Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites

In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.     

The effect of CEOs on firm performance

The extent to which CEOs influence firm performance is fundamental to scholarly understanding of how organizations work; yet, this linkage is poorly understood. Previous empirical efforts to examine the link between CEOs and firm performance using variance decomposition, while provocative, nevertheless suffer from methodological problems that systematically understate the relative impact of CEOs on firm performance compared to industry and firm effects. This study addresses these methodological problems and reexamines the percentage of the variance in firm performance explained by heterogeneity in CEOs. The results of this study suggest that in certain settings the ‘CEO effect’ on corporate‐parent performance is substantially more important than that of industry and firm effects, but only moderately more important than industry and firm effects on business‐segment performance. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

以提高执行力为重点 推进科技工作的开展

党的十七大报告对科技工作提出了前所未有的要求,文章从解放思想、创新工作思路、注重实效、提高执行力、加强学习、执政为民等几个方面论述了如何推进科技工作的开展,并且特别结合湖南省高新技术产业发展领导小组办公室的具体工作,论述了如何加强和支持湖南省高新园区和特色产业基地建设,增强持续创新能力。     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

高校介入大学生村官全程化培养的路径研究--基于嘉兴市200名大学生村官的调查

以嘉兴市200名在岗大学生村官为调查对象,分析了当前高校在大学生村官培养中存在的问题,同时,高校应根据大学生村官“村官前时期———村官任职期———后村官时期”三个不同成长阶段,建立“村官就业导向型在校教育———岗位技能提升型服务供给———期满流动对接型职业规划”的全程化培养机制,以推动大学生村官的有序流动。     

Experience Matters? The Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Firm Performance

We sample CEOs of the 2005 S&P 500 corporations to look at the relationship between experience in the CEO position of a different firm and the post‐succession financial performance of the firm that they currently lead. We find that experience in the CEO position is negatively related to firm performance. CEOs who directly move to their current CEO position from the previous one and those with job‐specific experience in the same or related industry or at the helm of a previous company similar in size to the current one are associated with significantly lower post‐succession performance than those without prior CEO experience. The results contribute to the literatures on CEO succession, the performance effect of job‐specific experience, and the transferability of human capital. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

论市、县级政府在旅游行政管理中的 “位”与“为”

本文对当前市、县级政府在旅游行政管理中的“无位”与“无为”原因进行了分析，并从政府行政组织的结构、体制与实施机制角度出发，研究如何解决旅游行政部门在旅游行政管理中的“位”与“为”问题。     

中国企业执行力存在的问题及对策研究

执行力是决定企业成功的一个重要因素,是21世纪构成企业竞争力的重要一环。在激烈竞争的市场中,一个企业的执行力如何,将决定企业的兴衰。当今世界,中国的企业也正以空前的速度成长着。尽管如此,中国的企业依然面临着严峻的挑战,要继续保持高速的增长,就必须更加关注企业的执行能力。     

CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance

This paper examines the relationship between CEO incentives and strong and weak corporate social performance. Using the KLD database we find that incentives have no significant relationship with strong social performance. Salary and long-term incentives have a positive association with weak social performance.