Indifference to profit-sharing is consistent

The incentive for a firm unilaterally to switch from a conventional wage to profit-sharing is analyzed for a duopoly as a function of the degree of market power. The point of indifference is shown to be the consistent-conjectures mode of conduct; more competitive firms will not switch while less competitive firms will switch. A proportional tax on corporate profits will not alter the incentive of a firm to adopt or reject profit-sharing.This paper embodies the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve System or of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.     

Tacit Collusion in a Spatial Model with Delivered Pricing

Received August 5, 1999; revised version received July 20, 2001     

A dynamic Stackelberg model with production-adjustment costs

We investigate the (dynamic) stability of a stackelberg oligopoly model of a market of a homogeneous good, with output competition, one Stackelberg leader and a number of identical followers. We assume that each firm incurs quadratic production-adjustment costs if it changes its output. We present a simple necessary and sufficient condition for stability of the model. Using the condition, we compare the stability of this model with the stability of two related Cournot models in which all firms present are followers. It turns out that the Stackelberg model is more stable than these two Cournot models.     

Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium

Summary. We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwers fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the players action set.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 31 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D00, D40. Correspondence to: Robert A. BeckerWe have benefited from comments on an earlier draft made by participants at Indiana Universitys Microeconomics workshop (October 2002) and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh (May 2003). We also thank Roy Gardner for comments on earlier versions. We thank the Associate Editor, Mark Machina, for his detailed comments and suggestions. This project began when Subir Chakrabarti was a visitor in the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington in the Spring of 2002. He thanks that department for its support.     

A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets

Summary. This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium. Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001     

纵向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争模型

本文以Butters(1977)关于信息性广告的开创性模型为基础,引入Mussa和Rosen(1978)提出的纵向差异化分析模型,借鉴泰勒尔(1997)基于Grossman和Shapiro(1984)模型改进基础上的对横向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争的分析方法,建立了一个纵向差异化下的双寡头信息性广告竞争模型。我们通过Matalab软件计算了模型的数值解,得出结论:(1)均衡时,高质量产品生产企业的价格、广告与利润水平较高;(2)纵向差异化程度越高,均衡时,企业价格越高,做广告越多,利润越大;(3)做广告的成本越高,均衡时,企业做广告越少,价格越高,利润越大。     

非对称冲击下的货币政策协调：一个斯塔克尔伯格模型

本文在非对称性冲击的假定下，研究了货币政策协调的斯塔克尔伯格博弈。对模型的斯塔克尔伯格均衡解的分析表明，非对称冲击对货币政策协调的政策效果有着不确定影响。在货币政策协调领域，由于冲击性质的改变，斯塔克尔伯格博弈中领导者的“先发优势”和“先动策略”并不能保证其从货币政策协调中获取确定的政策收益。     

具有Stackelberg博弈特征的供应链协调机制研究

如果针对一类分布控制型供应链,分析成员的独立决策行为,就能得到供应链系统上下层之间所具有的Stackelberg博弈特征,通过对Stackelberg博弈特征的分析,利用供应链协调理论,再进一步给出具有Stackelberg博弈特征的供应链协调机制的设计过程.     

碳交易和绿色补贴政策下的低碳供应链最优决策与协调

考虑政府的碳交易管制和绿色补贴政策,针对由政府、单个制造商和单个零售商组成的三级低碳供应链,运用博弈理论建立了政府主导下的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型。重点分析了消费者绿色偏好、碳交易价格和减排成本系数对低碳供应链最优决策和社会福利水平的影响。利用两部收费契约和低价促销策略分别对所建模型进行了协调研究,并利用数值算例对文中结论进行了验证。研究发现:较强的消费者绿色偏好有利于提高产品的绿色度、渠道成员的利润和供应链的社会福利水平;产品的绿色度和供应链的社会福利水平在集中决策模型下最高而在分散决策模型下较低;政府的最优绿色投资补贴率在消费者绿色偏好程度较强时降低而在碳减排难度较大时上升;在参数满足一定条件下,两部定价契约和低价促销策略可实现低碳供应链的完美协调。     

基于渠道竞争的双渠道供应链低碳协调策略

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链,将渠道竞争和产品的低碳性能引入消费者的非线性需求中,通过构建制造商为主导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了分散决策和集中决策下的最优定价、碳排放水平和成员利润,并采用价格折扣-成本分摊契约实现了供应链的协调。研究结果表明:在分散决策和集中决策两种情况下,渠道竞争程度的增加均会造成碳排放水平、供应链利润和消费者效用的降低;集中决策下的直销价格大于分散决策下的直销价格,集中决策下的零售价格小于分散决策下的零售价格。最后通过算例验证了以上结论和协调机制的有效性。