基于TCP/UDP的计算机通讯系统实现

通过利用VisualBasic6.0所提供的WinSock控件,在TCP/UDP协议上设计一个应用程序,就可以连接两台计算机实现数据通讯。文章介绍了TCP/UDP协议的原理,阐明了该系统的实现方法,探索了在客户方和服务方之间建立一条面向连接的虚电路的方法或是直接建立无连接的不可靠的UDP链路来完成数据传送的实现过程。     

价值型投资在中国证券市场上的有力证据

本文给出了1994年至2005年间价值型投资在中国A股市场中的有力证据。Fama—MacBeth回归表明在中国A股市场中存在着显著的市盈率和市净率溢价，1994年至2005年中牛市和熊市的滚动策略显示了我国A股市场中的价值效应，并且风险和收益之间基本上呈现出收益大、风险大的特征。本文的实证研究结果将有助于中小投资者以及机构投资者的长期投资决策。     

数字证书撤销方法的研究现状

证书撤销一直是公钥基础设施(PKI)研究和应用中的一个难点问题.文章对目前应用和研究中的证书撤销机制进行了介绍,详细描述了各种机制的实现原理,并对其优缺点进行了剖析,最后对证书撤销机制的研究作了展望.     

基于GASA算法的提前或拖期问题优化

针对企业生产的提前 /拖期问题,提出了提前 /拖期问题的数学模型,在此基础上,利用GASA混合优化策略优化之,既保留了传统遗传算法能很快达到最优值领域的优点,又通过结合模拟退火算法大大改善传统遗传算法在后期的收敛性。     

行为资产组合理论：理论基础、内容及对异象的解释

行为金融理论于20世纪80年代兴起，它通过将行为因素引入决策过程从而对传统的金融理论做出补充。谢夫林(Shefrin)和斯特曼(Statman)在现代资产组合理论的基础上提出了行为资产组合理论，该理论是行为金融的理论基础之一。行为资产组合理论的基础包括安全第一组合理论和安全、潜力和期望理论。内容分为单一账户资产组合理论和多重账户资产组合理论。行为资产组合理论能够对市场中的一些异象做出合理的解释。     

从交易费用的角度看行政补偿程序

我国新的宪法修正案确定了财产征收或征用必须给予补偿的规定之后,对补偿程序不合理之处的修改愈显必需。行政补偿程序是双方当事人一个讨价还价的过程,降低在谈判协商过程中的交易费用,要求行政补偿程序设计者必须合理配置双方的权利与义务。     

ERP中工资管理子系统的解决方案研究与实现

提出典型中小制造企业信息化建设中ERP系统整体解决方案,分析了定单式中小企业ERP系统中工资管理子系统与其它子系统的联系、系统体系结构和系统开发实现的关键技术,并重点讨论了基于B/S架构ERP系统中工资管理子系统开发中的一些关键技术.     

房地产财务管理工作中关键环节的有效控制研究

房地产行业是国家经济中重要的支柱性产业之一,其发展十分迅速。随着国家陆续出台对房地产行业宏观调控的政策,房地产企业之间的竞争也在逐渐加剧,使很多房地产项目的开发面临着财务风险和资金压力。因此,房地产企业应该结合自身发展情况,在企业管理工作中制定对关键环节有效控制的相关制度,从而使得房地产企业实现可持续性发展。     

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule

Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.