论电子政务安全的法律环境

电子政务是近几年出现的一个新概念,指公共管理组织在政务活动中,全面应用现代信息技术特别是互联网技术,进行办公、管理,为社会提供各种公共服务的一种治理方式.但电子政务的发展面临着一大制约因素即安全问题.应从黑客、病毒及信息安全、网络安全的法律防范四方面建立电子政务的安全法律环境.     

西方产业竞争政策的体系和目标

本文讨论美国、欧共体和日本的竞争政策的方法和体系的差异问题。美国的竞争政策侧重于追求消费者剩余和生产者剩余最大化 ,强调通过竞争的作用来达到这一经济效率目标。欧共体的竞争政策则强调在消费者福利的基础地位 ,通过协调竞争规则来促进欧共体经济一体化的进程。日本的反垄断法原本从西方吸收过来的 ,经过半个世纪的发展和演变 ,已经具有明显的日本特色 ,其基本功特征是对价格机制的运作缺乏信任 ,对规模经济神话的盲目崇拜和信任 ,结果是经常提倡和鼓励那种必然会导致寡占市场结构的兼并活动。     

旅游者自主性非生态行为的心理学分析与治理对策

在国内外的旅游过程中，我国旅游者往往有较多不道德、低素质行为发生，不仅损害了景区和其他旅游者的利益，也抹黑了我国形象，已成为社会普遍关注的问胚。对旅游者自主性的非生态行为进行了分类研究，并利用心理学与行为学的理论与方法，分析了旅游者做出此类行为的心理因素和外部因素，进而结合游客管理的知识提出了相应的治理对策。     

对我国金融业经营模式选择的思考

国际金融业混业经营已成定势，并显示出强大的生命力和竞争优势，我国金融业目前仍处于较严格的分业经营状态，不利于参与国际竞争和自身发展。深化和加快我国金融业经营机制尤其是金融法制的改革势在必行。     

Patterns of strategic alliances between rival firms

This article describes the results of a research project which examined 171 alliances set up by competing firms in an international context. It presents an empirically-based taxonomy of such alliances constructed on the basis of a set of variables chosen for their demonstrated or assumed influence on the evolution and outcomes of strategic partnerships. Three contrasted types of alliances are identified: quasi-concentration alliances, market penetration alliances and shared supply alliances. They differ according to two fundamental dimensions: their symmetrical or dissymmetrical nature and the way in which they alter competition. Legal structure, often emphasized in previous research on the subject, does not emerge as a strongly discriminating factor. Hypotheses on the likely evolution and outcomes of each type of alliance are derived from the taxonomy.We are grateful to Barbara Gray, Stuart Hart, Aneel Karnani, Will Mitchell, Michel Tenenhaus, and to two anonymous reviewers for their very valuable and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Our research project was funded by Fondation HEC, whose support we gratefully acknowledge.     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

浅析当前金融体制改革中有争议的几个问题

本文针对当前深化金融体制改革中存在的有关改革的方向、商业银行命运与发展前途、当前金融体制改革的侧重点、中国金融体系以什么为核心、对政府监管体系的改革等问题的不同争议进行评价、提出自己的见解。     

审计市场中的合并、产业专用化投资和价格竞争

本文从产业组织的角度，分析了审计市场的合并、产业专用化和价格竞争等竞争行为，并进一步探讨了这些行为对审计质量和社会福利的影响。本文认为，审计质量的信号传递机制推动了产业中的合并行为，而审计产业的专用化投资行为在于策略性地阻止进入。由于审计产品的异质性、信任品特性以及强大的买方谈判能力使得审计市场存在激烈的价格竞争，而合并和产业专用化投资有助于事务所降低成本。因而，审计市场的竞争提高了社会福利。     

Capital mobility,wage bargaining,and social insurance policies in an economic union

In a two-country model with mobile capital we analyse decentralized social insurance policies. These policies are a compromise between the preferences of workers and capital owners. Due to wage bargaining, worker-based social insurance contributions are borne by capital owners. These contributions affect the profitability of investment, and consequently the direction and size of capital flows. Countries will take account of these effects in determining social insurance policy. Noncooperative decision making results in tax competition and an underprovision of social insurance. In addition, increasing economic integration, represented by increasing capital mobility, could imply a divergence of social insurance levels in the two countries.