土地政策对北京市商服用地市场的影响

根据土地供应政策的变化,将北京市商服用地市场的发展分为三个阶段,分析土地供应政策对商服用地市场的影响;同时,运用土地竞租曲线和土地-资本替代弹性方法分析商服用地招拍挂出让市场的变化.     

中国汽车工业供应链管理的现状与发展对策研究

总结了国际汽车工业供应链管理的基本原理和发展态势,以中国三大汽车公司为对象,客观地从多个侧面分析了发展中国汽车工业供应链面临的主要问题,提出了我国汽车工业供应链的一系列发展对策。     

供应链价值流的分析与思考

基于供应链的竞争将成为21世纪的主要竞争方式。随着人们对供应链认识的深化,供应链价值流成为人们关注的新的焦点。供应链价值流的实现与否以及实现程度直接关系到供应链的竞争能力。通过对供应链价值流的再造,消除一切不增值活动,消除各种浪费,最终实现供应链整体竞争能力的提升和加强。     

基于供应链的集中式战略采购研究

在当今竞争激烈的市场环境中,采购管理逐渐成为企业新的利润创造源.基于供应链的集中式战略采购是指企业将采购职能和供应商资源跨部门集中管理,通过加强供应商合作,实现供应链总成本最低化和效率最大化的采购模式.该采购模式作为战略采购的深化,能够有效推动企业竞争力的提升.本文首先介绍集中式战略采购的内涵和特点,接着对该模式的竞争优势进行了深入分析,最后提出应用建议.     

供应链系统柔性经济定量模型

企业系统柔性是众多文献讨论得比较多的问题,然而系统地研究供应链系统的柔性,目前还处于初始阶段.在现有为数不多的供应链系统柔性研究文献中,定性讨论较多,定量研究方法多为模拟、加权评价法等.完整而系统地采用数学模型对供应链系统的整体柔性作出定量和说明,对于整个供应链系统的规划和决策,具有重要意义.但是,这方面的研究基本上还是空白.本文利用产品组合柔性（Product mix flexibility）的概念,建立了供应链系统的整体柔性经济定量模型,该模型能够对供应链系统的整体柔性作出定量化解释,从而帮助供应链系统作出柔性决策.     

Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution

We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economies such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty trap in which output converges asymptotically to zero. These results indicate that differences in the wealth distribution may be responsible for drastic differences in the long-run standard of living. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D50, O41.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

供应链竞争环境分析模型

本文将扩展后的波特模型用于分析供应链上几个连续环节组成的整体的竞争环境以及环节间的整合趋势。并采用新的模型分析了实现“厂网分离、竞价上网”改革后的电力供应链的竞争状态与发展趋势。     

对培育我国高科技产业集群的思考

产业集群的要素有企业、市场、品牌、协作关系、生产基地、专业化配套环境、公共研发机构、制度创新等。产业集群的模式有轴轮武产业集群、多核武产业集群、网状武产业集群等。培育产业集群的思路是制定产业集群发展规划、建设配套环境、实施专业化园区建设、培育品牌集群以及实施“目标招商”和“策划招商”。     

资本流动、货币供给与价格总水平--一个理论分析框架

在国际收支的货币主义理论背景下，资本流动与货币供应量之间是一个循环反复的作用过程，二者的相互作用在内部经济与外部经济取得新的均衡时结束。借助IS—LM—BP模型可以将这种复杂的循环作用过程以及作用结果通过图形进行演绎。固定汇率制度下资本不完全流动时的IS—LM—BP模型与开放经济下的AS—AD模型分析表明，在固定汇率制度下，资本流出对国内货币供应量有紧缩效应，并使价格总水平下降；相反，资本流入对国内货币供应量有扩张效应．使价格总水平上升。