送转行为、年报绩效信息与融资约束

基于我国上市公司数据,运用实证研究方法发现,送转行为是上市公司信息传递的有效机制,它有助于缓解我国上市公司由于管理者与其他利益相关者之间的信息不对称所造成的公司融资约束问题,特别是对于那些上年年报财务绩效不十分理想的受融资约束的公司,送转行为对缓解融资约束效果更为突出。我国上市公司的送转行为并非完全出于对市场投资者的迎合,而是一种有效的信号传递方式。在运用Heckman两步法控制了样本自选择问题之后,文章所得研究结论仍然成立。     

对NO.7信令实训教学的探讨

NO.7信令在通信网络中使用非常广泛,尤其在PSTN中。但我们在高职院校中采用惯常方式来讲解NO.7理论时,老师普遍感到教得很吃力,学生学得也很吃力。笔者认为:如果能在理论讲解时,能结合实训平台通过相应的呼叫接续实验来加强学生对NO.7信令的学习理解大有裨益。     

建立中国高速铁路技术体系的研究

介绍国外高速铁路发展概况，结合我国实际，对中国高速铁路工务工程、牵引供电、通信信号、高速动车组、信息系统及运用维修六大技术体系的主要技术条件、特点及其各项子技术体系进行论述，可为中国高速铁路的修建、运营作参考。     

Return predictability: The dual signaling hypothesis of stock splits

This paper aims to differentiate between optimistic splits and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits. Although markets do not distinguish between these two groups at the split announcement time, optimistic (overoptimistic/opportunistic) splits precede positive (negative) long‐term buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns. Using the calendar month portfolio approach, we show that the zero‐investment, ex ante identifiable, and fully implementable trading strategy proposed in this paper can generate economically and statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Our findings indicate that pre‐split earnings management and how it relates to managers’ incentives, is an omitted variable in the studies of post‐split long‐term abnormal returns.     

The Peripheral Halo Effect: Do Academic Spinoffs Influence Universities' Research Income?

Extant literature has drawn attention to the ‘halo effect’ of the good reputation of a core organizational activity on the outcome of a peripheral activity. We contribute to the literature on organizational reputation by illustrating a halo effect in the opposite direction – from the periphery to the core. We show that developing a reputation for a peripheral activity (in our context, universities' social impact via spinoffs) may have positive spillovers for core organizational activities (in our context, university research), a phenomenon we term the ‘peripheral halo effect'. We also show that this effect is more prominent for high‐status than for low‐status organizations. Our research also contributes to the academic‐entrepreneurship literature by revealing that spinoff portfolios can generate income for universities not only directly via equity positions but also indirectly via reputational benefits.     

Equity Undervaluation and Signaling Power of Share Repurchases with Legal Restrictions

This paper analyzes share repurchase programs, which are subject to specific legal restrictions in Taiwan, to determine whether the unique item repurchase price range conveys information regarding the degree of undervaluation and future prospects of a firm. We find that the price range conveys such information, not only about the past, but also the future. Companies with a higher upper bound of the repurchase price range experience better abnormal returns than do companies that do not. The lower bound of the price range does not efficiently convey the undervaluation effect, owing to the exemption clause in the announcement. Finally, the announced price range, in turn, conveys favorable information about the repurchasing firm and is a more powerful signal of future prospects than is the legal price range.     

The Differences Between Stock Splits and Stock Dividends: Evidence on the Retained Earnings Hypothesis

Abstract:  This paper investigates stock dividends and stock splits on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE), which is of interest because several of the more recent explanations for a stock market reaction can be ruled out. The main findings are that the announcement effect of stock dividends as well as stock splits is closely related to changes in a firm's payout policy, but that the relationship differs for the two types of events. A stock dividend implies an increase in nominal share capital and hence a decrease in retained earnings. Firms announcing stock dividends finance growth entirely by debt (explaining the need for an increase in nominal share capital) and retained earnings. Basically all firms announcing a stock dividend with a split factor of less than two can also afford to increase their total cash dividends permanently, at least proportionally to the increase in share capital, leading to a significant announcement effect of 4.23%. Firms announcing a stock dividend with a split factor of two or more also increase total cash dividends permanently, but less than proportionally to the increase in share capital. This leads to an insignificant announcement effect of 0.08%. These findings support a retained earnings/signaling hypothesis. For stock splits, no separate announcement effect was found when a firm's payout policy was controlled for. This lends support to the idea that a stock split per se is a cosmetic event on the CSE and is also consistent with the fact that making a stock split on the CSE is virtually cost free.     

Incentive Compensation and the Stock Price Response to Dividend Increase Announcements

Linking executive compensation to stock price performance is predicted to decrease the usual positive price response to dividend increases for two reasons. One, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) exacerbates managers' optimistic bias regarding future firm performance, reducing the credibility of dividend signals. Two, increasing pay‐performance sensitivity reduces the need for dividends as a means of reducing agency costs. Consistent with behavioral and agency theories of corporate finance, we find that price response does decrease as pay‐performance sensitivity increases and that this effect is concentrated in firms with low market‐to‐book ratios. Additional findings are most consistent with the agency cost explanation.     

Dividend Policy and Reputation

Abstract:  We examine the role of reputation when firms use dividends to signal their profitability. We analyze a signaling model in which reputation plays no role in equilibrium. We then show that taking reputation into account as a link between sequential dividend decisions makes it possible to endogenize signaling costs and obtain a separating equilibrium. Lastly, we use the reversibility hypothesis and assume that in each period, managers can reverse their choices in terms of dividend distribution. We find that in most cases, the signaling equilibrium becomes unstable, causing any dividend signaling policy to become difficult to implement.     

Restructuring as a signal: a simple formalization

Several studies have stressed that, contrary to initial expectations, state-owned firms at the beginning of the transition undertook painful measures to adjust to the new economic environment. This paper investigates this behaviour in a simple game theoretic framework. It is argued that the massive amount of lay-offs created by state-owned firms during the initial phase of the transition can be interpreted as a signal directed to the banking sector in order to obtain more favourable financing conditions for the subsequent process of restructuring. The conclusions are strongly supported by Polish firm-level empirical evidence.
JEL classification: P31, C72.