On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs

Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric size of customer bases makes monopoly pricing more difficult. Adding consumer heterogeneity to the model we demonstrate that also composition of each firms customer base affects pricing, and this composition may aggravate or ease the incentives to break out of the monopoly pricing equilibrium.Received: 16 August 2001, Accepted: 27 September 2004, JEL Classification: D43, L10, L13This research has been sponsored by Telenor, through the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration. We thank participants at the 2002 EARIE conference in Madrid, Matthew Jackson and an anonymous referee for helpful and constructive comments to an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies.     

基于RCE条件下双头垄断福利分析

本应用RCE（Rational Conjecture Equilibrium)条件来分析双头垄断企业（厂商）在成本不对称、需求不对称、产品差异化条件下对社会福利产生的不同影响，并说明了RCE条件下的双头垄断模型与cournot模型及社会最优模型的关系，提出在“结构－行为－绩效（SCP）”研究中，行为是一个重要的因素，即使在同一结构下，不同行为将会产生不同的绩效与福利。     

资源代际传递对收入分配的影响机制研究*——基于经济学权力范式的分析

优化收入分配格局是实现共同富裕的关键,资源代际传递又是收入分配公平的一大阻碍。本文借助二阶段Stackelberg博弈思想,引入生产性和非生产性资源代际传递构建子代对自身资源进行最优分配的博弈行为选择模型。基于资源形成权力、权力决定利益分配的逻辑,阐释资源代际传递过程中起决定性作用的家庭代际权力,即子代凭借家庭优势在资源竞争和利益分配时形成对他人的控制力或影响力。数值模拟发现制度选择对代际权力、社会产出和收入差距有较大影响,政府应着眼于预分配来缓解再分配压力,在子代进入市场前合理配置经济和非经济资源以缩小代际差异。利用资源调配权力制衡家庭代际权力,畅通向上流动通道,形成兼顾公平与效率的发展环境。     

中国式分权、社会资本与农村公共服务满意度

将财政分权体制与社会资本纳入农村公共服务供给的考察范畴,重点关注了中国式分权背景下不同维度社会资本对农村公共服务满意的调节效应。基于中国式分权的Stackelberg博弈模型证实了民生类支出偏好对村民具有较高的福利效应,社会资本不仅对提供者存在正向溢出渠道,还显著提升了村民福利。利用CGSS数据的实证结果表明：在考虑县级政府普遍面临财政困境的前提下,宽松的财政约束实际抑制了农村公共服务满意度提升,与正式制度存在替代关系的社会资本则显著提升了村民对公共服务的满意度。尽管如此,仍需警惕过度密集的网络嵌入所表现出的负向调节作用。以上结论通过分群回归和稳健性检验被证实是有效可信的,从而为纠正农村民生公共品供给偏向,补齐新时代农村公共服务短板提供了有益借鉴。     

供应驱动链中供应商主导的一种定价模型

供应链的定价尤其是供应驱动链的定价是供应链管理中的难点之一。本文针对这一问题,首先分析了供应驱动链的运作特点和供应商角色,并将供应驱动链中的供应商与需求驱动链中的供应商进行了比较,分析了供应驱动链中供应商的驱动作用和用户需求对价格变化的敏感性,从利润与需求的主从博弈行为的角度描述供应商定价问题,建立了一种供应驱动链中供应商主导的定价模型,并通过均衡求解引导供应驱动链积极响应用户需求及实现总体利润最大化。     

产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

20世纪60年代以后,学者研究发现,传统的贸易理论无法解释大量工业化国家之间的贸易,从而使产业内贸易的研究成为国际贸易的核心问题之一。本文建立古诺双寡头垄断模型对同质产品产业内贸易中的企业行为与贸易政策进行了博弈分析,通过研究发现：寡头垄断企业之间即使在比较优势和报酬递增都不存在的条件下也会互相向对方市场销售商品;追求社会福利最大化的政府很容易陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境,从而导致双方社会福利恶化。本文认为,政府之间应该加强交往,深化合作,通过谈判解决贸易争端,避免陷入贸易保护的囚徒困境。     

Various wholesale price equilibria for mobile virtual network operators

In this paper, various equilibria are analyzed according to the leader–follower relationship between vertically integrated incumbents when downstream entries are present. This analysis broadens our understanding of the incentives involved in deciding the wholesale price, which can be applied to explain the different situations of diffusion of mobile virtual network operators in the telecommunications market. Several implications are derived to facilitate effective policy formulation and management.     

A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

We use the concept of cartel stability defined by d’Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16(1):17–25, 1983) to obtain that the sequence of play between the cartel and the fringe affects cartel stability in a quantity-competition setting where firms tacitly collude. We also prove that an endogenous sequence of play between a cartel and a fringe depends on the discount factor. If the discount factor is large enough, the cartel and the fringe simultaneously choose quantities since the stable cartel may contain more firms under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership. This is due to the fact that under simultaneous play cartel firms have incentives to participate in the cartel because otherwise no collusion is possible.      

Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.      

横向兼并的均衡分析：对价格、利润和福利的影响

本文在Salant古诺模型的基础上尝试建立了一个新的模型来分析横向兼并对企业利润、市场价格和社会福利的影响。但是,与Salant模型不同的是,本文不再假定企业在兼并前后始终保持古诺竞争策略,而是假定当兼并发生之后新企业采取的是斯塔伯格竞争策略,而未参与兼并的企业仍然采用古诺竞争策略。结果表明：参与兼并的企业存在很强的兼并动机,而且对于企业而言有利可图的横向兼并在一定条件下可以降低市场价格,也有利于消费者福利和社会总福利的增长。