Airport partial and full privatization in a multi-airport region: Focus on pricing and capacity

This paper studies the capacity and pricing choice of two congestible airports in a multi-airport metropolitan region, under transition from a pure public, centralized airport system to partial or full privatization. We develop analytical models to investigate three privatization scenarios: public–private duopoly, private–private duopoly, and private monopoly. We find that, airports follow the same capacity investment rule as prior to privatization when capacity and pricing decisions are made simultaneously. Pricing rule after privatization becomes more complicated, with additional factors having an upward effect on the privatized airport(s) and a downward effect on the remaining public airport.     

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY REVISITED: AN EXTENSION TO STACKELBERG COMPETITION

This paper revisits De Fraja and Delbono (1989), which is the seminal paper on mixed oligopoly, in order to pay more attention to Stackelberg competition. First, we show that, even in Cournot competition, if the number of private firms is sufficiently small, privatization necessarily reduces social welfare. Second, we demonstrate that when a public firm is a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily reduces welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Moreover, we show that even when a public firm remains a follower, privatization reduces welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.     

Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of identical leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showing existence I characterize the equilibrium set and provide a number of results that contribute to the applied literature. As the number of leaders increases, leaders produce more and eventually they deter entry. Leaders produce more than the Cournot best reply, but they may underinvest in entry deterrence. As the number of followers increases, leaders become more aggressive. When this number is large, if leaders can produce the limit quantity and at the same time have market power, then they deter entry.     

供应链绩效控制的多目标主从对策研究

基于对供应链订货模式的分析,考虑顾客参与协调的合理性与公平性要求,文中建立了基于订货协调创新的供应链绩效控制的多目标主从对策模型,研究了不同决策机制下特定协调策略对供应链绩效水平的影响。应用改进的遗传算法,对一个化工品分销系统Stackelberg主从对策问题进行离线仿真计算,结果表明,订货协调创新策略可以有效地控制供应链的绩效水平,分销商、顾客以及整个供应链系统的绩效得到不同程度的改善,多目标Stackelberg主从决策机制更加合理,接近实际。     

基于Stackelberg模型的出口补贴政策对经济的影响分析

出口补贴政策一直是各国政府重点研究的战略性贸易政策之一。本文在Stackelberg寡头垄断模型的基础上，分析了当两国企业共同竞争海外市场时，追随者企业所在国的补贴政策对各国经济活动的影响效果。结果显示，补贴政策会增加本国企业的产量，提高本国企业的利润和净福利，甚至会在产品价格下降的情况下提高本国总体福利水平。     

混合寡头垄断、环境管制与清洁技术的使用

在一个由混合所有制企业和私营企业构成的混合寡头垄断市场,政府对企业的污染物排放进行环境管制,企业可以采用标准技术和清洁技术进行生产。研究结果表明,国有股份比例对不同所有制企业污染物排放量和排放价格的影响,取决于危害系数的大小。此外,清洁技术的使用提高了消费者剩余和社会福利。然而,清洁技术的使用在一定条件下对企业产生负的外部性,导致行业利润下降,而且排污许可价格也有可能上升,这都不利于激励企业采用清洁技术。     

成本差异对双寡头企业行为的影响分析

文章构建了生产成本不对称双寡头研发生产模型,采用逆推归纳法求解模型的Nash均衡解,研究了生产成本差异系数与参与程度、研发水平、产量间的关系。研究结果表明,生产成本差异系数与研发水平间呈正向关系、与参与程度和总产量间呈负向关系。     

面向化工企业的供应链模型研究

针对上海某化工企业与其原料供应商之间的Stackelberg博弈特征,利用二层规划理论构建了上层为原料供应商,下层为该化工企业的两层模型;然后利用仿真算例验证了模型的合理性,并简要分析了该化工企业存在的问题。     

Strategic trade policy and union-firm bargaining agenda

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between duopolistic firms and unions in an open economy with strategic trade policy. It is shown that, in contrast with the case of the absence of export tax/subsidy, a right-to-manage (RTM) arrangement always emerges endogenously as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in agreement between parties. Moreover, such an arrangement may be also Pareto-optimal in both exporting countries in the sense that profits, workers' welfare (provided that union's power is sufficiently high) and social welfare as a whole are higher than the efficient bargaining (EB) arrangement. Moreover, since the government of the country in which there is EB (while in the other country the alternative agenda RTM is used) levies a tax on export, then the conventional result that under quantity competition it is always optimal for exporting countries to subsidise exports may be reversed.     

Intertemporal monopolistic pricing of non-durables

This paper provides a tractable analytical framework to study intertemporal equilibria between non-competitive supply and dynamic demand for non-durable goods. The basic hypothesis is that consumers enjoy utility from particular services rather than from commodities. Consumption of the non-durable good follows a dynamic pattern, because it depends on the stock of durables and energy demand provides the prototypical example, e.g., mobility, thermal comfort, etc. are the output of a combination of durable and non-durable goods. Indeed, turmoils in energy markets are to a great deal due to short run inflexibility and this gives this theoretical paper a topical flavour. The outcomes differ substantially across the strategic setups while differences in expectations (myopic versus rational) matter only transiently but not in the long run.