基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链信用风险分析

讨论了由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的简单供应链,在销售商还款不确定的前提下,基于供应商和销售商订货过程是Stackelberg博弈,给出了他们的最优定价和订货策略,并说明了通过合理定价,供应商可以有效地防范信用风险;然后分析了销售商违约对供销双方及供应链的影响,并通过算例进行了说明。     

THE BENEFIT OF REDUCED COMPETITION AND THE COST OF INFORMATION RENT UNDER OUTSOURCING

We analyse the cost and benefit of outsourcing with adverse selection in a duopoly by comparing outsourcing with in‐house production in terms of the manufacturer’s expected profit. When two manufacturers faced with ex ante cost uncertainty compete in a differentiated duopoly, outsourcing brings about a benefit in terms of reduced competition, while it entails the cost of information rent. We show that the manufacturers always choose in‐house production in Cournot and Bertrand competition, when outsourcing and in‐house production follow the same ex ante cost distribution. When the manufacturers compete in Cournot fashion, the cost of information rent always exceeds the benefit of reduced competition under outsourcing. On the other hand, when they compete in Bertrand fashion, it is possible that even if the benefit of outsourcing exceeds the cost, both manufacturers cannot choose outsourcing.     

Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly

This paper examines a differential game model of international pollution control in which polluting oligopolists compete in a third country market. Two alternative policy instruments (emission taxes and command-and-control regulations) are considered. A tougher emission policy in the home country enhances the foreign firm’s competitiveness because of the static “rent-shifting” effect. The foreign country also enjoys a future improvement of the global environmental quality by “free riding” on the home country’s emission reduction effort. Because of these strategic effects, the levels of environmental policy determined in the noncooperative policy game are distorted away from the socially optimal level. Moreover, the emission tax game produces a more distortionary outcome than that in the command-and-control game; it generates more pollution and lower welfare.      

不同力量对比供应链中制造商竞争策略研究

笔者采用纳什博弈和斯坦伯格博弈结构,分别表述力量对等和力量不对等供应链中零售商和制造商的决策过程,分4种情形探讨了2个制造商在不同竞争策略下,供应链中成员的最优决策。从制造商的角度出发,着重分析在不同力量结构的供应链中制造商的竞争策略选择。研究结果表明:制造商竞争策略的选择依赖于产品的差异性及生产成本的大小。     

Convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of R&D: The undiscounted case

Will R&D increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time? We examine this issue in the context of a dynamic, alternate-move duopoly model of non-cooperative R&D. The asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market. Utilizing a value loss process constructed from the Optimality Equation of dynamic programming, we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time. We obtain this convergence-to-symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to R&D through the notion that R&D investment cannot be changed instantaneously, by allowing research externalities, complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated R&D, and either increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival R&D.     

一般需求函数下两级供应链定价博弈研究

研究需求函数为一般需求函数D=f（p）时,供应链中制造商和零售商不合作定价、合作定价的供应链利润。找出了两个充要条件,证明了在制造商和零售商之间不合作定价博弈存在纳什均衡时,该纳什均衡状态的供应链利润劣于合作定价的供应链利润。文中并且给出两个典型需求函数的例子：线性需求函数和柯布一道格拉斯需求函数。分别证明了它们均满足该两个充要条件,印证了所得结论。     

基于订单生产的供应链价格与承诺交货时间决策和协调

针对订单生产需求受价格和承诺交货时间影响以及延期现象,建立由生产商和销售商组成的供应链价格与承诺交货时间决策模型。研究表明:最优承诺交货时间绑定在服务水平上,提高服务水平可以降低双重边际化效应;相对于集中决策,分散决策采用较高的价格和较短的承诺交货时间,其最优利润和最优需求较少;此外,采用收益分享方式构建了供应链协调模型,得出销售商收益分享比例处于某一范围内才能实现供应链的协调。     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY WITH AN R&D RIVALRY

This paper is the first to examine the incentive for partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. We show that because mixed duopolies engage in more R&D, the optimal extent of privatization is unambiguously reduced. Yet, this reduction is often very modest. Adopting the extent of privatization that would be optimal if one ignored the R&D rivalry routinely results in greater welfare than retaining a fully public firm and ignoring partial privatization. Only when R&D has an extremely low cost would it be preferable to ignore partial privatization.     

Informative advertising with spillover effects

This paper studies the effects of advertising in a Bertrand duopoly model, which extends Grossman and Shapiro (1984) by introducing the spillover advertising effect on top of the direct advertising effect. It is shown that the spillover effects would make the environment more monopolistic: higher prices and lower demand.     

Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly

This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market.