政府的多重利益驱动与银行的信贷行为

本文以我国转型经济下政府、国有银行和国有企业的紧密联系作为研究的背景,深入分析了政府多重利益驱动下的银行目标函数,并以会计稳健性标准作为衡量银行对债务人信贷要求的指标,实证检验了这一制度安排下的银行信贷行为。研究结果表明:总体而言,随着一系列商业化改革的完成,国有银行的经营理念正在向现代商业银行趋近,对于没有政府干预或干预较少的贷款,其信贷要求能够根据债务人的风险作出相应的调整。然而,仍然存在的政治性贷款又使其信贷行为出现了一定程度的异化,即使得银行对债务人的贷款标准不能根据风险作出相应的调整,并且造成了其对国有企业和非国有企业信贷标准的差异。此外,来自政府提高资产质量的压力和向非国有企业发放信贷时潜在的政治成本迫使国有银行为了控制信贷风险对非国有企业要求过于严格的信贷标准。     

Non-grant microfinance,incentives and efficiency

I show that charging interest on funds provided by donors or investors to microfinance institutions (MFIs) can increase efficiency, the total number of loans and borrower welfare, compared to grant or concessionary funding. In a setting in which MFIs supply costly non-contractible effort, putting a price or raising the price of loanable funds strengthens the MFIs’ incentives to put effort in credit administration or monitoring, to extend more loans, and/or reduce overhead costs. This theoretical result is robust to several variations of the benchmark model allowing for an endogenous lending rate, motivated MFIs and endogenous overhead costs.     

高管薪酬激励、在职消费与经营绩效——基于房地产上市公司的实证研究

房地产上市公司由于其行业特殊性,可能会产生大额在职消费,通过对薪酬激励情况分组可以分析在职消费对企业经营绩效产生的影响,从而进一步完善激励体系。通过选取沪深两市2013-2015年房地产上市企业为研究对象,运用STATA软件进行实证检验。结果发现：在不同的激励情况下,在职消费对公司经营绩效的影响不同。     

On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

When agents compete for a bonus and their productivity in each of several possible occasions depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times this is checked to assign the bonus affects the level of uncertainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the effort made by competing agents (Cowen and Glazer, 1996; Dubey and Haimanko, 2003; Dubey and Wu, 2001). Theoretical predictions are derived and experimental evidence is collected for two competing agents, with the bonus awarded to that agent who outperforms the other. Sampling occasions (1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric or symmetric), and piece‐rate reward are manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty. For control, a single‐agent case is included. Results indicate that, for tournaments, greater uncertainty does indeed lead to greater than expected effort and lower average variable costs.     

Contracts,incentives and organizations: Hart and Holmström Nobel Laureates

This article reviews the contribution of Hart and Holmström, the 2016 Nobel Laureates in economics. Holmström's work on the principal-agent problem answered questions as to what should (and should not) be included in an incentive contract. His work helped explain the simple structure of incentive contracts we typically observe in the real world. The models he developed have been used to address questions of CEO compensation, organizational design and optimal regulation. A key element of Hart's research focused on the question of what are the optimal boundaries of a firm (and indeed, what a firm actually is). In doing so he developed the incomplete-contracts framework, which has subsequently been used to explain many economic phenomena whenever renegotiation is important, including authority and decision-making structures in firms, why financial contracts look the way they do, and various questions in international trade and public policy.     

论企业年金税收中的公平与效率

企业年金税收中的公平与效率是互相促进、互为条件的有机整体。在市场化的运行过程中,企业年金一般要经历缴费、投资和领受三个环节,每个环节在处理公平与效率时,其侧重点各有不同。未来的年金税收制度的发展应尽快出台统一的企业年金税收法,体现不同收入者、不同地区的税收优惠差别。     

企业在创业阶段的纳税筹划问题研究

在企业初创时期,进行针对全局的战略性的纳税筹划,是每个创业者在正式注册成为纳税主体之前必须考虑与分析的。可以从设立的产业方向和设立地点、组织形式、纳税人身份到创业筹资及创业投资几个方面入手,根据我国的税收优惠政策及企业的战略选择对税费的影响进行纳税筹划,以帮助企业实现税后利润最大化。     

绿色税收优惠能促进企业绿色转型吗

基于2008—2016年重污染行业上市公司绿色转型数据,研究绿色税收优惠对企业绿色转型的影响。研究发现：绿色税收优惠对企业绿色转型存在激励效应,该结论在经过一系列稳健性测试后依然不变。进一步研究发现,绿色税收优惠通过减少转型中面临的调整成本发挥其对企业绿色转型的激励作用,且该激励效果随着产权性质与地区市场化进程的不同而存在差异。     

双重激励下地方政府发展新兴产业的动机与策略研究

本文建立了政策执行的双重激励模型,探索政治激励、经济激励与地方政府政策执行方式的相互关系。通过考察新能源汽车产业政策在地方层面的执行情况,笔者发现,地方政府执行中央政府产业政策的实质动机是经济激励。由于新兴产业的市场回报无法现时兑现,且其发展前景与本地的资源禀赋情况密切相关,因此对地方政府的经济激励呈现很大的不确定性和差异性。地方政府故而在平衡经济发展和政治晋升的情况下作出实动、暗动、伪动、缓动等不同选择。本文进一步提出了新兴产业政策制定和执行的启示。     

Contribution-proportional remuneration rule for employee inventions and its effects on effort and investment incentives

The practice of the Japanese court in case of a dispute between the employer and employee regarding the amount of remuneration for an employee invention has been to order that the additional profit from the invention be divided proportionally to their respective input contributions. We show that, if the employer’s investment and employee’s effort are weakly complementary, this rule causes the share effect (excessive incentives on the part of each party to expend investment or effort in order to increase his/her share of the surplus) to dominate the probability effect (insufficient incentives arising from the fact that each party obtains only part of the increase in the expected surplus), and thus leads to excessive investment and effort relative to the joint-payoff-maximising levels. If the court cannot capture the employer’s investment as fully as the employee’s effort, the employer’s investment may be too low compared to the joint-payoff-maximising level.