Second‐Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective

Two firms with asymmetric costs engage in a Stackelberg game under multiple levels of uncertainty with information updating. A product life cycle perspective is employed to reveal when and why a second‐mover may have an advantage. At early stages in the product life cycle, when uncertainty is the dominating factor, the impact of uncertainty may be either positive or negative. As a result, the Stackelberg leader faces the possibility of either overshooting or losing its market leadership position to the second‐mover. In later market stages, when cost is more important, a process‐innovating second‐mover may accrue higher profits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cooperatives, regulation and competition in Norwegian agriculture

This article analyses the efficiency of current market regulations and market structure in Norwegian agriculture. Based on their potential to coordinate farmers' supplies, large marketing cooperatives are assigned a market regulation role. However, market prices frequently tend to fall below target prices, spurring costly additional market regulations. This is not necessarily a result of inefficient coordination by the cooperative. Using a mixed market model, the study shows that over production may be explained by the competition between marketing cooperatives and investor-owned wholesalers (IOW), typically weakening the cooperatives' ability to coordinate market supply. This conclusion is robust over a variety of IOW contracts. However, to what extent competition is to blame, depends on the target price level and the contract structure of the IOW. Moreover, it is shown that current market interventions to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production.     

Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification: C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.     

混合双寡头模型下的R&D竞争:不确定性和模仿视角

通过引入模仿参数δ来衡量R&D容易被模仿的程度,对Joanna Poya-go-Theotoky(1998)的研究进行了拓展,验证了其基本结论的稳健性。此外,通过引入二次R&D成本函数,研究发现,混合双寡头与私人双寡头情况下的社会福利的比较是不确定的,除了依赖创新规模P以外,还取决于模仿参数d,即——(1)对于任意的d,创新规模越大,私人双寡头越倾向于占优混合双寡头,混合双寡头仅在创新规模较小的时候可能优于私人双寡头;(2)对于创新规模比较小的R&D,只有同时具备较容易的模仿程度,混合双寡头才会优于私人双寡头;(3)在不完全模仿(d≠1)的情况下,在R&D越来越容易被模仿的过程中,利率越高(低),私人双寡头优于混合双寡头的最低P值先上升(下降)后下降(上升)。     

非线性定价的福利再分配效应研究——基于非对称双寡头市场的分析

较之"线性定价","非线性定价"在社会福利方面的优势被现有理论反复证明。在肯定"非线性定价"方式能够改进社会总福利的同时,指出并不是每一个市场主体的福利水平都能够通过"非线性定价"方式得到改进。通过建立模型、计算和比较分析,提出了在上述两种情况下,"非线性定价"可能会对特定的市场主体产生"福利剥夺",从而出现福利再分配效应。     

具有自营平台的制造商与零售商的竞争与合作模型

本文研究了由1个制造商和1个零售商组成的供应链中的竞争与合作定价问题,其中制造商具有平台直销渠道。本文建立了竞争下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并分析了解的唯一性和合理性,然后给出合作定价模型和各渠道的定价策略,结果表明制造商和零售商最优策略是降低线下渠道销售价格而线上平台销售价格不变。通过对比表明供应链合作所增加的收益等于非合作下零售商的收益,并证明了顾客对线下渠道购买偏好越高,合作所增加的收益越大。进一步地,分析了在合作的情况下制造商是否放弃通过平台直销渠道销售商品的问题,并给出双渠道下供应链总利润比单渠道下总利润高的判定条件。最后给出一个算例,对所获得的结论进行验证和补充。     

政府补贴下考虑销售努力的绿色供应链决策研究

在政府给予绿色补贴的情况下,考虑企业销售努力对绿色供应链决策的影响.以一个制造商和零售商构成的二级绿色供应链为研究对象,建立制造商主导和零售商主导的不同权力结构下的绿色供应链决策模型.通过对比分析不同模型决策,进一步采取算例分析进行验证,为企业实施绿色供应链管理提出相关建议.研究结果表明:政府绿色度补贴系数改变了产品绿色度、批发价格、销售努力、零售商利润、制造商利润以及供应链总体的利润;销售努力的投入会影响产品的批发价格以及零售商利润;无论是否考虑销售努力,集中决策下,供应链的效率总是大于分散决策下的效率;零售商主导的分散决策下,供应链效率高于制造商主导时的供应链的效率.     

A novel model to manage air cargo disruptions caused by global catastrophes such as Covid-19

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has drastically disrupted the air cargo industry. This disruption has taken many directions, one of which is the demand imbalance which occurs due to the sudden change in the cargo capacity, as well as demand. Therefore, the random change leads to excessive demand in some routes (hot-selling routes), while some other routes suffer from a big shortage of demand (underutilized routes). Routes are substitutable when there are several adjacent airports in the Origin & Destination (O&D) market. In this market, demand imbalance between substitutable routes occurs because of the above reasons. To tackle the demand imbalance problem, a novel model is introduced to estimate the quantity combinations which maintains the balance between underutilized and hot-selling routes. This model is a variant of the classic Cournot model which captures different quantity scenarios in the form of the best response for each route compared to the other. We then cultivate the model by integrating the Puppet Cournot game with the quantity discount policy. The quantity discount policy is an incentive which motivates the freight forwarders to increase their orders in the underutilized routes. After conducting numerical experiments, the results reveal that the profit can increase up to 25% by using the quantity discount. However, the quantity discount model is only applicable when the profit increase in the hot-selling route is greater than the profit decrease in the underutilized route.