Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information [Rubinstein, A., 1989. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under ‘almost common knowledge’. Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 385–391], we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk games [Crawford, V.P., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431–1451], and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero-sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem.     

Standards,innovation, and latecomer economic development: Conceptual issues and policy challenges

Little is known about the impact of standards on the economic development of countries which are latecomers to industrial manufacturing and innovation. Standardization is regarded primarily as a technical issue, and hence receives only limited high-level policy support.However, technical standards contribute at least as much as patents to economic growth. As a key mechanism for the diffusion of technological knowledge and due to the dominant leadership by advanced countries in patenting, technical standards have emerged in latecomer countries as an alternative to patenting. However, latecomer countries and their firms have a set of capabilities and constraints that are fundamentally different from that of advanced countries and firms. This paper argues that latecomer countries should adopt assessment criteria that are more fitted with latecomer contexts which emphasize learning effects and building dynamic capabilities. The paper discusses current issues that are essential in understanding the rise of Asian countries in standardization. We also examine the critical role that patents play for standardization and argue that “strategic patenting” to generate rents from de facto industry standards can stifle latecomer economic development.     

企业竞合理论研究综述

近年来，竞合理念逐渐成为企业战略管理理论的主流。本文回顾了以竞争为导向和以合作为导向的战略管理理论，追溯了竞合思想的来源与内涵，然后从人性的利他性和竞合过程中的囚徒博弈两个方面评述了个体竞合的研究现状，从企业竞合的表现模式、参与主体、互动演化和绩效四个方面归纳评析了有关企业竞合理论的研究现状，文章最后指出了已有研究的缺陷和未来的研究方向。     

Ownership and Control of Central and East European Enterprises:

No abstract available for this article.     

对培育和提升我国保险业核心竞争力的战略思考

随着加入WTO后中国保险市场的全面开放,培育和提升我国保险业核心竞争力成为国内保险业可持续发展的关键.本文在对保险业核心竞争力内涵进行科学界定的基础上,客观分析了目前我国保险业竞争力的现状和差距,从而提出了培育和提升保险业核心竞争力的具体对策.     

论中小型企业的比较优势及其战略选择

中小企业要获得持续发展的竞争优势,不能盲目地追求"做大做强",而应在全面认识自身比较优势的基础上,明确战略定位,制订适宜的发展战略,力争"做精做专做强".本文通过分析中小企业的比较优势和战略定位,归纳总结了可供给中小企业选择的几种战略.     

企业策略联盟绩效的影响因素研究

本文由关系资本的三项关键要素--信任、友谊与尊重入手,讨论企业间策略联盟关系运作的影响因素,认为:基于对于联盟伙伴的信任,企业才愿意提供联盟伙伴进一步的资源能力;友谊的存在,是促进企业间勾通的顺畅,对于组织成员间的相互学习具有加分的效果.尊重联盟伙伴专属性资产的所有权,不进行抄袭、偷窃等投机行为,是保持企业间策略联盟关系的存续关键.     

Thinking creatively about markets

The paper takes a broad view of how economists identify market boundaries. Three types of definition are distinguished: trading markets, anti-trust markets and strategic markets. The first is based on the familiar law of one price, while the second follows US DIJ guidelines and is designed to identify positions of market power. Neither of these definitions suits the needs of one of the more recent and fastest growing users of economics, namely those responsible for corporate strategy decisions inside firms. The paper reviews why market definitions are a fundamental part of strategy decisions, and identifies several ways that such users might define market boundaries.     

Adherence to environmental law: the strategic complementarities of compliance decisions

In this paper we address why firms comply with environmental regulations when enforcement is weak by suggesting that firms choose their level of environmental compliance strategically. Our theoretical model shows that compliance decisions among firms are strategic complements—increased compliance by one firm will positively influence the compliance rate of its rival. In our empirical analysis we find that the compliance rates of other regulated entities have a positive and significant effect on a regulated source's compliance behavior in three of our four heavily regulated industries. If compliance decisions are strategic complements, this may partially explain high compliance rates in the presence of limited regulatory pressure.     

Outsourcing and strategic alliances for product development: a case of Banta Digital Group

Banta Digital Group (BDG) is a pre media company needing to fill a void in the market it serves. This need could be met by an application that consisted of software and database development. A problem arose due to two conditions. First, the company was late getting to the market with this product. Second, the company did not have dedicated resources to work on this project. BDG needed to adopt a solution that comprised of outsourcing and strategic alliances to fill this market need. The study reports how the company selected and managed strategic alliances through the creation of a virtual team. It also reviews details of the new business operating system instituted to foster an environment for further product and process innovation. Finally, the proposed approach used in this unique type of product development is described, which is also applicable in many business situations.