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51.
一种逆向物流Stackelberg博弈下的库存契约研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
供应链中的库存协调是供应链管理的一项重要工作,而如何针对不同的供应链设计有效而合理的契约是其中的关键。本文分析研究了由一个供应商和一个生产商组成的供应链在集成条件下和分散条件下的最优库存,并研究了stackelberg主从博弈下如何通过设计契约使供应链库存达到最优。 相似文献
52.
基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益,就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下,文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中,建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型,提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平,进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性,更符合招投标实际操作的结论。 相似文献
53.
Oded Stark 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2004,14(1):37-42
We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification:
A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
54.
产业集群内企业之间合作创新的理论分析 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
集群有利于降低合作创新的交易成本、获得合作伙伴的隐性知识.企业选择合作创新,其动机主要是解决技术的外部性、分担研究开发成本和风险、获得合作伙伴的缄默性知识、实现技术转移以及获得巨大的国内和国际市场等.对合作创新的博弈分析表明,企业要形成合作创新的联盟,该联盟必须满足超可加性;否则,其成员没有动机形成联盟,已经形成的联盟也将面临解散的威胁.合理的利益分配方案是合作创新的基础.该方案是合作各方讨价还价的结果. 相似文献
55.
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a
class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph
games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like
this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that
each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties
in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations.
This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The
research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics.
Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme
for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the
Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We
thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 相似文献
56.
Miguel A. Costa-Gomes 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,104(1):104-136
M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91. 相似文献
57.
58.
具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。 相似文献
59.
知识经济时代,企业自主研发是增强其竞争力的必经途径。而在国内,众多中小企业对研发投入持消极态度,尽管政府多方鼓励,但收效不大,且企业在自主研发的投入方面与发达国家有着较大的差距。可从严格保护研发成果、协作研发与加大政府的政策优惠力度等方面对中国中小企业的研发投入情况进行改进。 相似文献
60.
James W Friedman 《Information Economics and Policy》1983,1(1):37-53
This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium. 相似文献