关于森林认证本质的探讨

探讨森林认证的本质对我国森林认证发展具有现实意义。森林认证的本质主要体现在市场机制、信息传递机制、学习机制3个方面。森林认证作为市场机制的含义是指森林认证是林产品生产和消费者的外部性通过市场内部化的一个过程,同时森林认证是以市场为驱动的机制;森林认证还是一种减少信息不对称的信息传递机制;森林认证作为一种学习机制是指生态知识、技术、经营实践等可以在不同的参与方之间转移。从森林认证这3种本质出发,对我国森林认证体系的建设和政府在森林认证中的作用等提出了相应的建议。     

电子商务中消费者权益保护的经济分析

在电子商务环境下 ,经营者和消费者的信息不对称尤其严重 ,这使得电子商务中的消费者权益保护问题更为突出。采用不完全信息的动态博弈模型对电子商务中的消费者权益保护问题进行深入的分析 ,同时 ,为了减少电子商务中经营者和消费者之间的信息不对称 ,以维护电子商务中消费者的权益 ,必须制定相应措施     

我国遭遇贸易摩擦的积极效应分析

随着改革开放的深化发展,中国逐步成为世界贸易大国,贸易摩擦也不可避免。中国遭遇的贸易摩擦具有发生频率高、涉及范围广、冲击程度深等特征,对中国经济发展产生了较大的负面影响。此外,中国遭遇摩擦也具有学习积累效应、信号传递效应、改革推动效应等潜在积极效应。中国必须加快培育自主创新企业群、激发经济增长新动能、推动国际多边经贸合作、完善国际贸易摩擦应对机制,促进贸易摩擦的潜在积极效应转变为现实趋势,化解贸易摩擦带来的不利影响。     

Building a competitive advantage based on transparency: When and why does transparency matter for corporate social responsibility?

Customers today are increasingly demanding transparency from firms. This article discusses the concept of performance transparency and explores when and why transparency plays a key role for a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) effectiveness. In doing so, it addresses consumer skepticism as the logic of the transparency-CSR interaction and presents empirical evidence of the effect. It also discusses key principles for managing performance transparency effectively. Companies should monitor and track performance transparency regularly, initiate consistent transparency practices along with CSR activities, pay attention to the types of information made available, and adapt the transparency practices to the involvement level.     

Do as You Say,or I Will: Retail signal congruency in buy-online-pickup-in-store and negative word-of-mouth

Buy-online-pickup-instore (BOPIS) services have become an increasingly important part of a retailer's omnichannel strategy. When service failures (e.g., stock-out) occur, consumers may resort to negative word-ofmouth (NWOM) to share their evaluation of the retailer's BOPIS service. While a retailer's service recovery policies (e.g., cross-channel substitution) may help to fulfill its service intent, the extent to which these two signals can improve consumer satisfaction and diminish their NWOM intent remains unknown. Drawing from both service recovery literature and signaling theory, we conducted a series of five experiments and find that the intradimensional congruity of the signal set communicated by the retailer during its BOPIS service process depends on both its operational capability and the consumer's own predilection regarding the product category. These insights collectively indicate that while a retailer's operations need to support service policies to provide a congruous BOPIS service process, substitution policies offered to consumers during the transaction need to consider the extent to which a consumer's purchase decision is hedonic or utilitarian. In turn, this finding suggests that a retailer's category management needs to consider BOPIS substitution in terms of both product assortment and inventory policies.     

企业社会责任报告语调与分析师预测：信号还是迎合？

运用文本分析方法提取了2010—2018年上市公司社会责任报告的文本语调信息，基于信号理论和迎合理论探讨企业社会责任报告语调对分析师预测的影响。研究发现，企业社会责任报告的净正面语调降低了分析师预测偏差和分析师预测分歧度，并且在分析师预测存在乐观偏差时这种作用更加显著。进一步分析发现，企业社会责任报告语调对分析师预测的积极作用仅发生在强制披露和不遵守可持续发展报告指南的企业中以及经验较少、非明星分析师中。经济后果检验发现，社会责任报告语调通过降低分析师预测偏差和分歧度缓解了公司股价崩盘风险。研究结论不仅有助于丰富非财务信息披露经济后果和分析师预测影响因素两个领域的学术文献，而且可以为监管部门合理规范企业社会责任报告披露和投资者有效利用企业社会责任报告中的语调信息提供有益借鉴。     

Do employers avoid hiring workers from poor neighborhoods? Experimental evidence from the real labor market*

We investigate whether employers avoid hiring workers who live in neighborhoods with low socio-economic status and/or with long commuting times. In a large-scale field experiment in the Swedish labor market, we sent more than 4,000 fictitious résumés, with randomly assigned information about the applicants' residential locations, to firms with advertised vacancies. Our findings show that commuting time has a negative effect on the likelihood of being contacted by an employer, while the socio-economic status of a neighborhood does not appear to be important. These results offer guidance for policymakers who are responsible for reversing segregation patterns.     

The virtuous brand: The perils and promises of brand virtue signaling

Signaling how virtuous a brand is has become an ever more common strategy. Brands have recently outcompeted one another to align themselves with various causes. We explore the rise in virtue signaling and review prominent examples of brands that have linked themselves to social movements—some successfully, some unsuccessfully. We draw on evolutionary theory to develop a conceptual framework to think about brand virtue signaling. Armed with this framework, managers can assess whether their brands should adopt virtue signaling as a strategy and assess the short- and long-term implications of such a decision.     

Monetary incentives and social ties in academic publications

Monetary incentives underlie academic publications, especially in countries where many researchers' incomes are performance-based. Evidence has documented that social ties improve the chances of publication in journals, whereas building and maintaining social ties require resources. We develop a simple model to investigate the consequences of monetary investment on the probability of publication through social ties. The results indicate that monetary incentive can stimulate researchers to make more efforts regarding publication. Through social ties, monetary investment in the process of academic publication distorts researchers' incentive. Monetary investment through social ties improves the probability of publication and then disables the signaling function of publication in terms of researchers’ abilities. Depending on the contribution of different types of researchers to society and the ability of the latter to differentiate the quality of publication in journals, the improvement in publication probability by monetary investment through social ties may improve or reduce the level of social welfare.     

Restatement costs and reporting bias

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. We explore why rational managers engage in misreporting despite the costly consequences. To guide our analysis, we build a parsimonious model of reporting bias and the cost of restating. In our model, the observed cost of a restatement conveys information about the true cost of biasing financial statements, which the manager incorporates into the optimal choice of bias. A restatement hence offers managers an opportunity to learn about the true cost of reporting bias, which allows them to update their biasing strategy if the observed cost differs from the expected. We test the model's predictions by analyzing how firms' accruals quality changes after observing the costs attached to restating, which we measure as the market loss following a restatement scaled by the restatement's net income effect. We find that future accruals quality is increasing in the cost of restating and the change in the cost of restating. Consistent with our stylized model, our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve their future bias strategy.