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71.
72.
An Examination of the Structure
of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Canadian Investigation 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal
42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance
26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics
45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review
69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues
37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory. 相似文献
73.
上市公司高管薪酬现实状况、变化趋势与决定因素:1999~2009 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
以1999~2009年中国上市公司的全样本面板数据,对中国上市公司高管薪酬的现实状况、变化趋势与决定因素分析表明,中国竞争性行业上市公司总经理的薪酬决定基本遵循了市场的决定逻辑,治理机制也发挥了一定的作用;而垄断性行业上市公司总经理的薪酬由于行业的行政性垄断性质,使其在决定机制上偏离了市场原则,尽管其利用政治激励等方式使其薪酬水平在绝对意义上相对较低,但这一措施却扭曲了公司治理机制的正常作用。在其他条件一定的情况下,企业的政府控制特别是中央政府控制,由于其委托-代理链条的延长,使企业高管薪酬比私有产权控制企业相对更高。 相似文献
74.
What happens to CEOs after they are let go by their firm? This study is designed to investigate CEOs who are rehired as CEOs by another firms after turnover. CEOs defined as “moderately optimistic” and those who left voluntarily from their departing firms, are younger, have better prior performance, and work in larger firms are found to have a greater likelihood of being rehired as a CEO by another employer. Moreover, new-hire firms with higher growth opportunity and higher R&D expenditures are found to be significantly more willing to hire overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, more-optimistic CEOs are found to receive higher total compensation from their new-hire firms than CEOs who are less optimistic. Finally, overconfident CEOs working in firms with high growth opportunity and higher R&D show a significantly greater tendency toward increasing firm investment. 相似文献
75.
选取2012—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验创新驱动发展与企业劳动收入份额之间的关系,以及高管股权激励和员工持股对上述关系的调节效应。研究发现:企业创新驱动发展能够有效提高企业劳动收入份额;实施高管股权激励和员工持股计划均能显著增强上述关系。进一步研究发现,盈利水平发挥了部分中介效应,且当企业处于成长期和衰退期、市场化程度较高的地区以及为非国有企业时,上述关系更显著。研究结论表明,特别是处于成长期与衰退期、市场化程度较高地区的企业,以及非国有企业,大力推动创新驱动发展,并辅之以高管股权激励和员工持股计划,可以提高企业劳动收入份额,实现和谐发展,推进共同富裕目标实现。 相似文献
76.
本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性框架下,运用动态面板System GMM估计方法,在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下,研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明:(1)前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关,前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关;(2)前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应;(3)高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在"交互效应",即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响;(4)高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。 相似文献
77.
何秋琴 《黑龙江商学院学报》2014,(4):491-495
以2005年5月1日~2007年12月31日的国有-国有、行业未变更的控制权转移公司为样本,在控制高管变更等因素后,检验薪酬变动与控制权转移后业绩变动的相关关系,研究发现:高管薪酬增加与控制权转移后业绩改善存在显著的正相关关系。这一结论对国有上市公司薪酬改革和控制权转移后如何提升公司业绩具有重要意义。 相似文献
78.
梁艺 《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》2014,(5):27-33
信息公开的制度价值并不限于监督依法行政与保障信息获取权。以杭州市政府开放式决策实践为观察样本,其将《政府信息公开条例》中对公众广泛知晓并参与重大事项的保障作为制度基点,构建了吸纳多元意见的信息渠道,将公众的直接参与导入政府的日常决策。开放式决策模式的实质目的在于证成现代行政权的正当性。在开放式决策的视角下,信息公开正是以充分主动公开作为参与的前提、以保障申请公开获得更广泛的决策认同、以互动协商促进决策结果合理化的多维视角化解现代行政权的正当性危机。把握信息公开重塑现代行政权正当性的关键作用,重新认识信息公开的制度价值理念,将促进行政机关更为主动、积极地回应信息公开。 相似文献
79.
高校设置总会计师适应高校经费收支多元化、复杂化现实,是回应有关制度要求的实践选择.新时期,我国高校组织特性呈现出新的变化,高校领导班子能力建设尝试新的实践探索.高校设置总会计师能够呼应这些新变化的需要,从而促进财务管理工作的科学化、专业化、精细化发展走向,提高管理的质量与效率.因此,高校设置总会计师可以从总会计师的职责权限、制度建设、任免方式及监管体系等方面统筹考虑. 相似文献
80.
Christian Andres Inga van den Bongard Mirco Lehmann 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2013,40(9-10):1221-1246
We investigate the relationship between firm governance and the board's position in the social network of directors. Using a sample of 133 German firms over the four‐year period from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms with intensely connected supervisory boards are (1) associated with lower firm performance, and (2) pay their executives significantly more. We interpret these results as evidence of poor monitoring in firms with directors who are more embedded in the social network. In both cases, simple measures for busy directors that were used by other studies in the past fail to show any significant pattern. The findings suggest that the quality and structural position of additional board seats may play a bigger role than simply the number of board appointments. 相似文献