企业创新战略的博弈选择

文章通过对古诺模型与斯塔克博格模型的纳什均衡解的比较，得出了大企业领导创新可赢得比原来更加多的市场份额,从博弈论的角度证明了大企业应该主动创新的结论。同时,在第二部分通过对智猪模型改进后的博弈矩阵的分析，明确了一般情况下小企业应选择模仿创新为自己的创新战略。     

Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t

Summary. In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.Received: 14 October 2002, Revised: 1 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43. Correspondence to: Hans-Theo Normann     

回收再制造逆向供应链中定价契约协调的研究

按分散式决策、集中式决策两种情形,分别构建了产品回收量与回收价格和回收努力同时相关的逆向供应链决策模型;并通过二部定价契约和回馈与惩罚契约对分散决策下的逆向供应链实现了协调,避免了"双重边际加价"所导致的利益损失,使得整条供应链的总利润与集中决策下的目标一致。     

Convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of R&D: The undiscounted case

Will R&D increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time? We examine this issue in the context of a dynamic, alternate-move duopoly model of non-cooperative R&D. The asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market. Utilizing a value loss process constructed from the Optimality Equation of dynamic programming, we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time. We obtain this convergence-to-symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to R&D through the notion that R&D investment cannot be changed instantaneously, by allowing research externalities, complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated R&D, and either increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival R&D.     

A general equilibrium model of bilateral trade with strategic public investment in commercial infrastructure

We explore how public investment in commercial infrastructure affects the composition of trade between countries. To this end, we develop a model of bilateral trade in which two countries produce, consume, and trade a continuum of goods. Goods are produced by a single homogeneous factor, labor, the productivity of which depends on the quality of the country’s commercial infrastructure, broadly conceived to encompass transportation, communication, and power transmission networks; regulatory and legal institutions; and basic research and educational systems. Countries may improve the quality of their commercial infrastructures through increased public investment. However, returns on these investments are constrained by fixed ‘natural’ endowments, with the better-endowed country enjoying greater labor productivity for a given level of public investment. We begin by analyzing optimal investment in public infrastructure in one country when public investment by the trading partner is fixed. We find that, ceteris paribus, greater public investment in commercial infrastructure raises general labor productivity, leading to gains in workers’ real income. We then analyze a non-cooperative game in which both countries strategically vary public investment in commercial infrastructure. We find that, in a Nash game, the better-endowed country optimally spends more on infrastructure and produces the goods requiring the greatest labor productivity. However, in a Stackelberg game, the results are ambiguous. An empirical analysis based on recent international trade data supports our theoretical finding that investment in public infrastructure is positively related to the export of ‘high-end’ goods.     

List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly

List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.     

技术创新扩散补贴机制研究——基于微分博弈分析

运用微分博弈纳什反馈均衡(Feedback Nash Equilibrium)和Stackelberg反馈均衡(Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium)对技术创新扩散过程中,采用时间定量补贴和投入比例补贴的两种补贴机制进行了研究。通过研究,我们发现在采用时间定量补贴的微分博弈中,纳什反馈均衡和Stackelberg反馈均衡相同,则先行动者无先动优势,补贴机制没有达到目标。而在改进的采用投入比例补贴机制中,存在唯一的Stackelberg反馈均衡:领导者是先采用者,跟随者是后采用者,则该博弈具有先动优势,从而达到了提高潜在采用者采用积极性的补贴目的。     

上游垄断背景下厂商提成特许策略研究

在原料供应厂商占据垄断地位的假设下,通过对比下游创新厂商提成特许前后的收益,对下游创新厂商的特许策略选择和创新激励进行了研究。研究结果表明:当技术创新规模较小时,下游创新厂商进行技术创新的激励增大,会对下游其他无创新的厂商进行技术特许;当技术创新规模较大时,下游创新厂商则不会进行技术特许。     

Entry and Vertical Differentiation

This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under the strong long run average payoff criterion. The qualitative features of the optimal entry strategy are shown to depend exclusively on the relative ranking of established and new products based on current beliefs. Superior products are launched relatively slowly and at high initial prices whereas substitutes for existing products are launched aggressively at low initial prices. The robustness of these results with respect to different model specifications is discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D83.     

The Game Model Analysis between the Individual and the Group

This paper analyses the game model between the individual and the group that has the characteristics of Stackelberg model in traditional game theory and replicator dynamic model in evolutionary game theory. In the first phase of game, the bounded rationality group players adopt the replicator dynamic behavior. Secondly, the full rationality individual player decides the own response function by the strategies distribution of group players. The shortsighted individual player will take the risk-dominant strategy. This model has some unique characteristics.