A division of the capitalist class and the market for money capital

In a one‐commodity economy populated by capitalists equipped with equal endowment but with heterogeneous linear production technology, a division of the capitalist class emerges endogenously. The capitalists with relatively weak technology, yielding the profit rate lower than the interest rate, become a money capitalist (lender), whereas the capitalists with relatively strong technology, yielding the profit rate greater than the interest rate, become an industrial capitalist (borrower). The equilibrium interest rate is derived by the associated demand and supply relation. From this setup of the model follow two essential relationships Marx establishes between the average profit rate and the interest rate: (a) that the profit (rate) sets a maximum limit of interest (rate), and (b) that the two rates are correlated in the long‐run. Lastly, the profit rate of financial sector is less than that of industrial sector due to the basic setup of the model where the industrial sector uses leverage to amplify the underlying capital profit rate, whereas the financial sector lacks intermediation technology, which would have enabled it to borrow profitably.     

Effect of religious priming in prosocial and destructive behaviour

In this paper, we study the behavioural impact of religious priming by showing participants religious words in a scrambled sentence task before a dictator game and a joy‐of‐destruction game. We also elicited data on individual religiosity and religious affiliation using a questionnaire. Priming religious words significantly increased prosocial behaviour in the dictator game, and the effect was especially striking among those reporting no religion, atheists and agnostics. The religious prime has no significant effect in mitigating destructive behaviour or own expectations of the other's destruction choice, but both destructive behaviour and expectations correlate positively with the multi‐dimensional religiosity measure.     

Modeling the time varying volatility of housing returns: Further evidence from the U.S. metropolitan condominium markets

This study extends the literature on modeling the volatility of housing returns to the case of condominium returns for five major U.S. metropolitan areas (Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco). Through the estimation of ARMA models for the respective condominium returns, we find volatility clustering of the residuals. The results from an ARMA‐TGARCH‐M model reveal the absence of asymmetry in the conditional variance. Dummy variables associated with the housing market collapse unique to each metropolitan area were statistically insignificant in the conditional variance equation, but negative and statistically significant in the mean equation. Condominium markets in Los Angeles and San Francisco exhibit the greatest persistence to volatility shocks.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.     

A quantitative study of financing efficiency of low‐carbon companies: A three‐stage data envelopment analysis

This study set out to evaluate the financing efficiency of low‐carbon companies. Applying a three‐stage data envelopment analysis with the data from 85 listed companies in China's low‐carbon industries over the period 2011 to 2017, this study has found that the overall financing efficiency of low‐carbon companies was relatively high, and the pure technical efficiency was quite steady over the period. The overall financing efficiency of these low‐carbon companies on average tended to change with the scale efficiency. This study has also shown that the scale efficiency was the main constraint influencing the financing efficiency of low‐carbon companies in China over the period. Our results are robust and have significant implications for policy makers and corporate managers.     

Behaviour‐Based and Outcome‐Based Control Systems: A Meta‐Analytic Study

Sales control systems are instruments used by firms to improve performance and other organizational outcomes. To understand their antecedents and consequences, this paper conducts a meta‐analysis based on 104 studies. The results showed significant relationships between behaviour‐ and outcome‐based control systems and the complexity of the products, bonuses, financial performance, sales innovation, organizational support and satisfaction with supervisors. The outcomes revealed that behaviour‐based control systems were the most effective mechanism in turbulent markets and for determining financial performance. However, outcome‐based control systems were the most efficient instrument for complex products.     

Does high‐speed rail connection really promote local economy? Evidence from China’s Yangtze River Delta

High‐speed rail (HSR) has led to a transportation revolution in China. This paper uses the county‐level panel data of China’s Yangtze River Delta to investigate the effect of HSR connection on local economy. To address the issue of endogenous HSR route placement, we use a straight‐line strategy to construct potential HSR connection variables as instrumental variables of the actual HSR connection. Both the difference‐in‐differences and instrumental variable methods show that HSR connection impedes local economy, especially in peripheral regions. The impediment effect is channeled through population reallocation from peripheral to core areas and the restructuring of industries.     

Arrow–Debreu equilibria for rank‐dependent utilities with heterogeneous probability weighting

We study Arrow–Debreu equilibria for a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents having heterogeneous probability weighting and outcome utility functions. In particular, we allow the economy to have a mix of expected utility agents and rank‐dependent utility ones, with nonconvex probability weighting functions. The standard approach for convex economy equilibria fails due to the incompatibility with second‐order stochastic dominance. The representative agent approach devised in Xia and Zhou (2016) does not work either due to the heterogeneity of the weighting functions. We overcome these difficulties by considering the comonotone allocations, on which the rank‐dependent utilities become concave. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of comonotone Pareto optima, and derive their characterizing conditions. With the aid of the auxiliary problem of price equilibria with transfers, we provide a sufficient condition in terms of the model primitives under which an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists, along with the explicit expression of the state‐price density in equilibrium. This new, general sufficient condition distinguishes the paper from previous related studies with homogeneous and/or convex probability weightings.     

Political corruption and capture of the minority

This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.