The impact of environmental regulation on Chinese spatial development

We examine the relationship between environmental regulation and spatial development in China. Exploiting changes in national pollution standards for three industries, ammonia, paper and cement, we measure the impact of environmental regulation on industry productivity. Our results suggest that national pollution standards do not affect industry productivity, but they reallocate productivity spatially. We show that regulated industries located in developing cities increase their productivity compared to similar industries in other cities. This means that environmental regulation affects the spatial distribution of technology in China and might influence long‐term spatial development by reducing geographical disparities.     

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

Inter-industry labor reallocation and task distance

This paper investigates factors preventing inter-industry labor reallocation by estimating the determinants of inter-industry worker flow and earnings change after a job change. We find that the difference in required tasks is an important reason for earnings reduction after an inter-industry job change, and thus, workers may hesitate to move to industries requiring a different set of tasks for fear of losing the wage premium acquired by task-specific human capital. In addition, more workers switch to industries with which their previous industry had larger transactions, although it affects earnings changes only marginally. On the other hand, industry performance does not affect labor inflow or wage changes significantly for inter-industry job changes. Young men, less educated women, and those quitting previous jobs for family or health reasons are more likely to move to industries requiring a different set of tasks, and young individuals who lost their jobs involuntarily are less likely to do so. Individuals more likely to move are not necessarily those whose earnings loss associated with the move is small: earning losses associated with task distance are relatively small among younger and less educated workers and are uncorrelated with the reasons for quitting the previous job.     

Investor protection,regulation and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks’ risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and private monitoring, whereas as investor protection factors, we consider the level of shareholder and creditor protection. We find that banking regulation moderates the positive direct influence of investor protection on banks’ risk, while investor protection reinforces the negative direct influence of banking regulation on risk. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of national regulations on banks’ risk is more pronounced during systemic crisis years. Finally, taking into account market competition, we argue that private monitoring only has a direct effect on banks’ risk, whereas the effects of capital stringency and activity restriction are channeled through market competition.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.     

发达国家第三方物流政府规制的法律问题研究及对我国的启示

介绍了我国以及美国、日本第三方物流政府规制及法律现状,并指出应构建系统的第三方物流法律规制体系,强化政府规制的法治性,同时构建法制经济体系,推进第三方物流市场化改革政策取向,转变政府职能,逐步下放行政审批权,让我国第三方物流业的发展真正走向法治化的道路。     

Land use regulation and urban land value: Evidence from China

Land use regulation has always been regarded as one of the most crucial means of macro-control of urban growth, which can affect a city’s land values directly and further determine related urban economic well-being. Since the New Type Urbanization Strategy proposed by the government in 2014, China’s mode of urban growth has been transformed from addressing “quantity” to “quality" in the urbanization process. In this case, the regulation of land use by the Chinese government plays a more important role in urban growth. With their planned land regulatory scheme, the various instruments employed by Chinese governments have quite different mechanisms influencing land prices. However, there are no rigorous studies focusing on the land use regulation system and its impact on land values to date, particular in China. This study seeks to explore how land use regulation affects urban land values through the systematic lens. We summarize the main land use regulatory instruments based on the analysis of China’s planned land use system and urban land banking system, including the construction land quota, constraints on the allowed floor area ratio (FAR) of each land transaction parcel, and land supply restrictions. A new dataset based on land transaction data from 2007 to 2016 that covers 286 prefectural cities from the country’s coastal, central, and western regions is used in the empirical analysis. The results show that the effects of the floor area ratio (FAR) on land values are significant and positive, with the residential and commercial land supply ratio being a key factor. Moreover, the results imply that the effects of constraints on FAR and commercial land supply vary between regions. These findings indicate that the Chinese land market is considerably distorted by excessive administrative interventions by local governments, in the stage of urban transition guided, the capable regulatory instruments could play an important role in adjusting urban land prices and hence impact on urban growth.     

When companies improve the sustainability of the natural environment: A study of large U.S. companies

In light of the call for companies to abandon current approaches to environmental management, this study adds to the environmental strategy literature and uses the evidence of competitive dynamics among companies to identify a mechanism by which companies invest in proactive environmental strategies and thereby improve the sustainability of the natural environment. An examination utilizing fixed effects regressions on a sample of large U.S.‐based companies reveal that even after controlling the number, environmental and financial performance of leading (environmental) companies, laggard (environmental) companies are more likely to invest in proactive environmental strategies when their leading peers display higher sustainability orientations. Neither the expectation of government regulation nor social movement pressure was found to be influential in this relationship. Therefore, the future dominance of companies' investments in the sustainability of the natural environment will be driven by companies themselves as long as competitive advantages are expected.     

Security regulations,access to capital markets,and firm performance: Evidence from China

This study explores the cost of security regulations in China, where firms are required to meet a certain profitability benchmark before applying for permission to raise more equity via secondary equity offerings (SEOs). Using a difference-in-differences setting, we show that firms affected by the regulation (i.e., firms with high external financing demands (EFD) but profitability lower than the regulatory requirement) significantly underperform their counterparts, while unaffected firms do not. The affected firms’ performance decline increases (decreases) when the requirement of profitability is more (less) restricted. Consistently, the three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of firms with high EFD is significantly negative (positive) when the regulation is tightened (loosened). Our study provides evidence on how the cost of regulation affects companies that have growth opportunities.