On the Distribution of CBOE Option Trade Prices Occurring Between Consecutive Stock Trades

This paper examines the volume distribution of option trade prices that occurs when the underlying stock price remains constant. The width of these option trade price bands provides direct evidence on the law of one price and the redundancy of options assumed in many option models. We find that index option bands are narrower than equity option bands. Furthermore, for both equity and index options, puts have narrower bandwidths than calls. In general, option price bandwidth is narrow and can be explained by the minimum price movement allowed by the Chicago Board Options Exchanges (CBOE). This supports the single price law and the redundancy assumption. The existence of bid/ask quotes on the option does not materially affect the above results although it does alter the frequency of multiple option trade prices for a given underlying stock price. We note that over 53% of option trading volume occurs without bid/ask quotes on the CBOE compared to less than 15% a decade ago. Our results suggest that the effective bid/ask spread on options is probably no larger than the minimum price movements allowed by the CBOE. Furthermore, the need for the liquidity services of market makers may be declining if the decline in quoting activity stems from cross trading (i.e. trades not involving market makers).     

Pricing and hedging power options

In this paper we study the pricing and hedging of options whose payoff is a polynomial function of the underlying price at expiration; so-called ‘power options’. Working in the well-known Black and Scholes (1973) framework we derive closed-form formulas for the prices of general power calls and puts. Parabola options are studied as a special case. Power options can be hedged by statically combining ordinary options in such a way that their payoffs form a piecewise linear function which approximates the power option's payoff. Traditional delta hedging may subsequently be used to reduce any residual risk.     

Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52     

Entry in the presence of dueling options

This paper investigates the influence of industry uncertainty on the decision by established firms to enter a new industry. Specifically, we examine the tension between the option to defer , which discourages entry in the presence of uncertainty, and the option to grow , which may encourage entry in the presence of uncertainty when there are early mover advantages. Empirical analysis on data from a broad array of industries revealed that the effect of uncertainty on entry is not monotonic. Our findings are the first to find support for the nonmonotonic effect of uncertainty that has only recently emerged in theoretical treatments of real options theory, and amplify the importance of considering both the option to defer and the option to grow when contemplating entry. Furthermore, we found evidence that the relationship between uncertainty and entry is moderated by: (a) irreversibility, which influences the value of the option to defer; (b) the total value of growth opportunities; and (c) early mover advantages, which magnify the value of growth options. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

建筑业内寻租活动分析及其对策

在中国市场经济转轨时期，建筑业内寻租活动止以不同形式在不同的方面不断发生，给社会和公众带来了巨大损失，给政府的形象和威信带来负面影响，导致寻租的成因是多方面的，如何从根本上抑制打击寻租行为值得深入研究。     

再谈环境保护税设置——基于两类竞争制造企业环保技术创新策略的演化博弈

利用演化博弈模型分析处在竞争的两类制造企业(在位企业和进入企业)的环保技术创新策略问题,考量以环境保护税为主体的环保规制如何科学设置才能更好地促进制造业企业的环保创新.研究发现:创新效应和市场需求均影响企业创新策略演化的均衡结果,并在两阶段博弈分析的基础上,得出市场需求和创新效应共同作用下两类制造企业的生产策略选择方案.因此,环境保护税的改革与实施应注意掌握好时点,税率的设置应充分考虑不同行业环保创新效应和产品市场需求,进行区别化的、动态的税率设置,并加大其他税种对环境保护税的支持.     

供应链金融利益主体的多阶段博弈研究

现代经济中,金融在资源配置方面发挥的作用明显不足,出现严重的资源浪费和供需错配现象,加剧了中小企业面临的融资难问题.本文从供应链金融的内涵切入,建立以利益相关者为主体的融资量化模型,利用多阶段博弈理论对企业不同模式下的成本收益进行检验,结果表明:供应链金融在实现上、下游各利益相关者个体的最优化的同时,也可有效促使供应链整体的利益最大化、实现高效运作和价值增值,全面实现链上企业间的资源共享、互利共赢.     

Optimizing the credit term decisions in supply chain finance

We study a credit term determination problem in the context of a supplier-buyer supply chain. The supplier's credit term decision is simultaneously made with its production and inventory decisions, and most importantly, it is impacted by the buyer's order quantity. We present a new game-theoretic framework to model this problem, which captures the interaction between the supplier's credit term decision and the buyer's order decision in a multi-period setting. An exact method based on nonlinear programming is implemented to obtain the optimal solutions. We apply our methodologies on a real world case. The computational results show that our approach significantly outperforms the heuristics with fixed credit terms, and either a short or a long credit term can be sub-optimal for the supplier in profitability. Our work offers the first data-driven model and solution approach that assists purchasing and supply managers to make optimal dynamic credit term decision in conjunction with production, ordering and inventory decisions in a game-theoretic setting.     

论企业创新与规范化管理的关系——从智猪博弈的视角

企业发展稳定的程度,直接决定于企业基础管理水平的高低。企业基础管理水平的高低,又直接决定于企业规范化管理的程度。企业规范化管理就是通过建立、健全、完善、优化一套公开透明、上下认同、系统完整、行之有效的游戏规则来实施管理。可是,很多企业领导人总担心企业规范化管理会约束员工的创新探索,降低企业的创新力。由智猪博弈故事可知,一个企业有无创新力,与企业管理是否是通过游戏规则的建立、健全来实现无关,而仅仅与游戏规则的内容相关。任何企业组织,要保证创新力,规范化管理都是前提。只有规范化管理,才能建立、健全能激发员工创新热情、积聚员工创新能力的游戏规则。     

会计政策选择研究

会计政策选择是会计主体一种有目的的、在会计政策中进行挑选的行为,它与会计信息失真和盈余管理之间有一定的联系.由于会计准则的不完全性和会计信息市场的不完全竞争,会计政策选择行为必然长期存在.企业管理当局在选择会计政策时,是从自己的利益出发的,与会计信息的质量要求并不一致,因而,必须通过行为主体、会计准则、监管机制等方面的制度完善以达到提高会计信息质量的目的.