Stock vs. stock-warrant units: evidence from seasoned offerings

Recent theories based on sequential financing and information signaling reveal a special role for warrants. Data from initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock-warrant units have been used to test the theories, and we extend the analysis to seasoned offerings. Consistent with predictions from both families of theories, we find that issues made by smaller and younger firms are more likely to involve stock-warrant units, and firms with greater stock price volatility are more likely to issue units in seasoned offerings. Moreover, firms with relatively high levels of long-term debt, and those whose issues are underwritten by less prestigious underwriters are more likely to employ stock-warrant unit financing. Consistent with information signaling, we find that firms with high managerial ownership are more likely to issue units. Firms that include warrants in their stock offerings are predicted to have experienced higher abnormal stock returns than if they had issued shares alone. Thus, consistent with both theoretical explanations, some firms can reduce capital costs by adding warrants to shares in seasoned offerings.     

Loan Loss Provisions,Earnings, Capital Management and Signalling: Evidence from Indian Banks1

Abstract

The debate on bank capital regulation has in recent years devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions play as a part of the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. The paper examines this issue in the Indian context, exploring the available evidence about bank loan loss provisioning in the Indian context. Using data on Indian banks for 1997–2005, evidence is found in favour of both earnings and capital management by Indian banks.     

上市公司股利政策对盈余管理的影响及相应的市场反应

本文基于私有信息传递的视角,以2003-2010年上海证券交易所A股市场上的上市公司为研究样本,检验了上市公司现金股利政策对盈余管理的影响及其相应的市场反应。统计结果显示,与其他公司相比,现金分红的公司倾向于上调应计利润即有正向盈余管理的偏好,并且市场能够识别出这类上市公司的盈余管理行为,分红预案公布期间现金分红公司股票的累积异常收益率与盈余管理变量是正相关的。     

金融监管的博弈分析

文章将监管辨证理论和资本监管理论结合起来,运用动态博弈模型研究中国金融监管制度,提出有效规范、化解金融风险的若干建议。     

基于软交换的容错7号信令协议栈的设计与实现

在近几年涌现的各种通信新技术中,以软交换技术为核心的下一代网络技术无疑是众多新技术创新的亮点之一。在软交换系统架构中,信令网关是实现PSTN和IP网络信令互通的核心关键设备。提出了一种应用于软交换系统中信令网关的容错7号信令协议栈的设计与实现方法,应用该协议栈构建的高可用的信令网关,适应了软交换系统下电信级信令网关的高可用性设计要求。     

信号发送、投资者识别与私募股权资本市场

基于金融市场上广泛存在的信息不对称,本文构造了信号发送和投资者识别能力的市场反应函数模型。分析发现,私募股权资本市场能够通过降低信息不对称程度,达到减少新项目潜在租金的消散、降低创业企业家的创业风险以及投资者能从与创业企业家的合作中分享租金的目的。本文的研究表明,私募股权资本市场是金融市场的重要组成部分,是经济发展的重要推动力。     

Windfalls of emperors' sojourns: Stock market reactions to Chinese firms hosting high‐ranking government officials

Research summary: We contribute to the corporate political activity (CPA ) literature by showing that investors value companies that host visits of high‐ranking government officials (P resident and P remier). We argue that investors may value host official visits for two reasons: (1) the signal received about possibility of firm accessing government‐controlled resources via promotion or protection; and (2) the certification effect from such high‐powered visitors elevating the firm's reputation and legitimacy. Results from an event study analysis of 84 high‐ranking government official visits in C hina from 2003 to 2011 indicate that investors responded positively to host firms as reflected by stock market performance. Furthermore, the greatest positive reactions accrued to firms experiencing weaker prior period financial performance and to firms that are privately compared to state‐controlled . Managerial summary: Do visits by high‐ranking government officials influence firm stock market performance? Studying a sample of C hinese public firms that hosted 84 visits by the C hinese P resident and the P remier from 2003 to 2011, we find that investors reacted positively to such visits compared with a group of non‐host firms from the same industry and with similar financial performance and size. In addition, firms with weaker prior financial performance and private firms benefit the most from hosting such visits. Our findings imply that hosting visits of high‐ranking government officials can signal future government‐controlled resource inflows and boost host firms' reputation and legitimacy . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above the critical mass, and an increasing returns version in which payoffs keep increasing for values above the critical mass. We test the predictive power of security and payoff-dominance under different information treatments. Our results show that convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium is the modal limit outcome when players have full information about others' previous round choices, while this outcome never occurs in the remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the efficient equilibrium in a step-like manner. Moreover, the frequency and speed of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially depend on players' willingness to signal to others the choice of the action supporting the efficient equilibrium.     

基于信号博弈的并购定价策略研究

文章对并购、并购定价理论作了引述,略述了信号博弈的基本概念。主要分析了并购定价的信号博弈过程,并利用信号博弈分析了并购定价博弈的分离均衡、混同均衡、准分离均衡,同时还考虑了后验信念调整的具体情况。