Scenarios and design: Scoping the dialogue space

This paper examines the intersections between two futures-oriented domains of practice and research: scenario planning and design. Both are practice-led, with uneasy but productive relationships with theorizing. Exploring their relations offers ways to address challenges faced by interdisciplinary management research, which struggles to connect research and practice. The authors describe how they brought the two fields together. We outline how we convened, designed and facilitated the fourth Oxford Futures Forum held in May 2014. This event brought together leading practitioners and researchers in a collective inquiry based on self-organizing, generative and reflexive making and dialogue. How participants engaged, from responding to the invitation to take part, as well as their practical and discursive encounters with one another during the event, threw up similarities and differences between the two fields. We present nine themes that capture the links and spaces between design and scenarios, yet suggest that they are not a straightforward overlap or a simple relationship, but rather a range of interactions between the fields, including feeding in, bridging, tension and repulsion. The paper's contribution is to suggest how scenario planning can engage with design, resulting in new opportunities for research and projects. These modes of engagement provide a framing to explore dialogues between other management disciplines.     

A strategic planning model for the railway system accident rescue problem

The present study examines the location of emergency rescue problems for urban ambulance and railway emergency systems. The proposed model considers probabilistic rescue demand, independent busy fractions of ambulances, and the corresponding risk levels in railway segments. We formulate the proposed model using fuzzy multi-objective programming and solve it using a generic algorithm and a non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm-II. Computation results are analyzed by applying the model to a real-world Taiwan railway system. Analytical results demonstrate that a proper adjustment of the rescue resource location improves rescue effectiveness for railway rescue and urban medical service demand.     

Network games with incomplete information

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players’ information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz–Bonacich centralities.     

Changes in risk and strategic interaction

In this paper we study the comparative statics of Nth degree stochastic dominance shifts in a large class of non-cooperative games. We consider symmetric equilibria as well as asymmetric equilibria in which the risk changes are idiosyncratic and not necessarily of the same stochastic order. Furthermore, we establish conditions for risk changes to produce multiplier effects on equilibrium strategies. Finally, we evaluate the comparative statics of stochastic dominance shifts in supermodular games, which may feature multiple equilibria and non-convex strategy sets.     

A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes

Global games emerged as an approach to equilibrium selection. For a general setting with supermodular payoffs, unique selection of equilibrium has been obtained through iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the case of global games with strategic substitutes, uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, making the equilibrium less appealing. In this work we provide a condition for dominance solvability in a simple three-player binary-action global game with strategic substitutes. This opens an unexplored research agenda on the study of global games with strategic substitutes.     

The dark and the bright side of liquidity risks: Evidence from open-end real estate funds in Germany

During the 6-month period from December 2005 to June 2006, the German Real Estate mutual fund industry suffered an unprecedented liquidity crisis. We investigate to what extend competing theories of liquidity crises help explain this event. Our results show that fundamental factors not only mattered for the liquidity outflow in normal times but also during the crisis. However, strategic complementarities accelerated the withdrawals during the crisis suggesting that pure panic behavior contributed substantially to the massive outflows. Thus higher liquidity buffers might help mitigating these tail events. Furthermore, we find that funds with a lower fraction of shares held by institutional investors suffered from less significant outflows suggesting that a segmentation of funds for different investor groups might help mitigate panics.     

Stability of international environmental agreements under isoelastic utility

There is now a growing consensus that ratifying International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) is the most effective way to tackle transboundary pollution problems. While the social benefit function (SBF) critically affects emission choices as well as decisions to ratify IEAs, the related economic literature has mainly concentrated on scenarios where the marginal SBF is linear. Using climatic data, I find that the linear marginal SBF case does not match data and isoelastic SBFs fit data better. In the more realistic, but not yet explored, context of isoelastic SBFs, I reconsider incentives to ratify IEAs. My analysis gives rise to novel conclusions. For instance, changes in the scale of damages do not affect the level of cooperation. When the scale of damages is small, variations of the SBF parameter reveal that large coalitions including the coalition of all countries are stable, but only when the potential gain from cooperation is sufficiently high.     

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

Decision-making in incomplete markets with ambiguity—a case study of a gas field acquisition

We apply utility indifference pricing to solve a contingent claim problem, valuing a connected pair of gas fields where the underlying process is not standard Geometric Brownian Motion and the assumption of complete markets is not fulfilled. First, empirical data are often characterized by time-varying volatility and fat tails; therefore, we use Gaussian generalized autoregressive score (GAS) and GARCH models, extending them to Student’s t-GARCH and t-GAS. Second, an important risk (reservoir size) is not hedgeable. As a result, markets are incomplete which makes preference free pricing impossible and thus standard option pricing methodology inapplicable. Therefore, we parametrize the investor’s risk preference and use utility indifference pricing techniques. We use Least Squares Monte Carlo simulations as a dimension reduction technique in solving the resulting stochastic dynamic programming problems. Moreover, an investor often only has an approximate idea of the true probabilistic model underlying variables, making model ambiguity a relevant problem. We show empirically how model ambiguity affects project values, and importantly, how option values change as model ambiguity gets resolved in later phases of the projects. We show that traditional valuation approaches will consistently underestimate the value of project flexibility and in general lead to overly conservative investment decisions in the presence of time-dependent stochastic structures.     

Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play.