A note on incentive incompatibility under franchising

This note provides a formal demonstration of the incentive incompatibility problem that exists in franchisor — franchisee relationships. It is shown that incentive incompatibility exists with respect to both price and quality. Several contractual mechanisms designed to mitigate the incompatibility problem are examined.     

国有经济结构分析与调整对策

国有经济战略调整是中央提出的国有企业改革和发展的重要目标。在计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转轨过程中，国有经济的分布仍不够合理，国有企业在竞争领域仍然占有很大的比重，在经济结构的优化方面仍然存在着一些不容忽视的问题。因此，对这一问题的深入研究，具有重要意义。     

试论不当得利的构成要件

不当得利制度发源于罗马法诉权,是民法中一项重要内容。构成不当得利有四个条件:必须一方获得利益;必须他方受到损失;必须受利益与受损失之间有因果关系;受益必须没有合法依据。     

公司财务控制机理:一个基于制度博弈的分析

财务控制的目标是对出资者和经营者之间形成的代理契约的冲突进行管理和协调.以出资者与经营者的制度博弈模型为分析基础,可以清楚表明财务控制机理特征:首先,财务控制本身具有的制度成本(控制成本)是制约控制成效的关键因素;其次,财务控制作为一种制度安排,应具备使经营者违背代理契约的外部成本内部化的功能;最后,财务控制本质是一种契约安排,是出资者和经营者之间多次动态博弈的结果,因此需要不断进行修正完善.     

基于混合激励机制的两层供应链产品开发合作博弈分析

针对供应商与制造商在产品开发合作中潜在的风险,建立了动态合作博弈模型,通过对正负激励策略的比较分析,得出两种激励策略按照一定结构混合运用能有效地发挥负激励降低合作风险、正激励增加合作收益的作用的结论。     

Capital structure and the control of managerial incentives

We present a theory of capital structure based on the power of shareholders, bondholders and managers to control the incentive conflicts in large corporations. The manager–owner conflict produces a trade-off between inefficiency in the low state and rents in the high state, and the shareholder–bondholder conflict produces under-investment as in Myers [Journal of Financial Economics 19 (1997) 147]. Since managers and bondholders both prefer more efficient actions in the low state, the two conflicts are interdependent. With risk-less levels of debt, there are no shareholder–bondholder agency costs, but managerial control over the incentive-setting process produces excessive rents. With risky debt, shareholders focus more on returns in the high state so that shareholder–bondholder agency costs increase but managerial rents decrease. Efficient levels of debt holder protection facilitate a reduction in manager–owner agency costs that outweighs shareholder–bondholder agency costs, and are decreasing in firm performance. The results are consistent with the separate empirical results relating control to both compensation and leverage, and suggest how future studies can be integrated.     

高新技术产业项目的绩效管理——基于软件项目管理的实证研究

针对高新技术产业广泛采用项目驱动的管理模式,在理论分析和实地调查的基础上,实证研究了客户、项目经理和激励制度对项目业绩的影响。结果发现客户对定制化需求大,但对标准化软件却有更高的边际利润;政府机构是大客户,但其垄断地位,所带来的销售利润率和项目交付率并不高;地域商务环境影响交易成本,进而显著地影响了项目的业绩水平;项目业绩受项目经理激励程度和方式的影响,但与项目经理认知特征无显著关系。这些结论说明软件企业在制定战略时,需以定制产品和定制服务为起点,但最终必须研发成为具有行业特点的标准化应用软件;在资源分配时,应重点关注地域商务环境好的客户,适当提高非政府机构行业客户的资源分配比例;应健全项目经理激励制度,促使项目提前完工,从而降低开发成本,增加项目业绩。     

绩效诱因契约设计对经理人风险行为的影响

经理人与投资人之间的代理问题是由于在信息不对称的环境下,投资人无法观察到经理人的经营活动是否真正从投资人的利益角度出发,从而引发了经理人的道德风险,产生了自利性高风险投资组合的逆诱因选择。通过应用选择权的观念推导三种不同的绩效诱因契约设计,对于抑制经理人自利性风险调整行为倾向有较好的效果。     

企业长期激励机制创新

长期激励机制匮乏问题一直是我国理论界和实业界最为关注的核心问题。指出目前在我国实行的长期激励措施的不足,提出了以“股息期权”,代替“股票期权”的激励方案,从而有效解决了我国目前的资本市场和法律法规对于“长期激励形式”的约束,可以为现阶段企业管理者进行薪酬激励机制设计时提供重要的参考和借鉴。     

Adverse selection in group insurance: The virtues of failing to represent voters

Compared with non-union workers, union workers take more of their compensation in the form of insurance. This may be because unions choose democratically, and democratic choice mitigates adverse selection in group insurance. Relative to individually-purchased insurance, we show that group insurance chosen by an ideal profit-maximizing employer can be worse for every employee, while group insurance chosen democratically can be much better. The reason is that democracy can fail to represent the preferences of almost half the group.Received: January 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: J51, D82, G22