我国鸡蛋价格波动传导的影响因素分析——基于非对称的研究视角

[目的]文章采用鸡蛋价格的周度批发和零售数据,从成本、替代品两个维度探讨鸡蛋价格波动的影响因素和非对称传导特征。[方法]通过滚动回归的方式探讨非对称传导特征的动态变化,并进一步探讨了鸡蛋批零价格之间的相互影响和非对称传导特点。[结果]成本、替代品价格变动对与鸡蛋批零价格具有正向影响和非对称特征,但在静态的线性回归模型中并不明显。鸡蛋批发价格受成本价格变动的影响更大,而零售价格受替代品价格变动的影响更大。在动态的滚动回归模型下,成本、替代品价格对鸡蛋价格波动具有十分明显的时变非对称特征,但这种非对称传导特征并不一致。鸡蛋批发价格早期对零售价格具有正向的非对称传导,但近年来趋向于对称传导。鸡蛋零售价格对批发价格总体具有负向的非对称传导特征,零售价格下降对批发价格的影响更大。[结论]需要建立蛋鸡产业成本—价格监测预警系统,充分发挥产业技术平台、行业协会、学会等研究机构在生产决策中的指导作用。不断完善鸡蛋供应链建设,增强调控与监管政策的灵活性与创新性。     

Stop and Go Agricultural Policies with a Land Market

This article studies the design of farm policy in the presence of asymmetric information about farmers' productivity, a government objective to insure farmers a minimum "parity" income, an endogenous land rent, and diminishing returns on alternative (nonprogram crop) land uses. In this setting, acreage set asides are never part of an optimal farm policy, although compensated acreage limits are. When there are new farmer entrants who cannot be excluded from farm programs, optimal policy takes the form of a pure voluntary acreage limitation—or "buyout"—program in which high-cost producers participate and low-cost producers do not.     

刍议人类历史科技发展单一性的尴尬

创造性劳动使人类最终脱离动物,科学技拓展了人们认识世界改造世界的能力,但科技在引领人类走向快乐新世界的同时,也将人类引入战争、灾难与道德失效的困境,究其原因,人类在发展一种技术时忽略了其制约技术的开发。     

不对称信息下餐饮企业绿色供应链管理实践多案例研究

本文通过多案例研究方法研究了餐饮企业在不对称信息下实施绿色供应链管理的实践以及信任关系协调,即企业如何在供应链中有效地传递环境绩效信息,协调机会主义行为与信任合作之间的关系。研究表明：企业通过第三方独立认证,可以构建绿色品牌声誉,从而向利益相关者传递环境绩效信息;通过契约合同及纵向一体化可以实现绿色采购;不对称信息下,企业面临平衡信任合作与机会主义行为之间的矛盾问题,需要通过提高信任程度来实现绿色供应链管理的持续改进。     

不完全信息与网络产业激励性规制改革

规制体制改革的核心是解决信息不对称下的最优激励问题，规制体制设计的关键就是要设计有效的激励合约，为企业提供适当的激励以达到成本效率，从激励角度看，价格上限规制的效率最高，竞争是重要的激励性体制，网络产业竞争体制形成的关键是约束在位运营商排斥竞争行为和建立有效的互联资费政策。     

信息不对称条件下银行业市场结构与市场竞争研究综述

将信息不对称理论纳入银行业市场竞争模型是当前跨经济学与金融学两个领域的热点问题。本文从理清产业组织理论中银行业市场结构与竞争和现代金融学中银行业信息不对称研究的发展脉络出发,对信息不对称与银行信息垄断和市场进入壁垒、信息不对称条件下银行的市场竞争行为等文献进行综述,评估银行业市场竞争程度的测量方法和实证分析结果。希望此综述对未来进一步的研究有所启示。     

Interbank market frictions, international banks and growth

In developing countries and countries in transition, a lack of finance is regarded as a major reason for the underperformance of the SME sector. The financial sector does not channel funds efficiently from savers to the most efficient investment. In a general equilibrium endogenous growth model, we explain the underperformance of the SME sector by interbank market frictions. High information costs in the interbank market lead to a high loan/deposit spread and hence to a low growth equilibrium. The solution to this problem is twofold. First, central bank policy could reduce interbank information problems by providing effective bank supervision. Second, if the central bank is expected not to have sufficient monitoring capabilities, reputation and reserves, opening up the interbank market to international banks can substitute for insufficient central bank activities.The sources of this advantage in efficiency are stronger incentives for workers and managers (direct connection between effort and return), easier monitoring and greater flexibility (McIntyre 2001).     

Optimal Area-Yield Crop Insurance Reconsidered

The implementability of area-yield insurance contracts in the presence of symmetric and asymmetric information about the farmer's "beta" linking his yield to the risk-pool's yield is examined. In the presence of fixed costs and symmetric information Mahul's result that optimality requires setting the slope of the indemnity schedule equal to each farmer's beta is confirmed. When there is asymmetric information between the insurer and the farmer, however, this full-insurance contract is vulnerable to adverse selection, and therefore may not be implementable for general cost structures. The optimal area-yield insurance contract under asymmetric information is characterized.     

Price determinants of bred heifers: Do reputations matter?

Replacement brood cows are among the most significant investments for cow-calf operations, thus crucial to profitability. Many cow-calf producers find it cost effective to purchase replacements from a reliable replacement heifer seller, though by doing so they increase risk of reproductive inefficiency due to unknown characteristics of the heifers. When important information about a product is missing to buyers, a seller can build a reputation over time that acts as signal for quality. Previous work has explored reputation effects in feeder cattle markets, but to our knowledge we are the first to explore reputation effects in bred replacement cattle markets. Using data from an annual replacement heifer sale, we analyze the values of heifer characteristics and test for premiums from reputation development. After controlling for reproductive practices, breed, and other characteristics, we find reputation does not play the role that Shapiro theorized. In this sale, the lot order is strategically chosen and may indicate bred heifer quality to buyers, replacing the need for reputation as a signal. This study highlights the importance of quality signals and regional preferences in bred replacement cattle marketing and lays the empirical groundwork for future studies to test Shapiro's theory.     

Integrating Agronomic Principles into Production Function Specification: A Dichotomy of Growth Inputs and Facilitating Inputs

This article presents a general conceptual framework for integrating agronomic principles into economic production analysis. We categorize inputs in crop production into growth inputs and facilitating inputs. Based on this dichotomy we specify an asymmetric production function. The robustness of the asymmetric framework is tested using crop-level panel data on potato production in the Netherlands. The test results do not reject the proposed framework, and the asymmetric specification better represents the underlying production technology.