激励、监督与经销商依从：依赖结构的调节作用

文章以代理理论为基础,实证分析激励和监督对经销商依从的影响及依赖结构的调节作用。研究发现：激励会促进经销商依从,而监督则会抑制经销商依从;相互依赖强度会削弱监督对经销商依从的负向影响,但对激励与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响;经销商相对依赖会增强激励对经销商依从的正向影响,但对监督与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响。文章最后对研究发现进行讨论,并提出管理建议和未来研究的方向。     

Increasing Charitable Giving: What Can We Learn from Economics?*

There is growing policy interest in charitable giving in the UK. As part of its Big Society agenda, the current government is keen to encourage a higher level of donations, highlighting new technologies, new social norms and tax incentives as potential mechanisms for raising giving. In the 2012 Budget, however, the Chancellor also proposed limiting tax relief on donations to £50,000, sparking an intense discussion about the effectiveness and desirability of tax incentives for major donors. This paper brings together recent evidence relevant to the ongoing policy debates.     

挑选合适酒店工作的员工提高激励效果

挑选适合酒店工作的员工是酒店成功的前提,是创造满意客人的关键。合适的酒店员工可为客人提供满意的情感体验,提升酒店在客人心目中的地位,切实提高酒店的激励效果。因而酒店管理者对合适的员工应建设一个开放型的上下级沟通环境,鼓励员工从工作中寻找乐趣,制定高标准的服务程序,提倡酒店的合作精神,并努力促使员工自行解决问题,同时关注员工的职业生涯发展,从而进一步的提高酒店的激励成效。     

政府的多重利益驱动与银行的信贷行为

本文以我国转型经济下政府、国有银行和国有企业的紧密联系作为研究的背景,深入分析了政府多重利益驱动下的银行目标函数,并以会计稳健性标准作为衡量银行对债务人信贷要求的指标,实证检验了这一制度安排下的银行信贷行为。研究结果表明:总体而言,随着一系列商业化改革的完成,国有银行的经营理念正在向现代商业银行趋近,对于没有政府干预或干预较少的贷款,其信贷要求能够根据债务人的风险作出相应的调整。然而,仍然存在的政治性贷款又使其信贷行为出现了一定程度的异化,即使得银行对债务人的贷款标准不能根据风险作出相应的调整,并且造成了其对国有企业和非国有企业信贷标准的差异。此外,来自政府提高资产质量的压力和向非国有企业发放信贷时潜在的政治成本迫使国有银行为了控制信贷风险对非国有企业要求过于严格的信贷标准。     

Short Selling Pressure,Stock Price Behavior,and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.