Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis*

This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used. We thus reject the hypothesis that education is not used as a signal in the hiring process.     

Geographic distance and corporate acquisitions: signals from IPO firms

This paper examines acquisitions of firms after they have undergone initial public offerings (IPOs). Combining insights from information economics with recent research on geographic distance in various market settings, the analysis investigates whether the presence or absence of different signals on IPO firms has an impact on the geographic proximity of acquirers. The central proposition we develop and test is that specific characteristics of IPOs—venture capitalist backing, investment bank reputation, and underpricing of issued shares—convey signals on these firms, which can facilitate acquisitions by more remote acquirers who are more likely to face the risk of adverse selection. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

企业并购的信号博弈分析

井购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动，是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业井购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择，企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态，其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型，提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。     

Bank Managers' Heterogeneous Decisions on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions

This study examines bank managers' three major motivations for discretionary behavior with respect to loan loss provisions: signaling, income smoothing, and capital management. To do so, it utilizes a bank-specific time-series regression approach that captures heterogeneity in the banks' priorities and strategies for alternative motives and compares the results to those from alternative model specifications. The statistical tests and results presented in this study lead to three conclusions. First, significant results for the income smoothing hypothesis are robust to the various model specifications. Second, average signaling coefficients estimated from bank-specific regressions are systematically larger than corresponding coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions and are statistically significant. Finally, bank managers appear to use loan loss provisions to manage their regulatory capital levels by comparing them with the minimum ratios specified by regulators rather than with a time-series bank-specific ratio or pooled time-series cross-sectional mean ratio.     

Signaling Power of Open Market Share Repurchases in Germany

This paper shows that abnormal stock price returns around the date of open market repurchase announcements are four times higher in Germany than in the USA (12 ver. 3%). We hypothesize that this observation can be explained by national differences in repurchase regulations. Our empirical evidence indicates that German managers primarily buy back shares to signal an undervaluation of their firm. We demonstrate that the stringent repurchase process prescribed by German law attributes a higher credibility to undervaluation signals than do the lax US regulations, and thereby corroborates our hypothesis.Financial support from the E-Finance Lab, Frankfurt am Main, and from Freitag & Co., Frankfurt am Main, is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

Social Capital and the Linkages of High-Tech Companies to the Military Defense System: Is there a Signaling Mechanism?

This study investigates linkages of new Israeli high-tech companies to the military and defense system. We examine the impact of social capital, signaling, and learning spillovers on resource acquisition in terms of investments and the financial performance of companies with and without linkages. Social capital, signaling, and learning spillovers are examined as they impact individual and organizational resource acquisition and performance of 200 new Israeli high-tech companies. The study contributes to the existing literature of entrepreneurship by suggesting the relevance of knowledge spillovers, signaling theory and social capital to the context of the interface between defense and civilian spheres.     

What you see is meaningful: Does green advertising change the intentions of consumers to purchase eco-labeled products?

Consumers are increasingly worried that their current consumption patterns have negative environmental impacts, which in turn shapes their green purchase intentions. Based on the signaling theory and stimulus–organism–response model, the purpose of this research is to construct a theoretical framework to understand consumer intentions to buy eco-labeled products. Empirical results from 671 questionnaires show that as expected, green advertising receptivity positively affects intention, and the relationship between green advertising receptivity and intention is also moderated by promotion focus and mediated by system trust and personal trust. However, the relationship between green advertising receptivity and purchase intention is not moderated by prevention focus. Hence, this research suggests that stakeholders should conduct truthful green advertising campaigns to dispel consumer suspicion and target different consumers with different green advertising and marketing campaigns to increase sales.     

Will We Ever Meet Again? The Relationship between Inter-Firm Managerial Migration and the Circulation of Client Ties

A large body of research shows that the migration of managers from one professional service firm to another weakens the old employer’s relationship with its clients, because migrating managers remove their relationship-specific knowledge and expertise – i.e., human and social capital – from their old employers, redeploying it to their new employers. This study extends this research by introducing a bi-directional perspective of social capital in which both firms and managers may exploit these relationship-specific resources. We use theory on social capital to build arguments about how one form of manager mobility, manager migration between two service providers in a single market, can both lead and lag the movement of client ties between those providers, and signaling theory to hypothesize the conditions under which this is likely to occur. Analyses using longitudinal data on New York City advertising agencies generally support our arguments. Our findings contribute to theory and research on manager migration, social capital, and signaling, and raise new questions for how the portability of relationship-specific social capital shapes markets.     

Human capital acquisition as a competitive response to the promotion distortion

Waldman shows that under the assumption that prospective employers observe whether a worker was promoted, but cannot observe his ability, the promotion policy is inefficient. In the current paper, we show that human capital acquisition made after the players (both worker and employer) observe the worker's ability reduces this inefficiency, even though such an investment is not optimal in some setups.