国有资产监管者监管研究

本文从我国国有资产监管体制改革的实践出发,从监管和监管者监管的涵义界定入手,探讨我国现阶段国有资产监管体制的性质以及所存在的缺乏监管者的监管、权责不对称、监管效率不高等问题,提出应建立由国务院和全国人大对国资委的监督机制,并从对国资委的财务、权力和行为、效率三个方面的目标入手,通过建立人大报告制度、加快并健全国有资产法制建设、加大国有资产经营和监管的信息披露等措施,提高我国国有资产的监管效率。     

Investor efficiency in the face of takings

Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner.     

The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function

This paper examines the efficiency and price effects of mergers by applying a frontier profit function to data on bank megamergers. We find that merged banks experience a statistically significant 16 percentage point average increase in profit efficiency rank relative to other large banks. Most of the improvement is from increasing revenues, including a shift in outputs from securities to loans, a higher-valued product. Improvements were greatest for the banks with the lowest efficiencies prior to merging, who therefore had the greatest capacity for improvement. By comparison, the effects on profits from merger-related changes in prices were found to be very small.     

Regulatory ‘Balancing’ and the Efficiency of Green R&D

We identify and analyse several dynamic implications of setting environmental standards such as to balance marginal costs and benefits. The adoption of such a regulatory approach is shown to effect (i) the speed of improvement of abatement technologies; (ii) the direction (in a sense to be defined) of that improvement; (iii) its source and the distribution of the rents from it; and (iv) the rate of development of defensive (averting) technologies. Existing views are thoroughly synthesised in the context of a simple diagrammatic model, several new results are derived and at least one conventional wisdom questioned. The message of the analysis for legislators and regulators is that cost–benefit balancing should be done with care.     

Accounting regulation, inertia and organisational self-perception: Double-entry adoption in a Spanish casa de comercio (1829-1852)

This paper analyses the influence exerted by compulsory mechanisms and cognitive and social factors on the adoption and implementation of double-entry bookkeeping. The study focuses on a small, commercial and family owned company located in Spain in the period 1829-1852. As our main conclusion we suggest that the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping in 1851 was influenced more by the managers' self-perception as traders, and the belief (internal and environmental) that the company must employ an accounting method appropriate to its new commercial status, than by State pressures derived from the enactment of a new accounting regulation in 1829.     

Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

上市公司分部信息披露动因与约束

分部信息的披露主体主要是上市公司.公司出于竞争投资者有限的资金等目的有自愿披露分部信息的动因.由于分部信息披露存在成本,在没有管制的情况下,企业出于自身利益最大化考虑,将通过对收益和成本的权衡来决定分部信息披露.由于分部信息披露的外部性、分部信息分布的不对称性等,不能完全依赖于自愿披露,必须对分部信息披露进行适度的管制,强制公司披露分部信息.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

Advertising Bans, Monopoly, and Alcohol Demand: Testing for Substitution Effects using State Panel Data

Using a panel of 45 states for the period 1982–1997,this study analyzes the importance of severalrestrictive alcohol regulations, including advertising bans for billboards, bans of price advertising, state monopoly control of retail stores, and changes in the minimum legal drinking age. In contrast to previous research, the study allows for substitution among beverages as a response to a regulation that targets a specific beverage. A restrictive law that applies only to one beverage (or one form of advertising) can result in substitution toward other beverages (or non-banned media). Allowing for substitution means that the net effect on total alcohol consumption is uncertain, and must be determined empirically. The empirical results demonstrate that monopoly control of spirits reduces consumption of that beverage, and increases consumption of wine. The effect on beer is positive, but is not statistically significant. The net effect on total alcohol is significantly negative. Higher minimum legal drinking age laws have negative effects on beverage and total alcohol consumption. Bans of advertising do not reduce total alcohol consumption, which partly reflects substitution effects. The study thus demonstrates the possible unintended consequences of restrictive alcohol regulations.     

Hedging Housing Risk*

An unusually rich source of data on housing prices in Stockholm is used to analyze the investment implications of housing choices. This empirical analysis derives market-wide price and return series for housing investment during a 13-year period, and it also provides estimates of the individual-specific, idiosyncratic, variation in housing returns. Because the idiosyncratic component follows an autocorrelated process, the analysis of portfolio choice is dependent upon the holding period. We analyze the composition of household investment portfolios containing housing, common stocks, stocks in real estate holding companies, bonds, and t-bills. For short holding periods, the efficient portfolio contains essentially no housing. For longer periods, low-risk portfolios contain 15 to 50 percent housing. These results suggest that there are large potential gains from policies or institutions that would permit households to hedge their lumpy investments in housing. We estimate the potential value of hedges in reducing risk to households, yet yielding the same investment returns. The value is surprisingly large, especially to poorer homeowners.