Burden of Crohn’s disease in the United States: long-term healthcare and work-loss related costs

Abstract

Aims

To quantify the long-term direct and indirect costs among patients with Crohn’s disease (CD) and specific subgroups of these patients in the United States from the private payer’s perspective.     

中国商业银行信用风险宏观压力测试

本文用Logit模型将贷款损失率转化为金融稳定性综合指标,并以此作为被解释变量,以CPI、GDP和利率等宏观经济因素作为被解释变量进行回归分析,并做出各宏观经济因素的预测模型。在此基础上,对下一期的相应经济数据进行预测,并对下一期经济分别受各项宏观经济变量极端可信冲击下进行压力测试。研究结果显示,以上三种宏观经济因素对贷款损失率影响显著,其系数的经济意义也与现实相符。此外,根据模型的回归结果显示,关于利率的研究部分准确验证了我国利率的产出经济效应和货币政策的时滞期。本文为政府降低贷款损失率,提高金融稳定性而进行系统的宏观经济调控提供定性和定量的参考建议。     

Are GDP forecasts optimal? Evidence on European countries

We assess the accuracy of real GDP growth forecasts released by governments and international organizations for European countries in the years 1999–2017. We implement three testing procedures characterized by different assumptions on the forecasters’ loss functions. First, we test forecast rationality within the traditional approach based on a quadratic loss function (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969). Second, following Elliott, Timmermann and Komunjer (2005), we test rationality by allowing for a flexible loss function where the shape parameter driving the extent of asymmetry is unknown and estimated from the empirical distribution of forecast errors. Lastly, we implement the tests proposed by Patton and Timmermann (2007a) that hold regardless of the functional form of the loss function. We conclude that governmental forecasts are biased and not rational under a symmetric and quadratic loss function, but they are optimal under more general assumptions on the loss function. We also find that the preferences of forecasters change with the forecasting horizon: when moving from one- to two-year-ahead forecasts, the optimistic bias increases and the parameter of asymmetry in the loss function significantly increases.     

A theory-based evaluation of food waste policy: Evidence from Italy

Italy recently reformed its food waste policy by introducing innovative measures, such as the possibility of donating food after the best-before date (BBD) and a significant simplification of the bureaucracy of donations. These measures are advocated by food waste specialists and are thought to increase donations almost automatically. The article performs a theory-based evaluation using the method of realist synthesis to investigate the two measures, test their implicit assumptions, and provide a more complete picture of how the policy works. The results highlight the marginal importance of bureaucratic procedures in the cost structure of donations, the diverse responses of different donors and food rescue organisations, and the importance of considering the capacity and preferences of charities when an increase in donations is expected. Further, the analysis uncovers severe reputational risks that limit both the supply of and demand for food past the BBD, despite legal provisions promoting its donation.     

The effects of pay regulation when agents are loss averse

This article analyses the effects of a regulatory cap on executive pay when the agent is loss averse. I use a principal–agent model with moral hazard in which a principal and an agent bargain over an incentive contract. I show that even a non-binding cap on the agent’s payments can have consequences for the bargained outcome and consequently for the effort the agent exerts.     

Empirical study relating macroeconomic literacy and rational thinking

We analyze macroeconomic literacy by insights from behavioral economics, while incorporating individual differences in gender, cognitive ability and academic institution. Our sample consists of economic students from two academic institutions in Israel. For statistical analysis, we used Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). Our main finding is that high-level male students who are prone toward mental accounting have very accurate expectations of inflation, interest rate and unemployment, i.e. they are highly macroeconomic literate. Yet, we found no indication that rational thinkers are more literate than others.     

The influence of accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks: Implications of bank regulation and the global financial crisis

We study the effects of country-level accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks and whether bank regulation substitutes or complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. We also examine whether the influence of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality changed after the global financial crisis. Using a sample of listed banks from 40 countries between 2001 and 2014, and abnormal loan loss provisions (ALLP) as our main proxy for earnings quality, we document a consistent and strong association between accounting enforcement and bank earnings quality. More specifically, an increase in accounting enforcement decreases the level of ALLP and decreases the propensity to manage earnings to avoid losses. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that bank regulation complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. Finally, unlike in the pre-crisis period, we find a positive association between accounting enforcement and income-decreasing ALLP in the post-crisis period, which indicates that stronger accounting enforcement is associated with more conservative earnings and higher loan loss reserves. Overall, our results indicate that accounting enforcement reduces opportunistic earnings management.     

Necessity of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion for the concavity of consumption functions

Carroll and Kimball (1996) have shown that, in the class of utility functions that are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and have nonnegative third derivatives, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) is sufficient for the concavity of consumption functions in general consumption-saving problems. This paper shows that HARA is necessary, implying the concavity of consumption is not a robust prediction outside the HARA class.     

The role of risk aversion in public goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: an experimental analysis

The purpose of this study is to extend earlier research on environmental uncertainty in public goods dilemmas. The present paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of risk aversion on public goods provision. A von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function with constant coefficient of relative risk aversion is used to investigate the impact of risk attitudes within a threshold public goods environment. The outcome of the threshold public goods experiment shows that subjects are indifferent to the changes in environmental conditions. Additionally, the analysis indicates that risk aversion is a significant determinant of voluntary public goods contribution level.     

基于DSGE模型的货币政策对银行风险承担影响研究*——兼论货币政策的应对

本文着力研究货币政策对商业银行风险承担的影响机制，并在此基础上分析货币政策应当如何应对。为此，本文构建了DSGE模型对比分析银行风险承担行为的传导机制，结果显示在信息不对称和有限债务的条件下，银行存在着道德风险，会过度地主动承担风险。为应对银行风险承担行为造成的低效率，本文设计了“最优”货币政策规则：货币政策应适当容忍通货膨胀的波动，优先关注实际利率，以降低由银行风险承担行为所导致的社会福利损失。