Strategic product showcasing mode of E-commerce live streaming

E-commerce live streaming can considerably help brands improve sales dynamics, but it is multiple dilemmas in choosing suitable e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes. To address the multiple dilemmas, we first employ the Stackelberg game to depict three e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes: brand self-live streaming, influencer-led live streaming mixture, and influencer-led special live streaming. Second, we analyze the relationship between choices and game parameters, including live streaming stimulus sensitivity, unit service quality improvement cost, and service sensitivity. Meanwhile, through the comparative analysis of the three modes, we get the optimal threshold of each mode. Last, we conduct a case study comparing Chinese apparel and accessories brands Hodo and RUANS to verify the above relations. The results suggest that: (i) the more sensitive consumers are to live streaming stimulus, the more beneficial it is for the brand manufacturer to employ special live streaming, while the increase in unit service quality improvement cost will harm the brand manufacturer; (ii) the fixed participation fee determines the choice of e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes; (iii) e-commerce live streaming product showcasing modes can help brands to optimize their decision-making.     

Endogenous location leadership

We analyze a game of timing where Sellers, which have marginal production cost asymmetries, can delay entry and a commitment to a location in a Hotelling type setting. When cost differences are large enough the game becomes a war of attrition that yields Stackelberg behavior where the high cost firm will delay choosing a location until the low cost firm commits to its position. We find interaction effects between timing and the degree of product differentiation and compute timing/location and mixed strategy equilibria through a range of marginal cost differences. The firms maximally differentiate with moderate cost differences; with somewhat greater cost differences there is intermediate differentiation, and; with large cost differences there is a blockading monopoly. The low cost firm always commits to entry immediately whereas the high cost firm either enters immediately, shortly after the low cost leader, or never, depending on the cost differences. Finally, we find that in equilibrium the duopoly is sustained for a larger range of cost differentials and that differentiation is greater than the social optimum.     

双寡头企业产量竞争的均衡质量安全水平研究——以受规制的食品企业为例

在双寡头企业产量竞争的基本模型基础上,考虑了政府规制水平的影响,分析了生产高、低质量安全水平的两个食品企业分别在古诺和斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型中的均衡质量水平及其相互关系,结果揭示了不同模型中两个企业的最优质量安全水平之间的关系及其均衡点。在斯塔克尔伯格模型中,以生产高质量安全水平产品的企业为产量领导者时,其产品质量安全水平、价格、产量和利润远高于追随企业;两个企业的均衡质量安全水平、价格和产量都随着政府相关部门规制水平的提高而上升。     

混合寡头竞争、污染物排放与环境税

通过建立一个混合双寡头市场竞争模型,借以考察在国家征收环境税的条件下,国有企业的私有化程度对污染物排放、社会福利以及环境税率的影响。研究表明:当国有企业的私有化程度较低时,继续私有化将会导致污染物排放的增加和社会福利的增加;当国有企业的私有化程度较高时,继续私有化将会导致污染物排放的降低和社会福利的下降;同时,环境税则随着国有企业私有化程度的提高,始终保持下降趋势。     

Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders always displaces the followers. Instead, how a stronger threat of entry affects the equilibrium depends on the technology. With strictly convex costs it is the followers that eventually displace the leaders.     

Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function

In this paper we analyze a duopolistic market with heterogeneous firms when the demand function is isoelastic (Puu, T., 1991. Chaos in duopoly pricing. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 1, 573–581.). We consider the same heterogeneous firms of Zhang et al. (Zhang, J., Da, Q., Wang, Y., 2007. Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with heterogeneous players. Economic Modelling 24, 138–148.) introducing a nonlinearity in the demand function instead of the cost function. Stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium and complex dynamics are studied. In particular we show two different routes to complicated dynamics: a cascade of flip bifurcations leading to periodic cycles (and chaos) and the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation which originates an attractive invariant closed curve. Comparisons with respect to the Puu model and the model of Zhang et al. are performed.     

Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly

We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo, F., [1997. The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375–384]. Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents’ previous output. Firms make mistakes and deviate from their decision rules with a small probability. Applying stochastic stability analysis, we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better off than are optimizers.     

The Role of Central Government in Tax Competition Between Heterogenous Regions

This paper analyzes the role of central government in a Nash tax competition between two heterogenous regions, which differ in their endowments of two production factors. Regional governments use a source-based unit tax on mobile capital to finance their public service expenditures. The central government employs excise subsidies and lump-sum taxes to induce the two regions to efficient resource allocations. We answer to the question that whether the central government can induce an efficient equilibrium, and investigate the effects of endowments difference on the optimum subsidy rates. We find that there exists a unique tax rate under which the efficiency is achieved. We identify the set of endowment allocations for which the subsidy rate to one region is higher (or lower) than the subsidy rate to the rival. The large poor region receives a higher subsidy than the small rich region, but the subsidy to the small poor region may be higher or lower than that to the large rich region. [H2]     

Barter Trading as a Microeconomics Teaching Device

Karpoff reports on a “barter trading game” in which students exchanged real goods over a period of seven weeks with different market constraints imposed each week. Student comments about the exercise were favorable.     

不对称R＆D活动下的市场绩效分析——基于有差异产品的寡头市场

为了研究在Stackelberg寡头竞争模型下企业在产品市场是否合作对市场绩效的影响,建立了寡头市场中面向R＆D工艺的两阶段博弈模型。采用逆向归纳法求出了产品市场合作与不合作两种情况下的古诺-均衡解。研究表明,从促进技术进步的角度来看,对于R＆D效率不太高的R＆D项目,产品市场合作策略优于产品市场竞争策略。从提高企业利润的角度来看,对于R＆D效率较高的R＆D项目,当产品差异不大时,产品市场合作策略优于产品市场竞争策略;当产品差异较大时,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。对于R＆D效率较低的R＆D项目,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。从提高消费者剩余以及改善社会福利的角度来看,对于R＆D效率较低的R＆D项目,产品市场竞争策略优于产品市场合作策略。