Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Trade-off Model of Debt Maturity Structure

In this paper, we suggest the trade-off model to explain the choice of debt maturity. This model is based on balancing between risk and reward of using shorter-term loans. Shorter-term loans have cost advantage over, but incur higher refinancing and interest rate risk than longer-term loans. Using the Compustat data, we show that the principal components of financial attributes are financial flexibility and financial strength. Therefore, only firms with greater financial flexibility and financial strength can use proportionately more short-term loans. We also document that financially strong firms take advantage of lower interest rates of short-term debt. They use proportionately more short-term loans when the term premium is high. The results of our study also provide evidence supporting the agency cost hypothesis, which is strongly supported by current literature.     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

对发展我国汽车金融服务市场的思考

我国现有的非银行金融机构,不具备专业办理汽车消费信贷的要求。为此,我国金融机构序列中应增加一类新的机构———汽车金融公司,专门办理汽车消费信贷业务。这对我国汽车产业的发展必定是一个极大的促进。为此,需要我们在发展汽车金融服务市场方面作深入地研究。     

基于EVA的股票期权激励机制探讨

在委托代理关系中，企业所有者和经营者的目标函数存在差异，由此产生代理成本，需要对经营者进行相应的激励。然而，基于传统业绩评价而实施的股票期权存在一些弊端。本文探索将股票期权嫁接到EVA（经济附加值）平台之上，提出了基于EVA的经理人股票期权激励方案，以期能更有效地解决激励问题。     

管理层收购(MBO)与我国国企改革

管理层收购(Management Buy-outs,MBO)广泛流行于欧美国家,为企业提供了一种新的发展模式。近几年来,管理层收购(MBO)在中国也有了较快的发展。本文的宗旨在于对管理层收购自身的优缺点及其在我国的发展现状进行客观评价,进而推动国有企业改革走上健康发展之路。     

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board governance and corporate performance

We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world.     

Carbon Disclosure,Financial Transparency,and Agency Cost: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies

Given the constraints on carbon emissions due to their impact on global warming, carbon disclosure has become an important way to deliver signals to the market. We examine the benefits associated with carbon disclosure from the standpoint of corporate social responsibility (CSR) for China’s manufacturing industries from 2010 to 2014. We divide corporations into heavily polluting and non-heavily polluting groups in order to control the industry factor. Based on the Principal-Agent Theory, we empirically test the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial transparency, and we evaluate the effect of carbon disclosure on agency costs and operations. Our results highlight that carbon disclosure is negatively associated with agency costs. However, we do not find enough evidence to prove what role financial transparency plays in the relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost. Therefore, the influence of financial transparency as a mechanism is not yet clear. This study provides a way to look at the intentions of firms that disclose carbon information, and it also enhances the literature on carbon disclosure and agency costs in China based on Chinese data.     

Can employee ownership and human resource management policies clash in worker cooperatives? Lessons from a defunct cooperative

The article analyzes the interaction between employee ownership, HRM policies and practices, and HRM outcomes in what was the world's biggest industrial worker cooperative for decades, and now defunct, Fagor Electrodomésticos. Using longitudinal internal data and detailed interviews with key stakeholders, this paper sheds light on how employee ownership conditioned HRM policies. HRM outcomes—such as job satisfaction and absenteeism—are also analyzed over a long period of time. Chronic nepotism when recruiting new members, failures in the training policy, impoverished and Taylorist working systems, and reverse dominance hierarchies are analyzed as factors that increased free riding and caused low satisfaction and the disengagement of working members. This case study contributes to the literature on HRM and worker cooperatives as it provides some insights that are rarely found in that literature. It also provides guidance to worker cooperatives about increasing the fit between employee ownership and HRM policies and outcomes.