Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

风险投资项目筛选阶段的创业企业家风险规避

创业企业家是创业企业的灵魂,也是风险投资项目筛选的重要影响因子。博弈模型描述了风险投资项目筛选对创业企业家类型的依赖,并针对创业企业家可能存在的信息不对称风险,从信息获取、信号传递、契约机制、制度环境完善等方面,提供了一系列服务于风险投资项目筛选阶段风险规避的经验性的对策和建议。     

基于声誉信息效应的战略伙伴逆向选择抑制研究

企业声誉传递了企业内在特征信息,能为潜在的战略伙伴提供有效的识别信号,从而抑制战略联盟伙伴的逆向选择。本文将声誉引入信号传递博弈模型,证明在声誉成本函数下,声誉信号可以使该博弈产生一个分离均衡,由此分析阐释了联盟企业可以利用声誉信号识别战略伙伴的机理与过程。     

高校扩招后果的经济学分析--基于劳动市场信号发送理论的研究

文章运用劳动市场信号发送理论,分析近年来我国高校大规模扩招所产生的社会经济后果。其基本观点是:在假设教育只具有能力信号功能的前提下,扩招提高了就业门槛,导致教育信号的过度投资,这是雇主和雇员互动博弈的结果。若引入教育的生产力功能,扩招使特质对应的教育水平分布区间加大,原来教育水平可以分离的特质分布区间降低,意味着本科教育的信号区分功能减弱。高能力的本科生为了分离自己会选择更高的教育信号(如研究生),或是追求名校、特殊资质证书等其他信号,教育信号投资的激励增强。如果高校不断扩招,则会形成教育信号投资的不断攀升,并最终导致教育过度。     

Stock market reaction to CEO certification: the signaling role of CEO background

As a direct result of the corporate scandals that started with Enron and led to general unrest in the financial markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission required chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers of large publicly traded companies to certify their financial statements. Using market signaling theory, we propose that attributes of the CEO send important signals to the investment community as to the credibility of the CEO certification and thus the quality of the firm's financial statements, which in turn impact the stock market reaction to the CEO certification. We find that a CEO's shareholdings and external directorships are positively related to the abnormal returns of CEO certification. Further, the stock market penalizes a firm with a CEO who is associated with the firm's prior financial restatement and rewards a firm with a CEO who is appointed after the firm's prior financial restatement. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Signaling Product Quality by Price

This paper analyzes the role of price as a signal of the quality of a monopoly firm's new product. The quality of the goods is drawn from a continuum and is unknown to consumers. We establish a unique separating equilibrium using equilibrium characterization results for signaling games. The equilibrium price monotonically increases with quality levels and exceeds the complete-information monopoly price for all quality levels but the lowest one. However, the upward distortion decreases as the proportion of pre-informed consumers increases. These results extend both the signaling role of price and characteristics of the separating equilibrium as established in Bagwell and Riordan (1991).     

大股东控制与资产注入：基于信号博弈的分析

为了解析上市公司资产注入的动机和影响因素,考虑到大股东与外部中小投资者可能选择不同的策略,应用信号博弈理论研究了企业资产注入的动机以及大股东与外部中小投资者之间的博弈关系。博弈分析结果表明：大股东对上市公司的控制力度、企业的持续发展能力以及公司治理环境和资本市场效率都会影响到双方的博弈均衡结果。完善的资本市场,良好的公司治理机制,是实现资产注入信号传递分离均衡的必要条件,分离均衡的存在使得投资者可以有效甄别企业的类型,并进行有效的投资决策。而差的公司治理机制和资本市场环境将可能产生资 产注入信号传递出现混同均衡结果,使得资本市场无法真正区分企业的类型,进而影响投资者的理性投资决策。     

Opportunistic Behaviour and Trust: Experimental Results from Broccoli Farmers in Ecuador

Linking smallholder farmers to high‐value markets through contract farming has become an important strategy to increase farm incomes in developing countries. However, various forms of opportunistic behaviour have been reported, threatening the sustainability of inclusive supply chains. When formal institutions are weak, informal codes of conduct like trust can be important complements to facilitate market transactions. We explore the effect of opportunistic behaviour on farmers’ trust, using a field‐framed trust experiment with prior signaling with small‐scale farmers in Ecuador. These farmers are linked to different types of markets, including high‐value export chains, and have been exposed to varying levels of opportunistic behaviour in the past. Our unique dataset allows us to control for self‐selection of game participants. We find that a positive signal triggers a positive response increasing trust, while a negative signal has no effect – possibly reflecting very low overall trust levels. In settings where market linkages have failed previously, ex‐ante credible positive signals could help to build trust and encourage small farmers’ participation in sustainable value chains.     

Costly Signaling: Asian Americans and the Role of Ethnicity in the Willingness to Pay More for Socially Responsible Products

The present study applies motivated reasoning and costly signaling theory to examine whether consumers transfer stereotypical race-related attributes to their evaluations of companies' socially responsible advertisements. The study compares corporate socially responsible advertisements featuring different model races and cultural cues in order to meet consumers' motives to impress others by supporting CSR initiatives. Results (N = 754) of a 2 × 2 × 4 experiment reveal that strong ethnic identifiers among Asian Americans are more likely to make a costly signaling behavior when ads feature a white model with white cultural cues by attributing higher social status to whites' images, which is mediated by conspicuous consumption motives. Interestingly, ethnic identification among white Americans is also a strong predictor in making costly signaling behavior with socially responsible products.     

企业配股申请与政府门槛监管措施的动态博弈均衡

文章运用信息博弈动态均衡模型,对企业的配股申请与政府监管的关系进行了分析,结果表明过于严格的监管会造成企业虚假披露愈演愈烈,而政府监管机构不断提高监管水平,企业也不断提高造假水平,监管机构的高门槛措施无法有效分离投资型企业和投机型企业,除非监管机构能够增加信息包装的成本,使得投资型企业在发送投资型信号时最有利,而投机型企业发送投机型信号时能使自身利益最大化,从而实现两者的分离.