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111.
The condition of information asymmetry between current owners and potential IPO investors creates a context wherein the legitimacy of the top management team (TMT) may serve as a valid signal of value to potential investors. The results confirm our hypotheses that TMT legitimacy is negatively correlated with post‐IPO stock value run‐up. Our results support a previously unexplored view of the TMT as an important signal of value in IPOs, and suggest that dual benefits accrue to the TMT selection process in IPO firms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
112.
This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information. 相似文献
113.
Robb Willer 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):189-190
The “collective action problem” describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding
contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse
off. I present a new solution to the collective action problem based on status. I argue that contributions to collective action increase an individual’s status in the group because contributions create
perceptions of high group motivation, defined as the relative value an individual places on group versus individual welfare. Individuals are predicted to receive
a variety of social and material benefits for their contributions to the group. These rewards can help explain why individuals
contribute to collective action.
Four laboratory studies tested the theory. In Study 1, following interaction in a 6-person public goods game, participants
reported viewing higher contributors as more group motivated and higher status. Higher contributors also wielded more interpersonal
influence in task interactions with participants. Participants also cooperated with higher contributors more, and allocated
greater altruism to them in a Dictator game. Study 2 addressed an exchange-theoretic alternative explanation for the findings
of Study 1, showing that observers of collective action who did not benefit from higher contributors’ contributions to the
public good, nonetheless rated them as higher status, cooperated with them more, and gave them greater altruistic gifts. These
results show that collective action contributors can earn social and material benefits even outside the group.
Study 3 more directly tested the mediating role of group motivation. Contributors who sacrificed a greater proportion of resources
for the collective action were rated as more group motivated and higher status than a moderate proportional contributor, even
though the amounts they contributed were the same. These findings support the theory, and underscore the significance of self-sacrifice
in the acquisition of status in collective action.
Study 4 investigated the effects of status rewards on contributors’ behavior towards and perceptions of the group. Participants
who received positive status feedback for their contributions subsequently contributed more than those who did not. Rewarded
participants also identified more with the group and saw it as having greater solidarity and cohesion. I conclude by discussing
theoretical implications and future research.
JEL Classification C71 相似文献
114.
115.
New business models combined with a lack of objective operating data result in significant information asymmetry and uncertainty in the valuation of new firms in emerging markets. Information asymmetry increases the risks of both adverse selection and moral hazard. When traditional differentiators of firm quality are lacking, such as in emerging economic sectors, markets may turn to secondary information sources to filter and sort firms. We investigate the roles played by observable corporate governance characteristics as indirect indicators of new firms' potential qualitative differences. Markets may sort firms based on such characteristics because they are perceived to be correlated with desired but unobservable characteristics and actions and they lower the risks of both adverse selection and moral hazard. Our study of publicly traded U.S. Internet firms found that firm market valuation was strongly associated with corporate governance characteristics (e.g., executive and director stock‐based incentives, institutional and blockholder stock ownership, board structure, and venture capital participation). In addition, firm age moderated how markets used some quality proxies to determine firm valuation during the post‐IPO period. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
116.
GUIDO SANDLERIS 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2014,46(2-3):321-345
Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in foreign and domestic credit to the domestic private sector. This paper analyzes theoretically whether sovereign defaults can lead to this decline, even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt. It also studies whether the quality of domestic financial institutions affect the magnitude of this effect. In order to address these issues, the paper embeds the traditional sovereign borrower/foreign creditors relationship of the sovereign debt literature in a macromodel where widespread individual financial constraints limit a country's ability to reallocate resources. The paper finds that sovereign defaults can indeed generate a decline in foreign and domestic credit even if domestic agents do not hold sovereign debt, and that stronger domestic financial institutions can amplify this effect. These findings constitute a new step toward understanding the costs of sovereign defaults. 相似文献
117.
118.
Iaki Heras‐Saizarbitoria Olivier Boiral Erlantz Allur María García 《Business Strategy and the Environment》2020,29(2):422-431
This article analyzes how organizations communicate their voluntary environmental management certification. Previous research suggests that firms use certification to signal and to create a better public image as one of their main objectives in adopting environmental management standards. How organizations communicate their certification to their stakeholders has not been fully researched. To fill this gap, this work focuses on the hospitality industry, one of the most relevant sectors for environmental certification, and Eco‐Management and Audit Scheme, one of the most demanding certification schemes. On the basis of the analysis of the communication practices of 201 certified European hotels and 37 interviews with managers from certified hotels, the findings are surprising. The great majority of organizations included in the study engage in no significant communication activity. The results cast doubt in the idea that improving corporate image is one of the main drivers to adopt third‐party voluntary certification. 相似文献
119.
This article introduces the concept of conspicuous anticonsumption and provides evidence that it can be an effective means for green demarketing brands to encourage anticonsumption. Conspicuous anticonsumption refers to practices whereby brands provide visible signals imbued with meaning that consumers use to convey environmental motivations for consumption reduction activities. Two experiments suggest that without a signal, observers perceive anticonsumers to have lower socioeconomic status. However, when a visible signal communicates environmental motivations for anticonsumption actions, negative status inferences are mitigated and perceptions of the associated brand become more favorable. These visible signals confer status and restore the symbolic benefits that are often lost when consumption is forgone. Because symbolic benefits are powerful drivers of consumption choices, conspicuous anticonsumption can appeal to a broader base of moderate consumers. This practice has the potential to reduce negative environmental impact on a societal level as well as have positive outcomes for the brand. Counter to the prosocial perspective taken in most anticonsumption literature and activist thinking, This study highlights the importance of focusing on the personal symbolic benefits and costs of anticonsumption at the individual level. 相似文献
120.
Research Summary: The ability of innovative firms to create and capture value depends on innovations that are quickly and widely adopted. Yet, stakeholder concerns can establish important barriers to diffusion. We study the human capital aspect of this challenge and investigate whether innovative firms pay salary premiums to new hires with work experience from advocacy groups like Transparency International. We integrate strategic human capital with stakeholder theory and suggest that advocacy group experience creates signals for valuable human capital in terms of stakeholder knowledge and legitimacy transfers to innovative firms. Using matched data for 3,562 employees in Denmark, we find that new hires with advocacy group experience enjoy larger salary premiums at technologically leading firms, in occupations with direct stakeholder interaction, and for advocacy group top management. Managerial Summary: Innovation research is increasingly aware of the non-technological factors behind successful innovations. Users, regulators, or public opinion can be benevolent supporters or stingy opponents of innovations. Employees with an understanding of the needs and sensitivities of societal stakeholders should therefore be valuable to innovative firms. We find this to be the case when innovative firms hire employees from advocacy groups representing such stakeholders (e.g., Transparency International). Such employees receive higher salaries than an otherwise comparable reference group. These findings indicate that recruiting needs of innovative firms reward stakeholder experience, not merely technological expertise. They demonstrate how firms can create value in the pursuit of the public interest. Further, advocacy groups emerge as an important career stage allowing individuals to develop credible signals for stakeholder expertise. 相似文献