate multiple strategic factors and operational issues before deciding which tasks to keep in-house and which to outsource. We focus on one operational aspect of this evaluation process by examining the impact of different sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times on operating profits. As an initial attempt, we present two stylized models that capture two simplest types of projects: (a) a project with two “parallel” tasks that can be performed simultaneously and (b) a project with two “serial” tasks that must be performed sequentially. For each model, we determine the optimal operating profit for the case when the firm outsources zero task, one task, or two tasks. These operating profits can be informative for making sourcing decisions of different project tasks.     

搭便车行为对双渠道供应链的影响分析

本文建立了一个双渠道供应链的模型,得出了存在搭便车行为时供应链的定价、服务决策和利润水平,并分析了搭便车行为的强度变化对于供应链决策和状态的影响。我们的结果说明了搭便车行为对于双渠道供应链有双向作用,既能提高集中决策供应链的利润,也会使分散决策的供应链利润受损,同时,证明了搭便车行为是导致供应链冲突的原因之一。     

供应商与制造商在订单分配方面的博弈行为

对于两类不同质供应商与单制造商组成的供应链在订单分配方面的博弈行为,通过综合考虑部件价格、质量、交货期等构造订单质量指标,建立制造商和两类供应商的斯塔克尔伯格效用模型。模型显示,当两类供应商送交的订单质量相等时,制造商的效用可以达到最大;同时两类供应商对订单数量的需求均受到竞争对手对订单偏好的影响,由此可能导致供应商出现虚报自身信息的情况。制造商引入惩罚机制,并通过对惩罚进行适当限制,可实现让供应商实报私人信息的目标。     

A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE

We investigate the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that: (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.     

Heinrich von Stackelberg on joint production

In the 1970s, considerable interest arose into the study of multi-output firms and industries. However, this literature did not seem to be aware of the contribution that von Stackelberg made to the issue almost half a century earlier. This paper outlines von Stackelberg's contribution to the theory of costs under joint production. It critically assesses the place of his contribution in the modern history of the theory of joint production and it suggests an answer to the question of why von Stackelberg's theory of joint production fell into oblivion and even contributed to the abandonment of the issue for decades.     

Collusion in Differentiated Duopolies with Quadratic Costs

The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated duopoly games has generally assumed that marginal cost is constant, but this note uses quadratic costs (linear marginal costs) to compare the sustainability of collusion under Bertrand and Cournot duopoly with differentiated products. It is shown that when marginal costs are sufficiently increasing in output, then it is always easier to sustain collusion under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly for any degree of product substitutability.     

Advances on Stackelberg open-loop and feedback strategies

In this paper, we study a familiar type of dynamic games called "common-property resource games" to establish the following results. First, the Stackelberg equilibrium may not exist in some cases, with open-loop strategies as well as with feedback strategies. Second, an explicit example is given to show that under feedback strategies, the best linear strategy on the part of the leader is inferior to a nonlinear strategy so that it is dangerous to confine our search to the Stackelberg equilibrium in the space of linear functions. Most importantly, we establish an "Implementation Lemma", which allows us to develop one methodology to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium with feedback strategies when the equilibrium is assumed to exist.     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.