Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation

We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12     

企业晋升公平激励与优化对策研究

我国企业晋升制度不健全、监督机制不完善、晋升文化扭曲等原因导致了我国企业晋升激励中存在性别歧视、玻璃天花板、看重关系等问题。企业要构建基于组织公平的晋升激励模型,并从培育正确的组织公平文化,不断完善晋升程序,选择和培训合适的晋升决策者,帮助员工树立正确的晋升观念,扩展我国企业晋升激励路径等五个方面保障企业晋升的公平激励效果。     

众包式创新激励机制研究——基于委托代理理论

众包式创新是基于互联网交互作用快速兴起的一种多主体参与的合作创新理念和创新模式.它是指公司或其他组织将过去由内部员工执行的部分工作任务,以自由自愿的形式分包给非特定的、数量庞大的网络大众完成的一种创新模式.这种创新模式所呈现出的民主、平等、参与的理念及其汇集集体智慧的网络组织创新特点受到众多世界500强企业及创业企业的青睐,展现了无限的魅力.企业发布任务,参与者完成任务获得奖励的活动实际上是一种委托代理活动.本文基于委托代理理论对众包式创新激励机制进行了分析,探讨了企业应该如何进行激励机制的设计,使参与者更努力的完成任务,创造出更优秀的作品,以及不同激励机制设计对于众包式创新运行效率的影响.     

挑选合适酒店工作的员工提高激励效果

挑选适合酒店工作的员工是酒店成功的前提,是创造满意客人的关键。合适的酒店员工可为客人提供满意的情感体验,提升酒店在客人心目中的地位,切实提高酒店的激励效果。因而酒店管理者对合适的员工应建设一个开放型的上下级沟通环境,鼓励员工从工作中寻找乐趣,制定高标准的服务程序,提倡酒店的合作精神,并努力促使员工自行解决问题,同时关注员工的职业生涯发展,从而进一步的提高酒店的激励成效。     

经济全球化下的国际税收竞争与税收优惠

本文从经济全球化入手,论述了经济全球化、税收国际化、国际税收竞争与税收优惠的关系,主张纵向研究国际税收竞争,从国民经济发展的全局出发审视利用税收优惠手段参与国际税收竞争的利与弊.     

激励、监督与经销商依从：依赖结构的调节作用

文章以代理理论为基础,实证分析激励和监督对经销商依从的影响及依赖结构的调节作用。研究发现：激励会促进经销商依从,而监督则会抑制经销商依从;相互依赖强度会削弱监督对经销商依从的负向影响,但对激励与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响;经销商相对依赖会增强激励对经销商依从的正向影响,但对监督与经销商依从间的关系没有显著影响。文章最后对研究发现进行讨论,并提出管理建议和未来研究的方向。     

国内科研人员激励研究范围与热点分析

随着我国科技体制改革的深入,科研人员激励问题成为社会和学术的焦点。通过对收集的文献分析,发现国内科研人员激励研究的范围与内容主要存在几个方面:一是收入分配与科研人员激励研究;二是科研人员评价研究;三是科研人员激励宏观政策研究;四是科研人员激励机制研究;五是不同类型组织中的科研人员激励研究景,这五个研究热点构成了国内科研人员激励的研究范围。这些热点不是孤立的,而是相互交叉,在研究中应侧重于系统视角。     

Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.     

Can incentives mitigate student overconfidence at grade forecasts?

Research shows that college students exhibit bias in their forecasts of exam performance. Most students are overconfident in their forecasts, academically weaker students are the most overconfident, and top-performing students are underconfident. The literature identifies negative repercussions of these biases, including inadequate preparation for exams. A recurring attribute of this literature is the absence of meaningful incentives for students to forecast accurately. We implement an extra credit scheme to incentivize accurate forecasts. Depending on how forecast bias is measured, the scheme mitigates bias by top-performing students and marginally mitigates bias by other students. Our results have several implications. First, we illustrate an extra credit tool instructors can use to incentivize students to make more thoughtful assessments of their future exam performance. Second, we show how the association between incentives and forecast bias differs across student groups. Finally, we show that results in this literature are sensitive to how bias is measured.     

CEO Risk‐taking Incentives and Bank Loan Syndicate Structure

This paper investigates the effects of a borrowing firm's CEO risk‐taking incentives on the structure of the firm's syndicated loans. When CEO risk‐taking incentives are high, syndicates are structured to facilitate better due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates have a smaller number of total lenders and are more concentrated, and lead arrangers will retain a greater portion of the loan. Moreover, CEO risk‐taking incentives have a lesser effect on the syndicate structure when lead arrangers have a good reputation and a prior lending relationship with a borrowing firm, while they have a greater effect on the syndicate structure when borrowing firms have low information transparency, are financially distressed or have low growth prospects.